10 thoughts for your mobile device policy:
http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2012/02/10-thoughts-for-your-mobile-device.html
10 thoughts for your mobile device policy:
http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2012/02/10-thoughts-for-your-mobile-device.html
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Disability discrimination law in Ohio is a mess:
http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2012/01/disability-discrimination-law-in-ohio.html
See also Courts are finally starting to apply ADAAA—and it ain’t pretty:
http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2012/03/courts-are-finally-starting-to-apply.html
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“Friending” co-workers depends on your level of organizational risk tolerance:
http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2012/01/friending-co-workers-depends-on-your.html
See also Latest stats about supervisors being “Facebook friends” with employees reveals interesting generational data:
http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2012/02/latest-stats-about-supervisors-being.html
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Trying to make sense of the NLRB’s lastest social media missive? Good luck:
http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2012/01/trying-to-make-sense-of-nlrbs-lastest.html
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Where were you in 1983? I was in the 5th grade at Loesche Elementary School in Northeast Philly. I’ll get back to 1983 in a second.
Today is my daughter’s last day of kindergarten. Her (amazing) teacher (see #13 below) assigned the class a time capsule project. Each child had to answer 14 questions, which, along with a letter from mom and dad, will be sealed in a time capsule, to be opened at their graduation in 2024. Here’s my daughter’s submission:
When I posted this photo to Facebook, one of my grade school classmates reminded me of the time capsule our 5th grade class buried in 1983. He even had the article from The Jewish Times discussing the project (page 1 / page 2). For the record, I sacrificed the instruction manual from our Smurfs ColecoVision game. I’m not sure what’s more shocking, that I’m admitting to owning a Smurfs game, or that people paid $569.99 for a VCR (check out the Sound Odyssey ad at the bottom of page 2, and bonus points to anyone who can name any other store that was in the Leo Mall).
I am taking a much needed vacation next week. Enjoy some of my greatest hits spanning the past 6 months. I’ll be back on June 11 with brand new content.
Thanks to Tom Mighell for featuring me on Wednesday as the Blawg of the Day at Inter Alia. Tom’s blawg is one of the originals, dating all the way back to 2002. It’s always nice to be recognized by one of the trailblazers.
Here’s the rest of what I read this week:
Discrimination
Litigation
Social Media & Workplace Technology
HR & Employee Relations
Wage & Hour
Labor Relations
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Oh! what a tangled web we weave
When first we practice to deceive!
– Walter Scott, Marmion, Canto VI, Stanza 17 (1808)
Yesterday, NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon issued his third report on social media cases brought to the agency [pdf]. This report focuses entirely on “policies governing the use of social media by employees.” If you read the employment law blogs today, my guess is that you will find a whole bunch of management-side employment bloggers critical of Mr. Solomon (Molly DiBianca, Eric Meyer, and Dan Schwartz, for starters). Allow me to add my name to the mix. I apologize in advance for my treatise-length post.
As you might recall, I was very critical of Mr. Solomon’s 2nd report in its treatment of employer policies. Has the Acting GC solved any conundrums for employers with his latest missive? Can a company draft a social media policy with any teeth that the NLRB will conclude passes muster? Don’t count on it. In fact, Mr. Solomon's latest missive is as galling of a piece of legal analysis I have ever read. It's nothing short of intellectual dishonesty masquerading as hair splitting. How else can you explain the following razor-thin distinctions?
Other baffling illegal policies?
Mr. Solomon also invalidated various “savings clauses,” including one that provided:
This policy is for the mutual protection of the company and our employees, and we respect an individual’s rights to self-expression and concerted activity. This policy will not be interpreted or applied in a way that would interfere with the rights of employees to self organize, form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from engaging in such activities.
This unlawful policy is not all that different from the workplace posting that the NLRB wanted to have in every break room in America, yet it’s not good enough for any employer’s social media policy? Where is the logic and consistency? This is the exact breed of intellectual relativism that makes me furious.
Here’s the kicker. If challenged, Mr. Solomon would have to take issue with his own agency’s internal social media policy. Thanks to Mike VanDervort’s The Human Race Horses and Human Resources Executive Online, we can take a peek at the NLRB’s own social media policy, which prohibits: “Comments that the NLRB Office of Public Affairs deems inappropriate.” How is the NLRB’s own policy substantively different than any of the policies Mr. Solomon thinks are overly restrictive of employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity?
So, what’s the takeaway? The NLRB’s position on social media policies remains an absolute mess. If anything, it’s more confusing now than before Mr. Solomon issued his 3rd report. Employers need to be able to adopt bright line rules to guide their employees towards proper conduct. Yet, this report puts employers in the dangerous position of being fearful of drawing even the simplest of lines. The result, I’m afraid, is that businesses won’t adopt any rules, creating online anarchy among their employees.
As a emerging communication tool, social media is unstructured enough. Do we really want to create unnecessary legal impediments to disincentivize employers from drafting the rules their employees desperately need?
Perhaps the answer for employers lies in this policy, which Mr. Solomon concluded was lawful:
Use your best judgment and exercise personal responsibility. Take your responsibility as stewards of personal information to heart. Integrity, Accountability and Respect are core [Employer] values. As a company, [Employer] trusts—and expects—you to exercise personal responsibility whenever you participate in social media or other online activities. Remember that there can be consequences to your actions in the social media world—both internally, if your comments violate [Employer] policies, and with outside individuals and/or entities. If you’re about to publish, respond or engage in something that makes you even the slightest bit uncomfortable, don’t do it.
Think before you click? My four-word social media policy might be a whole lot closer to reality.
Epilogue: If you scroll down to the last 3 pages of Mr. Solomon’s report, you will find a form social media policy on which the NLRB signed off. If you want to err on the side of abundant caution, this policy is the one you should be using (with the input of your attorney). Until the federal courts weigh in on this issue, however, we will have to live in world of uncertainty over the permissible scope, reach, and breadth of social media and other workplace communication policies.
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Hot off the presses, NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon has issued his third report on social media cases brought to the agency [pdf]. This report focuses entirely on “policies governing the use of social media by employees.” I am digesting the report and will share my thoughts first thing tomorrow morning. Here’s a preview: if you are holding your breath for a sign that the NLRB will allow employers to draw lines to guide employees about what’s right and wrong (or permissible and impermissible), you will suffocate.
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Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel [pdf], decided last week by the Ohio Supreme Court, is a pretty straight-forward case. In this case, four ex-employees claimed that Acordia could not enforce their non-competition agreements. They argued that the under the plain language of their covenants, the agreements were limited to the predecessor employer, and that there were no allowances in the agreements for a successor entity such as Acordia, which had acquired the original employer.
The Supreme Court agreed:
The agreements defined the “Company” only as “Frederick Rauh & Company,” the predecessor employer. Because the agreements did not extend the definition of “Company” to include successor entities, Acordia could not enforce them. Simply, the agreements lacked any language that specifically assigned rights to the new company….
The noncompete agreements between the employees and their original employers specified that they applied only to the specific companies that had originally hired each employee. Because the agreements made no provision for the continuation of the agreement upon any acquisition of the original company by another company, the agreements are not enforceable by the L.L.C. according to the agreements’ original terms past the two-year noncompete period agreed to by the employees and their original employers.
In other words, if have any current non-competition agreements that operate under Ohio law, you need to review them to ensure that they allow for successor entities. Otherwise, even a simple change in corporate structure could render your agreement unenforceable.
Going forward, non-competition agreements should:
Luckily for employers, Ohio law provides that continued employment is sufficient consideration to support a non-competition agreement. In other words, you should be contacting your counsel to review all non-competition agreements for compliance with the Acordia case, and redrafting and reissuing to employees where necessary.
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It was only a matter of time before Ohio joined the list of states to introduce legislation that would prohibit employers from asking for social media passwords. Senate Bill 351, introduced late last week, would amend Ohio’s employment discrimination statue to make it an “unlawful discriminatory practice” for employers to do any of the following:
The bill defines “private electronic account” as “a collection of electronically stored private information regarding an individual, including such collections stored on social media internet web sites, in electronic mail, and on electronic devices.” It then broadly defines “social media internet web site” as “an internet web site that allows individuals to do all of the following”:
The bill does not prohibit an employer from monitoring the electronic accounts of employees or applicants on the employer’s own Email or Internet system.
As far an enforcement, the bill would permit aggrieved individuals to file a charge of discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, or a private cause of action in court. It also allows the OCRC to levy fines of up to $1,000 for the first violation and up to $2,000 for each subsequent violation.
I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again, this is not a problem that needs fixing. Companies simply aren’t engaging in the type of conduct this bill seeks to legislate. I am troubled that the path this legislature chose is to seek to make this an unlawful discriminatory practice, on the same plane as race, sex, age, and disability discrimination. Moreover, there are no exceptions for industries that might have a legitimate reason to know what applicants or employees are doing on social sites (schools, police departments, financial services). The lack of any exceptions is a glaring omission from this legislation.
This bill is in its infancy. I will continue to monitor its status and update you with any movement in Columbus.
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More than a year ago, the 6th Circuit upheld its use of a “sole reason” causation standard in ADA cases, but invited the full 6th Circuit to revisit (and overrule) this issue. That en banc panel issued its ruling last Friday, and, expectedly, it overruled the Court’s prior use of the “sole reason” causation standard. Unexpectedly, however—in Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp. (6th Cir. 5/25/12) [pdf]—the Court replaced it with a similarly restrictive “but for” causation standard.
Relying on the linguistic similarities between the ADA and the ADEA, the Court looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services for the appropriate causation standard:
[W]hat standard should trial courts use in instructing juries in ADA cases? Gross [v. FBL Financial Services] points the way. The ADEA and the ADA bar discrimination “because of” an employee’s age or disability, meaning that they prohibit discrimination that is a “‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.”
Case closed. Or is it? As one of the dissenting opinions points out, the 6th Circuit is very much in the minority in its interpretation of the ADA’s causation standard. “Significantly, a majority of our sister circuits have embraced the motivating factor standard in reviewing ADA claims.” (citing to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, and 11th Circuits). Could this conflict among the circuits now head to the United States Supreme Court for resolution?
Or, is this issue a mere academic exercise? The ADA Amendments Act changed the ADA’s operative causation language. Pre-amendments, the ADA provided: “No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual.” The ADAAA, however, changed the “because of” causation standard to a “discriminate … on the basis of disability” standard. This alteration is significant, because it changes the key language in the ADA that had mirrored the ADEA, and upon which the 6th Circuit based its opinion that the rationale of Gross also applies to ADA claims. Is is splitting hairs to say that “because of” is materially different than “on the basis of?” Maybe. But, it is not insignificant that the ADAAA altered this key phrase.
As you can see, these issues are complex and, despite the en banc ruling, are far from settled. For employers, you are infinitely better off making reasonable accommodations and avoiding disability discrimination claims, so that you do not place yourselves in positions to have to worry about proper burdens of proof and causation standards. In other words, if you don’t put yourself in a position to be sued, because-ofs and but-fors simply don’t enter the equation.
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Yesterday afternoon, I appeared on the The Proactive Employer, talking all things workplace social media with host Stephanie Thomas, fellow guest Molly DiBianca (of the Delaware Employment Law Blog and @MollyDiBi). Thanks to Stephanie for a great hour.
Luckily for you, if you missed yesterday’s hour live, its available for replay two different ways:
Now there’s no excuse for not listening. Enjoy your holiday weekend.
Here’s the rest of what I read this week:
Discrimination
Social Media & Workplace Technology
HR & Employee Relations
Wage & Hour
Labor Relations
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On November 7, 2006, Ohio voters passed a ballot initiative to
enact the Smoke Free Workplace Act. It became effective on December 7, 2006, and is codified in R.C. Chapter 3794.
Generally, to adhere to the Act, businesses must do four things:
Yesterday—in Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc. [pdf]—the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the Smoke Free Workplace Act.
If you have been dragging your feet in enforcing this law in your business, or have been hoping for a reprieve from the Ohio Supreme Court, you are out of luck. You need to ensure that your business complies with the Act and is smoke free.
In addition, whether you are in Ohio or another state, and your business is to be smoke-free, you should adopt a formal smoke-free policy, which includes formally designating where on your property employees are allowed to smoke (if allowed at all).
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The court properly granted summary judgment because reasonable minds could only conclude that appellant’s actions in photographing an inmate placing his penis on a sandwich and then feeding the sandwich to another inmate were manifestly outside the scope of employment.
I can promise you read that sentence correctly. It is the Ohio Supreme Court’s digest summary for Cantwell v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (Ohio Ct. App. 5/22/12) [pdf] You can do a double-take, a triple-take, or as many takes as you need. It is still going to say that a Franklin County jail guard, while delivering bologna sandwiches to inmates, asked an inmate to place his penis on a sandwich, took of cell phone photo of said penis sandwich, and fed said sandwich (sans penis) to another unsuspecting inmate while taunting him.
The lawsuit concerned whether these actions were in good faith, and not manifestly outside the scope of Cantwell’s employment or official responsibilities, which would determine whether the county had a duty to defend Cantwell in the prisoners’ subsequent civil rights lawsuits.
What could Cantwell possibly argue?
It was commonplace for jokes and pranks to take place at the Franklin County jail between inmates, as well as hazing to take place between deputies, and such, if not condoned, were certainly not discouraged. Thus, appellant contends, because these jokes were encouraged, promoted, and tolerated, his “joke” to give Copeland a genital-tainted sandwich was not manifestly outside the scope of his employment.
The explanation is a whole lot funnier than the joke. Needless to say, none of this amused the court, which affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Cantwell’s claim.
From this mess of a case, I draw the following lesson. You cannot always guard against lawsuits by ex-employees. I am certain that given these facts, the county never dreamed it would be defending a lawsuit by this employee. Yet, he found a reason to sue. No termination (no matter the reason) is bulletproof. Even the most rock-solid termination can result in a lawsuit. That fear, however, should not hamstring employers from making appropriate termination decisions based on legitimate reasons. The best you can do with any termination is to make sure every “i” is dotted and every “t” is crossed (with the help of counsel, if needed), and let the chips fall where they may.
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This Thursday, May 24, at 3 pm, Molly DiBianica (proprietor of the Delaware Employment Law Blog and tweeter extraordinaire @MollyDiBi) and I will be guests on The Proactive Employer, hosted by Stephanie Thomas.
We will be discussing all things social media for employers, including providing tips on workplace social media policies, offering suggestions on how to ensure employees are using social media safely, and talking about how companies can be be smart about social media.
We will also be taking live questions, both via Twitter with the hashtag #TPE, and via call-in at (866) 472-5790. If you can’t join us live, the episode will also be available for streaming or download.
Molly and I go way back in the blawgosphere. She also contributed the chapter on privacy to my social media book, Think Before You Click, Strategies for Manging Social Media in the Workplace. Please tune in for what should be a very engaging and interesting conversation.
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The EEOC has released state-by-state charge filing statistics for the past three years. Which types of discrimination are popular (and not so popular) with Ohio employees?
These numbers shouldn’t be that much of a surprise to any businesses.
What is more interesting (at least to me) is how Ohio fairs when compared to the other 49 states. For fiscal year 2011, there were 3,137 total charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC in Ohio. Overall, that number comprises 3.1 percent of all charges filed nationwide, placing Ohio 12th among the 50 states.
Ohio is 7th in overall population, yet 12th in EEOC filings. Is is possible that Ohio is more friendly to employers than smaller states such as Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, and Alabama, all of which rank ahead of Ohio in the number of EEOC filings per year? Probably not. Instead, let me offer a different explanation. Ohio’s employment discrimination statute is quirky. It allows employees to proceed directly to court without first exhausting their administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC (or its state equivalent).
Ohio businesses are facing their fair share of discrimination claims; they are just facing them in courts instead of in the agencies. This quirk fails Ohio businesses. Employees are able to bypass the EEOC’s crucial role in filtering out frivolous claims. Until Ohio’s legislators step up to the plate and fix this anomaly of our discrimination statute, our state’s business community will continue to be disadvantaged by defending the bulk of discrimination claims in a more costly and time-consuming judicial venue.
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For an act to be considered an “adverse employment action” sufficient to support a discrimination claim, it must constitute
”a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Traditionally, a negative performance review does not constitute an adverse employment action, unless “the evaluation has an adverse impact on an employee’s wages or salary.” Or does it?
In Goldfaden v. Wyeth Laboratories (5/14/12) [pdf], the Sixth Circuit concluded that a warning letter issued to an employee constituted an “adverse action” even though the employee quit her job before she could suffer any consequences from the warning:
She received a warning letter in September that limited her year-end performance evaluation to a three on a scale of one to five. However, she never made it to the year-end evaluation, as she resigned three weeks after receiving the evaluation. The parties dispute what the effect of the lower evaluation would have been…. We cannot know for sure what would have happened, but there was a possibility that she would have received a lower bonus. This doubt is sufficient to survive summary judgment….
This result is even more troubling because the same opinion affirmed summary judgment for the employer on Goldfaden’s constructive discharge claim. In other words, the warning letter was not so intolerable that it compelled Goldfaden to quit, but it nevertheless could rise to the level of an adverse employment action because it could, maybe, have resulted in a lower year-end bonus.
It’s cases like this one that make it so difficult (and often frustrating) to attempt to predict outcomes for clients.
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You’d think that with all the posting I do about Labor & Employment Law, it’s the only area in which my law firm—Kohrman Jackson & Krantz—practices. You’d also be very wrong. Our diverse practice also covers, for example, telemarketing law.
In fact, my parter, Brett Krantz, recently co-published an article on this issue:
Brett Krantz, Chair of the Litigation group, and associate Melissa Yasinow have co-authored an article with Mark Rasch, the director of Cybersecurity and Privacy Consulting at technology company CSC. The article, entitled Please Press #5 Now: How Businesses Can Use UETA and E-SIGN to Create Signed, Written Contracts Over the Telephone, explains how businesses can use recent federal and state pro-technology laws to create signed, written contracts over the telephone. Connections Magazine, the nation’s premier magazine for the telemarketing and teleservices industry, will be publishing a shortened version of the article in its upcoming July/August Issue. The full article has already been published online in Connections Magazine’s “White Papers” Section. Please click here to access the full article.
Enjoy!
Here’s the rest of what I read this week:
Discrimination
Social Media & Workplace Technology
HR & Employee Relations
Wage & Hour
Labor Relations
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Between the following two options—a federal statute or a private employment agreement—which wins?
–or–
In Oswald v. BAE Industries (5/16/12) [pdf], the 6th Circuit ruled that the contract trumped USERRA.
After returning from serving with the Marines in Iraq, Jerome Oswald claimed that BAE limited his duties and responsibilities compared to his pre-deployment work, failed to give him a raise, transferred him to a lesser position, and ultimately fired him.
Unfortunately for Oswald, he waited until almost three years after his termination to file suit against BAE. The 6th Circuit concluded that his feet-dragging doomed his lawsuit:
Plaintiff’s employment contract does not eliminate all procedural rights in that it only shortens the time frame that Plaintiff can raise a USERRA claim. Because the contractual period of limitations diminished a right under USERRA that was merely procedural, [it] does not override the contractual limitations period on that basis….
Because Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely under the 180-day period in the contract, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendant….
There are two key takeaways from this case:
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According to a recent survey by Intel (h/t: Lifehacker), 85% of American adults share information about themselves online, while 90% think others are sharing too much. Maybe the former CFO of Francesca’s Holdings Corp., Gene Morphis, should have heeded the latter and shared less about his company’s inner workings.
On Monday, Francesca’s announced that it fired Morphis for improperly communicating company information through social media. A quick review of Morphis’s Twitter feed and (very public) Facebook Wall offers some possible suspects.
Maybe it was this tweet:
Or maybe it was this one:
Or maybe this one:
Or, maybe it was this Facebook post:
Or, maybe it was this one:
Social media presents a real risk of corporate breaches of confidentiality. It is easy to tell your employees, “Think before you click.” (Hey, that’s a catchy title for a book.) Yet, 76% of the Inc. 500 lack a social media policy for their employees, and 73% of all employers conduct no social media training. If you aren’t educating your employees about the risks and benefits of social media, both in and out of the workplace, you are not only missing a golden opportunity, but you also leaving yourself exposed to breaches of confidentiality such as that which befell Francesca’s. These issues are not going away.
Businesses that ignore the possibility that their employees can divulge trade secrets and other confidential and proprietary information via Twitter, Facebook, and other social media do so at their own peril. Did Morphis’s disclosure harm his ex-employer? Probably not. But, the company’s swift and decisive reaction to any breach of confidentiality will make it easier down the road for it to protect its confidential information when it really matters. Mark my words. The day will come when a court will invalidate a corporate trade secret because of a lax social media policy.
As an aside, I’m leading off tomorrow’s NLRB Region 8 Labor Law Conference [pdf], discussing social media policies and protected concerted activity. NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon is the lunch speaker. I am very interested to hear his thoughts on how employers can balance their right to limit disclosures of confidential information against his perception that social media policies that prohibit such disclosures violate the NLRA.
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How far do you have to go to accommodate an employee’s disability? In Regan v. Faurecia Automotive Seating (5/10/12), the 6th Circuit provides some boundaries, and teaches us a lesson about accommodation best practices.
Alisha Regan—an assembly line worker at Faurecia—suffers from narcolepsy, a sleep disorder that causes excessive sleepiness and frequent daytime sleep attacks. When her supervisor pushed back by an hour the start and end times of her shift, Regan advised that her narcolepsy would make it difficult for her to get to work, as it would push her commute into rush hour, causing longer commute times and a greater likelihood of sleepiness.
When the company refused to allow her to work her original schedule, Regan resigned, noting the “tremendous consequence” the change in work hours would have on her narcolepsy. She then filed suit, claiming that the company’s refusal violated the disability discrimination laws.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision that the ADA does not require an employer to accommodate an employee’s commute to and from work:
While an employer is required to provide reasonable accommodations that eliminate barriers in the work environment, an employer is not required to eliminate those barriers which exist outside the work environment. We find … that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not require Faurecia to accommodate Regan’s request for a commute during more convenient hours.
This case is not the first I’ve covered discussing whether an employer has an obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s commute. For example, in Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., the 3rd Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, finding that an employer must change an employee’s work hours if needed to enable a disabled employee to commute to and from work.
The real lesson here isn’t whether employers do, or do not, have to accommodate a disabled employee’s commute to and from work. Given the conflict between Regan and Colwell, I’d say this issue of open for interpretation (even though Regan is controlling in Ohio). Instead, the lesson is how employers should handle these issues when they arise. The ADA requires that the employer and employee engage in an interactive process (a back and forth to determine whether and what type of accommodation would be effective).
What shouldn’t you do in a situation such as this one? Don’t dismiss the employee’s request outright (as the employer appears to have done in Regan). Don’t force the employee to take FMLA leave as a prerequisite to the interactive process (as the employer in Regan appears to have done).
Each conversation with an employee (which should be documented in his or her confidential medical file) is an opportunity to establish your consideration of the employee’s specific needs in light of the specific and essential job requirements. If you legitimately cannot start a production line an hour early to accommodate an employee’s commuting schedule request, then so be it. But, how can you (and a court) judge the reasonableness of your decision if you never even have the conversation in the first place?
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