Wednesday, January 25, 2012

When office pranks attack


Read these facts, from Slasinski v. Confirma, Inc. (6th Cir. 1/24/12) [pdf], and I’ll be back to discuss:

In July 2007, members of Confirma’s sales team, including Mr. Slasinski, attended a week-long seminar in Bellevue, Washington.  On the evening of July 25, 2007, Mr. Slasinski and others … attended a dinner cruise….

Near the end of the cruise, but before the boat docked, Mr. Slasinski proceeded toward the ship’s lavatory on the aft end of the boat. Before he reached his destination, Mr. Slasinski observed a colleague named Kris Daw enter the lavatory. Several other Confirma employees were standing nearby, and Mr. Slasinski observed Bickford engage an external lock on the lavatory door, thereby locking Daw inside. A few moments later, Bickford unlocked the door and released Daw to the laughter of those standing nearby.

Mr. Slasinski then entered the lavatory and shortly thereafter discovered that he also had been locked inside … approximately 20 to 25 minutes. During that time, the boat docked and the other Confirma employees disembarked. After some time had passed, Mr. Slasinski began making phone calls to colleagues on his cell phone to request assistance…. Mr. Slasinski then resorted to kicking the door in an attempt to free himself, at which point the boat’s crew discovered and released him.

Like any embarrassed employee, what did Slasinski do? He sued, for false imprisonment. After a four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Confirma, which the appellate court upheld:

If the jury accepted Confirma’s version of the facts, and drew all inferences in Confirma’s favor, it could easily have found that Mr. Slasinski entered the lavatory knowing he would be locked inside as part of the prank, and thus initially consented to the confinement. Moreover, for at least part of the duration of his confinement, Mr. Slasinski did not knock, call out to, or otherwise beseech any of the Confirma employees standing nearby to release him. A reasonable jury could conclude, therefore, that any confinement Mr. Slasinski experienced began with his consent, and only after the passage of time became against his will. A jury could further conclude, based on the evidence, that the period of unconsented-to confinement was of such brief duration as to be only momentary or fleeting.

What does this case mean? I could draw a great lesson about or the risks of lawsuits coming from anyone at any time, or the importance of workplace training to avoid similar problems, or the synergy between employee morale and having a good laugh, but instead, watch this:

See you tomorrow.

Tuesday, January 24, 2012

If employees had common sense, I’d be out of a job


Last Thursday, I participated in the Social Workplace Twitter Chat (#SWchat), which covered social media policies. In response to a question on whether employers need social media policies, or if they can leave employees to their own devices, I responded as follows:  

– and –

In other words, if employees had common sense, I (and every other employment lawyer) would be out of a job.

Case in point: long-time Philadelphia TV weatherman (and notorious playa) John Bolaris, who lost his job last week because of an interview he gave to Playboy magazine discussing a debaucherous night in Miami that resulted in the Russian mob (of all things) drugging him and scamming him out of $43,712.25. Here’s my favorite quote from the Playboy interview (courtesy of Gawker):

He saw two women on a swing. Very elegant, beautiful, classy, with jet-black hair and blue eyes… They were smoking cigarettes in that exotic European manner… “I’m a guy,” Bolaris says. “There was the thought that I might get laid.” It never dawned on him to be suspicious about two gorgeous, elegant women all over him like a wet suit, he says, because “I was used to girls in Philly coming on to me aggressively once they found out I was John Bolaris, the TV weatherman.”

Needless to say, his employer was less than pleased by his very public discussions of his escapades.

As long as employees continue to engage in public discussions about what should be private matters, the role of employers in monitoring and regulating their employees’ online activities will continue to be a very active part of the discussion. And, as long as employees lack the common sense to keep these matters private, yes, you need a social media policy to direct their behaviors and expectations.

Maybe Warren Zevon said it best (and maybe John Bolaris should have heeded his advice):

I went home with the waitress
The way I always do
How was I to know
She was with the
Russians, too?

Monday, January 23, 2012

Do not forget to tell employees how you are calculating FMLA leave


Two of the most popular post on this blog relate to how employers calculate their employees’ “annual” FMLA leave allotment:

(Go head, click through and read; I’ll wait).

On Friday—in Thom v. American Standard, Inc. [pdf]—the 6th Circuit illustrated for employers why it is crucial for employers to communicate to their employees which of the methods to calculating the 12-month period they are using. Thom involves an employee terminated either during his FMLA leave (if the employer was calculating his 12 weeks of leave using the “calendar year” method) or after his FMLA leave expired (if the employer was using the “rolling” method). The employer argued that it had always used the rolling method, which it formally published in its policies before Thom’s FMLA leave and termination. The Court disagreed:

Although American Standard did internally amend its FMLA leave policy in March 2005 to indicate that it would now calculate employee leave according to the “rolling” method, it did not give Thom actual notice of this changed policy….

This case illustrates both the importance of designating your FMLA year, and providing proper notice to your employees of that designation or any subsequent changes. In this case, the failure cost the employer $312,402.60, an expensive lesson.

Friday, January 20, 2012

WIRTW #209 (the “I am the greatest” edition)


This week, we celebrated the 70th birthday of the greatest (and most entertaining?) athlete ever, Muhammed Ali:

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Competition & Trade Secrets

Thursday, January 19, 2012

“Friending” co-workers depends on your level of organizational risk tolerance


On Time Magazine’s Moneyland Blog, Dan Schawbel asks the following questions: “Is it a bad idea to friend co-workers on Facebook? How about your boss?” In his post, Mr. Schawbel discusses a recent study of 4 million Gen-Y Facebook profiles, conducted by Millennial Branding and Identified.com, which found the following:

  • Nearly two-thirds (64%) of Gen-Y Facebook users omit their employers from their profiles.
  • Only 16 out of an average Gen-Y Facebook user’s nearly 700 friends are co-workers.

From these findings, Mr. Schawbel concludes:

Gen-Y needs to be aware that what they publish online can come back to haunt them in the workplace. Gen-Y managers and co-workers have insight into their social lives, which could create an awkward workplace setting or even result in a termination.

There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the issues raised by co-workers connecting via social networks. Social sites such as Facebook and Twitter can be a powerful tool for added employee engagement and communication. Because of the the added connectivity, however, they also present an added risk for problems such as harassment, retaliation, and invasions of privacy. You have five options to choose from in the level of connectivity to permit for your employees. Which answer you choose will depend on how you balance the benefit of the added communication versus the risk of potential problems:

  1. Anything goes. Any employee can friend any other employee regarding of rank or position.

  2. Supervisors are prohibited from friending direct reports, but employees can friend their supervisors (who can choose whether to accept the request).

  3. Supervisors and their reports cannot be Facebook friends, regardless of who initiates the request.

  4. Employees are only permitted to be Facebook friends with their peers. No one can friend anyone higher or lower on the org chart.

  5. Employees are expressly prohibited from being Facebook friends with any co-workers, regardless of position.

Regardless of which option you choose, you should choose one to incorporate into your social media policy, and train your employees about the dangers of unfiltered online communications and the proper use of social media inside and outside of the workplace. Without the appropriate training of your employees on these new and evolving issues, you might as well not have the policy at all.

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

Is it time to do away with McDonnell Douglas?


For the unfamiliar, the McDonnell Douglas test is an evidentiary framework used in discrimination cases, which lack direct evidence of discrimination, to determine whether an employee’s claim should survive summary judgment and proceed to trial. (For the familiar, skip down the next paragraph.) It first asks whether the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination—(i) s/he belongs to a protected class; (ii) s/he was qualified for the position; (iii) though qualified, s/he suffered some adverse action; and (iv) the employer treated similarly situated people outside of his/her protected class differently. If the plaintiff satisfies this showing, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. Once the employer makes this articulation, the burden shifts again, back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s reason is a pretext for discrimination. This test is engrained in the hearts and minds of anyone who practices employment litigation.

Early this month, in Coleman v. Donahoe, the 7th Circuit (albeit in a concurring opinion), asked whether the McDonnell Douglas test still has any utility:

Perhaps McDonnell Douglas was necessary nearly 40 years ago, when Title VII litigation was still relatively new in the federal courts. By now, however, … the various tests that we insist lawyers use have lost their utility. Courts manage tort litigation every day without the ins and outs of these methods of proof, and I see no reason why employment discrimination litigation (including cases alleging retaliation) could not be handled in the same straightforward way. In order to defeat summary judgment, the plaintiff one way or the other must present evidence showing that she is in a class protected by the statute, that she suffered the requisite adverse action (depending on her theory), and that a rational jury could conclude that the employer took that adverse action on account of her protected class, not for any non-invidious reason. Put differently, it seems to me that the time has come to collapse all these tests into one.

Yesterday, the 6th Circuit, in Donald v. Sybra, Inc. [pdf], helped prove the 7th Circuit’s point. Sybra, which owns Arby’s franchises, terminated Gwendolyn Donald’s employment after it concluded she had been intentionally mis-ringing customer orders to steal from her cash register. Among other issues, she claimed that Sybra terminated her employment both in retaliation for, and to interfere with, her rights under the FMLA. After concluding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applied to both her retaliation and interference claims, the court ignored McDonnell Douglas, and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer:

The district court effectively gave Donald the benefit of the doubt and assumed that she could establish both prima facie cases. This boon notwithstanding, the district court determined that Donald produced insufficient evidence to prove that Sybra’s stated reasons, cash register and order irregularities, were pretextual….

Donald’s claims fundamentally rest on the timing of Sybra’s decision to terminate her employment [the  day after she returned from her FMLA leave], which, we admit, gives us pause. But that alone is not enough, and her other arguments are no more persuasive. Whether Sybra followed its own protocol, or its decision not to prosecute Donald, or even Donald’s history of employment, provides neither us, nor a rational juror, with a basis to believe that Sybra’s decision was improper. The district court therefore correctly dismissed Donald’s FMLA claims.

If courts skip the first two steps of the McDonnell Douglas test and go right to the heart of the matter—whether a rational jury could conclude that the employer took that adverse action on account of her protected class—does it make sense to continue the charade of pretending that McDonnell Douglas remains useful? As a management-side litigator, I like the ability to have more than one evidentiary bite at the apple in trying to get a case dismissed on summary judgment. As a pragmatist, however, I’m afraid that the concurring opinion in Coleman v. Donahoe might be correct, that “the time has come to collapse all these tests into one.”

Tuesday, January 17, 2012

Clearing a path to complain is a key part of any harassment policy


EEOC v. Management Hospitality of Racine, Inc. (7th Cir. 1/9/12) concerns some of the worst allegations of sexual harassment you will encounter, especially when you consider that the complaining employees were both teenagers and that the harassing manager was a decade their senior.

The employer tried to avoid liability by relying on its zero tolerance sexual harassment policy and its prompt investigations of complaints. The court disagreed for several reasons, including that managers had never received any harassment training and that the employer waited two months to investigate the complaints in this case. Most importantly, however, the court concluded that the employer’s harassment policy failed on its face:

An employer’s complaint mechanism must provide a clear path for reporting harassment, particularly where, as here, a number of the servers were teenagers…. Flipmeastack’s sexual harassment policy did not provide a point person to air complaints to. In fact, it provided no names or contact information at all.

What does this mean for you? A harassment policy is worthless if it does not tell employees how to complain and to whom to make complaints. Let me make one additional suggestion — have more than one avenue for complaints. You do not want to be in a situation where an employee does not complain because the person to whom your policy directs him or her is the alleged harasser. Suggest that employees can complain to anyone in management, up to and including the head of your company. Depending on the size of your organization and the resources available, consider implementing a harassment complaint hotline or inbox.

Monday, January 16, 2012

What Dr. King fought for … and what he didn’t


What MLK fought for…

From abcnews.com, discussing the resolution of a story on which I reported last month:

The Ohio Civil Rights Commission dismissed a landlord’s claim today that a “white only” pool sign was simply an historical antique sign and ruled that it was discriminatory…. The five-member commission decided unanimously on the matter, upholding an earlier ruling…. [According to the landlord,] “If I have to stick up for my white rights, I have to stick up for my white rights. It goes both ways.”

What MLK did not fight for…

From Brown v. Village of Woodmere [pdf], a race discrimination case decided last week by the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals:

Brown further admitted that he was aware of the village’s electronic use policy and his use of the sergeant’s computer was in violation of the policy…. The mayor testified that she terminated Brown after she viewed the pornographic images that were on the sergeant’s computer; the images included pictures of Brown’s genitalia…. Under the circumstances presented in this case, summary judgment on Brown’s racial discrimination claim was entirely appropriate

Any questions?

Friday, January 13, 2012

WIRTW #208 (the “manners” edition)


Next week, my daughter’s kindergarten class will hold its second “manners lunch.” It is a formal lunch, with formal place settings, at which the children learn proper table manners. I hope that she takes these manners with her for the rest of her life. Lately, however, I’ve been reminded that not everyone exhibits proper manners. As a courtesy to my opposing counsel in a case, I notified him that I would be bringing a college student, shadowing at my firm, to an upcoming pretrial conference. Believe it or not, he objected:

Jon:

We do not agree with your intention to bring an outsider to the status conference tomorrow. The last thing we need is a distraction, especially since we are only 30 days from trial and the parties need to conduct candid discussions concerning this matter. Only trial counsel and parties should be at the conference.

Regards,

Am I off my rocker for being upset about this discourtesy? Does anyone see any harm in a college student, wanting to learn a little about what a litigator does, sitting quietly in a federal courthouse conference room observing a pretrial?

Anyhow, here’s what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, January 12, 2012

Supreme Court finds religion, dismisses discrimination lawsuit


Any decision issued by the Supreme Court in an employment case is newsworthy. Thus, even though Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC [pdf] concerns the viability and applicability of the narrow ministerial exception under Title VII, it is still worthy of discussion.

Hosanna-Tabor employed Cheryl Perich as an elementary teacher. She started her employment as a “lay” teacher, and later received her “diploma of vocation” as a commissioned minister “called” by God. As a teacher, she spent approximately 45 minutes per day teaching religious studies, and the rest teaching secular subjects. Hosanna-Tabor terminated her employment after she began suffering from narcolepsy and threatening to sue for discrimination. The EEOC sued on her behalf under the ADA.

Last year, the 6th Circuit permitted Perich to continue with her lawsuit, finding dispositive the fact her primary job functions were secular, not religious. The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed, recognized that a constitutional ministerial exception exists under Title VII, and that because Perich was a religious employee she could not sue for discriminatory termination.

Other bloggers, who got to this case before me, have admirably recapped the Court’s opinion:

Instead of retreading their ground, I thought I’d focus on what this case means going forward. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, made it clear that this case only addressed an employment discrimination claim, and not other possible claims a “minister” might bring against a religious institution:

The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise.

***

The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.

Wage and hour claims? A church employee fired after being wrongly accused of molesting a child? Given the Court’s reliance on the right of a church, conferred by the Constitution, to “control … the selection of those who will personify its beliefs,” it will be hard to imagine a different result in future cases.

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

Statistics show that lactation breaks are not a workplace problem


Before you read further, make sure you are sitting down, and that there is nothing blunt nearby for you to bump your head on if you pass out from the shock. Okay, here we go. According to the Huffington Post, since Obamacare mandated that employers provide space in the workplace for mothers to lactate, the Department of Labor has cited a whopping 23 companies for not providing adequate lactation breaks or spaces.

According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s latest statistics, there are 5,767,306 American employers, and yet only 23 have been cited for a violation of this mandate. In other words, the Department of Labor has cited .0004% of all American employers. If we only consider employers with 20 or more employees, the DOL has cited .0038%—still an infinitesimally small number. If we only consider the largest of employers—those with 100 or more employees—the percentage of citations drops to a still-miniscule .023%.

What does this mean? Either that the lactation mandate is not yet widely known, and as public knowledge catches up with the law’s requirements complaints (and citations) will rise. Or, the lack of lactation space in American workplaces is a myth that does not need need a legislative solution.

Are there employers that violate women’s rights (already protected by Title VII) to lactate in the workplace? Absolutely. Do enough trample these rights such that we need legislation to address this issues? Likely not.

[Hat tip: ABA Journal]

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

Is the NLRB backing off its position on social media as protected, concerted activity?


A quartet of advice memos released by the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel over the past weeks suggests that the NLRB may be backing of its extreme protections of employee social media posts as protected, concerted activity.

  • In Children’s National Medical Center [pdf], the General Counsel recommended the dismissal of a charge brought by a respiratory therapist terminated for updating her Facebook status during an ambulance ride to threaten a co-worker who was committing the cardinal sin of sucking on her teeth:

“[T]here is no evidence to establish concert. The Charging Party did not discuss her Facebook post with any of her fellow employees, and none of her coworkers responded to the posts…. The Charging Party was merely airing a personal complaint about something that had happened on her shift.”

  • In TAW Inc. [pdf], the General Counsel recommended the dismissal of a charge brought by an accountant terminated for refusing to remove a Facebook post which suggested that her employer was engaged in fraudulent accounting practices:

“Even if the Charging Party initially posted the comment in furtherance of alleged concerted activity …, her refusal to remove the comment after the April 18 meeting with the outside auditor was not protected…. [H]er comment suggesting that the Employer was engaged in fraud was false and, after April 18, she knew it was false. Her insistence on retaining the post after knowing it was false is not entitled to protection under the Act.”

  • In Copiah Bank [pdf], the General Counsel recommended the dismissal of a charge brought by a bank teller terminated for off-duty Facebook posts complaining that employees at another branch had “narced” on her:

“The Charging Party did not post her comment on her Facebook page in furtherance of concerted activity for mutual aid or protection. The Charging Party admits that that she was not speaking on behalf of any other employees, nor is there evidence that that she was looking to group action when she posted her comments on Facebook.”

  • In Intermountain Specialized Abuse Treatment Center [pdf], the General Counsel recommended the dismissal of a charge brought by a therapist who took to her Facebook wall to complain about staff meetings, including at least one interaction with a co-worker during which they agreed to use Facebook to “complain about work.”:

“The Charging Party’s Facebook posting was merely an expression of an individual gripe about … a staff meeting that affected only the Charging Party – her removal as the facilitator of her victims group. The posting contained no language suggesting that she sought to initiate or induce co-workers to engage in group action. And the only co-worker who commented in response to the posting stated that he did not think that the Charging Party’s post was an attempt to change anything at work.”

These G.C. memos suggest, as I suggested almost a year ago, that the sky may not be falling in regards to social media and the NLRB. Children’s National, TAW, and Copiah Bank are reasoned opinions on lone-wolf employees who took to social media to air gripes about work, or, in the case of Children’s National, to threaten a co-worker.

Intermountain, though, may have wider implications. One of my key concerns about the NLRB’s foray in regulating workplace social media is that by its very nature, social media is concerted, i.e., does a co-worker’s unsolicited comment or response to a social media post convert lone-wolf conduct into concerted activity? Intermountain suggests that the concerted nature of the social media activity depends on both the intent of the original poster and the understanding of that intent by any subsequent commenters.

These issues are far from settled. Intermountain, though, is a good first step in the right direction to providing employers some much needed clarity in this area. It’s also a welcoming sign that the NLRB isn’t forging ahead with blinders on in this area.

Monday, January 9, 2012

NLRB trumps U.S. Supreme Court on class action arbitrations


Last year, the U.S. Supreme Court, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, held that a business could compel a group of individuals to waive their right to file a class action lawsuit and instead arbitrate their collective dispute. Employers rejoiced, believing that they finally had the weapon they needed to battle the scourge of wage and hour class actions. Last Friday, however, the NLRB struck a blow against this apparent victory.

In D. R. Horton, Inc. [pdf], the NLRB held that an arbitration agreement violated the National Labor Relations Act’s protections for employee concerted activity. The facts are pretty straight-forward. The employer required all of its employees, as a condition of their employment, to sign a master arbitration agreement, under which they agreed:

  • to submit all disputes and claims relating to their employment to final and binding arbitration;
  • that the arbitrator “may hear only … individual claims,” “will not have the authority to consolidate the claims of other employees,” and “does not have authority to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief to a group or class of employees in one arbitration proceeding”; and
  • to waive “the right to file a lawsuit or other civil proceeding relating to … employment with the Company” and “the right to resolve employment-related disputes in a proceeding before a judge or jury.”

The NLRB concluded that the agreement “unlawfully restricts employees’ Section 7 right to engage in concerted action for mutual aid or protection,” and held that the employer “violated Section 8(a)(1) by requiring employees to waive their right to collectively pursue employment-related claims in all forums, arbitral and judicial.”

A few key points to make about this case:

  1. This case continues the trend (as we’ve seen in the social media cases—more on this tomorrow) of the NLRB pursuing protected, concerted activity cases in non-union workplaces.
  2. The NLRB did not concluded that all class action arbitration agreements are invalid, but merely those that leave employees without a collective remedy. An arbitration agreement, for example, that permits for a judicial filing would still be lawful. (But, then again, wouldn’t that fall-back nullify any benefit to be gained from the arbitration agreement in the first place?)
  3. This decision likely is not the last we will hear on this issue. This case is almost certainly headed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. Depending on that result, it will be curious to see if the Supreme Court picks up the ball to reconcile this case with AT&T Mobility. Until then, employers should tread carefully in trying to implement or enforce class action arbitration agreements.

Friday, January 6, 2012

WIRTW #207 (the “world tour” edition)


Okay, so it’s not really a world tour, but I do have a bunch of speaking engagements coming up in the next few weeks, all but one of which you can join.

The blogosphere never sleeps, even over the holidays. It’s been a busy couple of weeks. Let’s get to it.

Here’s what I read this week (and last week):

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, January 5, 2012

Disability discrimination law in Ohio is a mess


Let’s start with the obvious: it is illegal in Ohio for an employer to discriminate against an employee because of the employee’s disability. It is not always easy to figure out who this proscription covers, because Ohio’s statute (R.C. 4112) and the federal statute (the ADA) have their own respective definitions of what is a disability, which vary slightly:

     Ohio Law:

“Disability” means a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, including the functions of caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working; a record of a physical or mental impairment; or being regarded as having a physical or mental impairment.

     Federal Law:

The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual — (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

Before Congress amended the ADA in 2009, there existed another key difference between its and Ohio’s respective definitions of “disability.” To be “regarded as” disabled under Ohio law, one has to be “regarded as having a physical or mental impairment.” Under the pre-ADAAA ADA, to be “regarded as” disabled, one had to be perceived as having an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. By adding the “substantially limits” language, the federal definition was more restrictive.

Until recently, and despite these differences, Ohio law has almost always looked to federal law in interpreting its state disability discrimination statute. Last month, however, the rules changed. In Scalia v. Aldi, Inc. (12/21/11) [pdf] (discussed yesterday), one Ohio appellate court said the following:

Because the plain language of the definition of disability contained in R.C. 4112.01 differs in substance from the ADA, it is not appropriate to look to federal materials interpreting the pre-2008 ADA with respect to perceived disability claims under Ohio law.

The key language in that quote is “pre-2008 ADA.” The ADAAA amended the definition of “regarded as” disability. Under the amended ADA, it is now irrelevant whether the actual or perceived physical or mental condition substantially limits a major life activity:

An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as having such an impairment” if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.

Thus, as the court pointed out in Scalia v. Aldi, Ohio law and federal law now match on this issue. Because Aldi terminated Scalia before Congress amended the ADA, the court applied the pre-amendment version of the statute, and left open the question of whether Ohio courts should look to federal caselaw interpreting the amended federal statute.

What does all this mean for Ohio employers? Disability discrimination law is a mess. Until the General Assembly passes legislation clarifying whether interpretations of “disability” under R.C. 4112 are supposed to mirror the ADA, companies doing business in Ohio would be best served following the most expansive interpretation of the definition of disability possible under either statute.

Wednesday, January 4, 2012

Resolve this year to properly handle no-fault attendance policies


For the uninitiated, a no-fault attendance policy terminates an employee who accumulates a pre-designated number of absences, regardless of the reason. For employers with high-volume, high-turnover operations, these policies make a lot of sense as the best tool to manage employee attendance. They are not, however, without their risk. For example, no-fault attendance policies cannot penalize absences that fall under the protective umbrella of statutes such as the FMLA or the ADA. As some employers have discovered, disciplining or firing disabled employees under a no-fault policy can be a costly error.

What about employees on leave for a workers’ comp injury? Can an employer count those absence under a no-fault policy? According to one recent Ohio appellate decision—Scalia v. Aldi, Inc. (12/21/11) [pdf]—the answer is a decided maybe. The court concluded that it is not per se retaliatory for an employer to terminate an employee on workers compensation leave pursuant to a facially neutral attendance policy. The court remanded the case back to the trial court to consider the issue of whether the employer—through the application of its attendance policy— terminated the plaintiff retaliation for instituting, pursuing, or testifying in a workers’ compensation proceeding.

What does this mean? This means that the plaintiff cannot rely solely on the attendance policy to prove retaliation, but must prove that the employer’s reliance on the attendance policy was a pretext for retaliation. A uniformly applied attendance policy will go a long way to disproving this pretext. As mentioned above, however, employers cannot apply attendance policies to penalize employees on leave for FMLA or ADA reasons. Will this lack of uniformity hurt employers in defending against workers’ comp retaliation cases? Or, can an employer lawfully treat FMLA-related and ADA-related absences differently than workers’ comp-related absences. Another court will have to answer these questions in another case. As this case illustrates, employers must tread very carefully when disciplining or terminating an employee who is absent from work because of work-related injury.

Tuesday, January 3, 2012

Does India have sex discrimination laws?


I have no idea if India has workplace sex discrimination laws. The following classified ad would suggest not:

india

Does anyone know if this is legal in India? Do I need to tell you that it is the absolute opposite of a best practice to list a position as one for a “Lady Computer Operator … preferably married”?

[Hat tip: my wife]

Monday, January 2, 2012

Did anyone resolve to be less connected in 2012?




Available at http://www.gocomics.com/nonsequitur/2011/12/26

Happy New Year!

Friday, December 30, 2011

Best of 2011: Numbers 2 and 1


   2.  “If I could press a button and instantly vaporize one sector of employment law?”

My answer—the Fair Labor Standards Act. The FLSA needs to go because compliance is impossible…. I would bet any employer in this country a free wage and hour audit that I can find an FLSA violation in your pay practices. A regulatory scheme that is impossible to meet does not make sense to keep alive. Instead, what employers and employees need is a more streamlined system to ensure that workers are paid a fair wage.

   1. The Employer’s Bill of Rights

After nearly 15 years representing employers in workplace disputes, the one conclusion that I can reach with absolute certainty is that American employees do not lack workplace rights. There is a veritable alphabet soup of laws that protects employees…. The only group in the country that lacks workplace rights is employers. We are the marginalized and the unprotected, living in fear of making any personnel decisions because they might result in expensive lawsuits. Employers, I feel your pain, and present the Employer’s Bill of Rights.

Thursday, December 29, 2011

Best of 2011: Numbers 4 and 3


   4. Charlie Sheen and the National Labor Relations Board

CBS fired Charlie Sheen, in part because he made public disparaging comments about his boss. Charlie Sheen is a member of SAG. He also has his own “performance” problems. Should he file an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, based on his own protected, concerted activity—for example, calling his boss a “stupid, stupid little man and a pussy punk”; a “piece of  shit”; a “turd”; and a “clown”?

   3. NLRB says a “f**ktard” is different than a “d*ck” under Section 7

In American Medical Response, the NLRB argued that calling one’s boss a “d*ck” is “not so opprobrious as to lose the protections of the Act” because the “name-calling was not accompanied by any verbal or physical threats.” Yet, in Schulte, Roth & Zabel, the NLRB points out that Section 7 does not protect the “f**ktard” post. What’s the difference, other than the fact that your employees are now aware that they have rights under the National Labor Relations Act, and will run to the NLRB if fired or disciplined for their social media activities?