Friday, April 8, 2011

WIRTW #172 (the juxtaposition edition)


These two stories came through my feed reader this week, and I thought that together they tell an interesting story:

Why Is It So Hard to Get a Low Paying Job? – from Suzanne Lucas, the Evil HR Lady

and

McDonald’s will hold hiring day April 19 to fill 50,000 jobs – from USAToday

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media

Employee Relations & HR

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

SpongeBob


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, April 7, 2011

When does 50 not equal 50?


Most people think of “50” as the magic number for the FMLA. “Oh, we have 50 employees, so we now have to comply with the FMLA,” is a popular refrain among HR departments. It’s not that simple.

The FMLA has two different rules that must be met before you have to offer FMLA leave to an employee—coverage and eligibility. Coverage applies to the employer and eligibility applies to the employee. They both have the magic number 50 as a key component, but are very different in application.

Coverage. The FMLA covers any private employer that has 50 or more employees on the payroll during 20 or more calendar workweeks (not necessarily consecutive workweeks) in either the current or the preceding calendar year. Who counts as an employee for coverage purposes?
  • Any employee whose name appears on the payroll will be considered employed each working day of the calendar week, and must be counted whether or not any compensation is received for the week.
  • Employees on paid or unpaid leave, including FMLA leave, leaves of absence, disciplinary suspension, etc., are counted as long as the employer has a reasonable expectation that the employee will later return to active employment.
  • If there is no employer/employee relationship (as when an employee is laid off, whether temporarily or permanently) that individual is not counted.
  • Part-time employees are considered to be employed each working day of the calendar week, as long as they are maintained on the payroll.
  • An employee who does not begin to work for an employer until after the first working day of a calendar week, or who terminates employment before the last working day of a calendar week, is not considered employed on each working day of that calendar week.
Once a private employer meets the 50 employees/20 workweeks threshold, that employer remains covered until it reaches a future point where it no longer has employed 50 employees for 20 (nonconsecutive) workweeks in the current and preceding calendar year. Thus an employer who met this threshold in 2010, drops below it later that year, and never crosses it again during 2011, would remain covered until December 31, 2011.

Eligibility. Just because the FMLA covers a particular employer, does not mean that the FMLA requires that employer to provide FMLA leave to any or its employees. An employee must still meet the FMLA’s eligibility requirements. To be eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must work for a covered employer, and:
  1. Was employed by the employer for at least 12 non-consecutive months;
  2. Worked 1,250 hours during the 12-month period preceding the start of the requested leave; and
  3. Works at a location where the employer employs 50 or more employees within a 75-mile radius.
There you have it. At least as the FMLA is concerned, 50 does not necessarily equal 50. If you a business that has 50 or more employees who are fragmented across smaller locations, each more than 75 miles from the others, then you may fall into the weird vortex of being covered by the Act, but never having any employees who are eligible for leave.

Next week, we’ll look at what this distinction means on a practical level for your business, and also explore whether in light of the recent ADA Amendments it even matters.

Wednesday, April 6, 2011

How far can a Cat’s Paw reach?


Last month—in Staub v. Proctor Hosp.—the Supreme Court held that employers are liable for the discriminatory animus of managers and supervisors uninvolved with the adverse action decision making, unless the employer’s decision is entirely independent of the discriminatory input of the manager or supervisor. At the time, I argued that this broad holding would make it very difficult for employers to win summary judgment in these “cat’s paw” cases. Blount v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co.—decided a mere nine days after Staub—illustrates my point.

In Blount, two former Ohio Bell employees claimed that their employer discharged them in retaliation for taking protected leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. They argued that their managers punished FMLA users more severely than non-users who engaged in the same alleged workplace misconduct. Ohio Bell, however, argued that those managers lacked the discretion to fire the plaintiffs, and that the decision to terminate was made higher up the supervisory chain. The Court, however, concluded that the plaintiffs presented enough evidence to defeat the employer’s motion for summary judgment:

Moreover, even if the decision to punish and terminate resided higher in the supervisory chain, as Defendants argue, the animus of the Center Sales Managers can be inferred upwards where it had the effect of coloring the various adverse employment actions in this suit. See Staub v. Proctor Hospital (holding that discriminatory animus can be inferred upwards where the employee who makes the ultimate decision to punish does so in reliance upon assessments or reports prepared by supervisors who possess such animus).

The takeaway? If employers will be liable for the animus of managers and supervisors in all but the most unconnected of decisions, then businesses should get started training those managers and supervisors on their EEO responsibilities. If courts will hold you responsible for their actions, don’t you want some peace of mind that you did everything you could to guide those actions?


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, April 5, 2011

What does Chicken Little teach us about social media policies?


Last week, I had the pleasure of presenting a three-hour seminar on social media and employment law at the Labor & Employment Advances Practices (LEAP) Seminar. The one issue that garnered the most discussion from a room packed with HR professionals, business owners, and in-house counsel was the NLRB’s recent foray into the regulation of social media policies. Almost to a fault, a room of informed and knowledgeable businesspeople entered the session with the notion that the NLRB had banned companies from implementing social media policies that restrict or limit employees’ speech about their employers. I did what I could to dispel that notion. Until the Supreme Court tells me otherwise, I will not be convinced that a business cannot fire an employee who trashes its reputation, or the reputations of its management personnel, online.

My back-and-forth with the conference attendees got me thinking (and tweeting with fellow blogger Daniel Schwartz) about the law of unintended consequences. Because of how the NLRB press-released this settlement, and how the media reported on it, public perception is that social media policies cannot restrict any employee speech. For example, last week a post at Above the Law quoted a Seton Hall law professor from a CBS News interview: “Souza’s case ‘has expanded the free speech rights of American workers…. If they are communicating about the workplace, and they’re talking about their supervisors, then it’s a protected activity.’” This quote accurately summarizes the public (mis)conception about the Souza case.

If the NLRB has succeeded in scaring employers, then hasn’t the NLRB won this point? Even if rational minds conclude that employees will never be allowed to defame or disparage their places of employment or the people who work there—even in the name of protected, concerted activity—hasn’t the very threat of an NLRB charge chilled employers from implementing social media policies that regulate this type of speech?

We’ll never know if the NLRB intended this chilling effect, but the NLRB’s publicity machine has done enough for corporate America to believe that the social media sky is falling, legitimately or not.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, April 4, 2011

Don’t give lip service to your harassment policy


It’s one thing to have a harassment policy. In fact, you’d be hard-pressed in 2011 to find many businesses that don’t. It’s entirely another thing, however, to have corporate culture that take the enforcement of that policy seriously. EEOC v. Dave’s Supermarkets (N.D. Ohio 3/1/11), illustrates the dangers that lurk for employers that choose to give their harassment policies lip service.

In Dave’s Supermarkets, female employees complained that the store ignored their complaints when the meat department manager (no jokes, please) sexually harassed them. The court not only denied the employer’s summary judgment motion as to (most) of the employees’ harassment claims, but also permitted their punitive damage claims to proceed to a jury trial. In refusing to dismiss the punitive damages claims, the court relied heavily on the fact that while the employer maintained a detailed anti-harassment policy, it did not follow through on its own procedures when it received the plaintiffs’ complaints.

A comprehensive anti-harassment policy involves three components:

  1. The anti-harassment policy.
  2. Appropriate training of all employees about that policy.
  3. A consistent corporate culture that take the policy and the company’s anti-harassment stance seriously.

Having a policy and enforcing it are two different animals. A policy is only as good as the people who execute it. Training and the right corporate culture are necessary to ensure that your anti-harassment policy works as best as it should and as often as it is needed. Otherwise, you are left in the awkward (and expensive) position of having to explain to a jury why your actions didn’t match your policy.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, April 1, 2011

WIRTW #171 (the actual retail price without going over edition)


Congratulations to Kristen ten Brink (@onthe10brink on Twitter), who submitted the winning bid to Medical Costs Price Is Right:

The actual retail price of a 19-day at the Cleveland Clinic, including all procedures, labs, doctors, etc., is $106,885.10, which is at least half of what I expected. Kristen, either email or DM me your contact information and I’ll send out your exciting prize package. And, thank you to everyone who participated.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Dukes v. Wal-Mart

Discrimination

Wage & Hour

Social Media & Workplace Technology

Labor Relations 


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, March 31, 2011

The punishment fits the crime – appropriate corrective action in harassment investigations


An employer has an absolute obligation to investigate a complaint of harassment, and, where founded, take appropriate corrective action to stop the harassment from continuing. Next week, we’ll look at the implications of when an employer fails at the former. Today, though, we’ll look at a case that helps define scope of the latter.

In Wilson v. Moulison North Corp. (1st Cir. 3/21/11), the plaintiff alleged that his employer failed to take appropriate corrective action in response to his complaint that coworkers created a workplace permeated by heinous racially discriminatory taunts. The plaintiff argued that the employer’s verbal reprimand and warning that future harassment would result in termination was too mild a sanction, and that the company should have immediately terminated them instead.

The court refused to armchair-quarterback the employer’s business judgment:

In most situations—and this case is no exception—the imposition of employee discipline is not a rote exercise, and an employer must be accorded some flexibility in selecting sanctions for particular instances of employee misconduct.... The short of it is that, given the totality of the circumstances, the punishment seems to have fit the crime....

We appreciate the sincerity of the plaintiff's outrage, but the discipline imposed need not be such as will satisfy the complainant.... The plaintiff’s argument that the sanction must have been inadequate because it was ineffective to stop the harassment is nothing more than a post hoc rationalization.... Barring exceptional circumstances (not present here), a reasoned application of progressive discipline will ordinarily constitute an appropriate response to most instances of employee misconduct.

The key takeaway here is the progressiveness of progressive discipline. When might a similar warning not suffice, and a court require more severe corrective action?

  • If the perpetrators are repeat offenders.
  • If discrimination is a long-standing problem for the employer.
  • If the employer has a history of inconsistent discipline.

Absent these “exceptional circumstances,” do not always jump to the conclusion that a harassment investigation must end in termination. Instead, make the punishment fit the crime.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Today is the final Day for Medical Costs Price is Right


Today is the last day to enter my little Medical Costs Price Is Right Contest (official rules and pictures of the fabulous prize package here). Here are the bids so far:

  • $10,000
  • $62,000
  • $64,250
  • $92,750
  • $117,684.34
  • $121,000
  • $140,000
  • $192,000
  • $234,000
  • $249,999
  • $265,000
  • $275,000
  • $386,000
  • $389,750.19

Remember, the closest to the actual, retail, non-insurance adjusted price of my son’s 19-day stay at the Cleveland Clinic wins. Those of you waiting until the last minute to underbid someone else now have your chance. The contest closes at 11:59 p.m. tonight, so enter now (but not often—one entry per person). I’ll announce the winner tomorrow.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, March 30, 2011

Reading the tea leaves: The Dukes v. Wal-Mart oral argument


Today, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Dukes v. Wal-Mart (transcript available here). Dukes will determine the propriety the certification of the largest sex-discrimination class action ever—a nationwide class of 1.5 million employees. I've previously covered the background of this case. If you have any doubts about the potential significance of Dukes, consider that 66 uninvolved businesses and lobbying groups filed 28 different briefs with the Court advocating for one side or the other. I’m not sure of the record for these filings, but Dukes has to be close.

According to Bloomberg Businessweek, “The suit, citing what are now dated figures from 2001, contends that women are grossly underrepresented among managers, holding just 14 percent of store manager positions compared with more than 80 percent of lower-ranking supervisory jobs that are paid by the hour.” According to Wal-Mart, however, the certified class “includes too many women with too many different positions in its 3,400 stores across the country. [I]ts policies prohibit discrimination and that most management decisions are made at the store and regional levels, not at its Bentonville, Ark., headquarters.”

In pre-gaming today’s oral argument, the Los Angeles Times not only framed the issues but also the importance of this case:

The court’s ruling could be the most far-reaching decision on job bias in more than a decade, according to experts on both sides. A win for [the plaintiffs] could open the door for the broader use of statistics to prove job discrimination—and not just on behalf of women, but also for minorities or persons with disabilities.

However, a win for Wal-Mart could deal a death blow to nationwide job-bias suits by ruling that employees who work in different stores and hold different jobs do not have enough in common to be a class.

Reading the tea leaves, I predict a resounding Wal-Mart victory at the Supreme Court. It is no surprise that given the political makeup of the Court, Justice Kennedy is the swing vote in close cases. As Justice Kennedy goes, so goes the majority. Thus, the following exchange between Justice Kennedy and the plaintiff’s lawyer signals that employees’ string of victories in employment cases may be coming to an end:

   Q: It’s not clear to me: What is the unlawful policy that Wal-Mart has adopted, under your theory of the case?

   A: Justice Kennedy, our theory is that Wal-Mart provided to its managers unchecked discretion in the way that this Court’s Watson decision addressed that was used to pay women less than men who were doing the same work in the same – the same facilities at the same time, even though – though those women had more seniority and higher performance, and provided fewer opportunities for promotion than women because of sex.

   Q: It’s – it’s hard for me to see that the – your complaint faces in two directions. Number one, you said this is a culture where Arkansas knows, the headquarters knows, everything that’s going on. Then in the next breath, you say, well, now these supervisors have too much discretion. It seems to me there’s an inconsistency there, and I’m just not sure what the unlawful policy is.

Suffice it to say that if the key vote on the Court does not fully understand the plainitffs’ argument, Wal-Mart is feeling pretty good about its chances right now.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, March 29, 2011

Ohio House considering comp time bill (HB 61)


One of the biggest wage and hour mistakes a company can make is assuming that it is legal to pay comp time in lieu of overtime for any hours employees work in excess of 40 in a work week. Make no mistake, with the exception of state and local governments, it is illegal to pay comp time as a replacement for overtime wages.

Ohio House Bill 61, currently under consideration, is trying to change this rule for Ohio’s small businesses. HB 61 would allow workers to bank up to 240 hours of comp time per year. At the end of a year, employers would have to pay out overtime wages for any unused comp time. Covered workers would have the right to chose between comp time and overtime pay. Employers would be prohibited from requiring workers to elect comp time, in addition to threatening, intimidating, or firing workers who choose overtime wages.

Here’s the catch: this bill only applies to those small businesses covered by Ohio’s Fair Wage Standards Act but not covered by the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act—those that have gross annual gross sales between $150,000 and $499,999.99. Nevertheless, according to PolitiFact Ohio, this bill has the potential to reach at least 10,000 Ohio small businesses.

HB 61 is a significant move in the right direction to making Ohio a more business-friendly environment. By allowing small businesses the ability to offer comp time to employees, Ohio’s small businesses will be able to provide workplace flexibility that currently does not exist and that employees covet. This benefit will help Ohio attract and maintain the small businesses we need as the backbone of our economic recovery.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, March 28, 2011

The 5 most interesting things about the ADAAA Regulations


Last Friday, the EEOC published its long-awaited (and hotly debated) regulations implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) [pdf]. The blawgosphere has lit up with extensive summaries. Instead of doing the same, I thought I’d share with my readers what strikes me as the five most interesting things I’ve found in these regulations.

     1. Broad Coverage. In case there is any doubt in anyone’s mind, the purpose of the ADAAA is to make it easier for employees seeking the ADA’s protection to establish a disability within its meaning. In other words, employers, the EEOC, and courts are supposed to interpret the definition of disability “broadly.” As a result, ADA cases will no longer focus whether an employee qualifies as disabled, but instead on the merits of the challenged employment decision. Notwithstanding the breadth of these amendments, groups such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and SHRM (registration required) are applauding the EEOC for the pro-business changes incorporated into the regulations.

    2. Individualized Assessments for Medical Conditions. The regulations abolish any notion that certain medical conditions will always qualify as disabilities. Instead, the regulations call for an “individualized assessment” of whether a certain condition “substantially limits a major life activity.” For many conditions, this assessment should be simple and straightforward. For example, deafness, blindness, intellectual disability, partially or completely missing limbs, mobility impairments requiring use of a wheelchair, autism, cancer, cerebral palsy, diabetes, epilepsy, HIV infection, multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia will usually, but not automatically, qualify as disabilities.

     3. Handling of Episodic Conditions and Ameliorative Effects. The current effects of a disability are not the only factors that one considers in determining whether a medical condition is substantially limiting. Impairments that are episodic or in remission—including cancer, epilepsy, hypertension, asthma, diabetes, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia—qualify as disabilities if substantially limiting when active. Additionally, mitigating measures—those that eliminate or reduce the symptoms or impact of an impairment—do not factor into the “substantially limiting” calculus. These mitigating measures include medication, medical equipment and devices, prosthetic limbs, low vision devices (except ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses), hearing aids, mobility devices, oxygen therapy equipment, use of assistive technology, reasonable accommodations, learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications, psychotherapy, behavioral therapy, and physical therapy.

     4. Most Adverse Action Claims Going Forward Will Be “Regarded As” Claims. The ADAAA does not change the statute’s three-pronged approach to defining disability:

  • a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities (an “actual disability”)
  • a record of a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited a major life activity (a “record of disability”)
  • when a covered entity takes an action prohibited by the ADA because of an actual or perceived impairment that is not both transitory and minor (“regarded as” disabled).

What has changed, however, is the agency’s approach to how these definitions factor into claims brought by employees. There is no rule that an employee must use a particular prong when challenging an employer’s actions. However, because an employer is not required to provide a reasonable accommodation for a “regarded as” disability, an employee claiming a denial of a reasonable accommodation must bring the claim as an “actual disability” claim or a “record of” claim. While an employee can bring an adverse action claim under any of the three definition, the EEOC believes that they should be brought under the “regarded as” prong because of its ease of coverage.

     5. Coverage for Temporary or Short-Lived Impairments. The ADAAA substantially expanded the circumstances in which employers may be liable under the “regarded as” prong by removing the requirement that an employee prove that the perceived impairment substantially limits a major life activity. The only exception to the “regarded as” prong is for “transitory and minor” impairments. “Transitory and minor” is an affirmative defense that employers must prove. It is only a defense, however, to claims brought under the “regarded as” prong. It is not a defense to actual disabilities or a record of disability.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, March 25, 2011

WIRTW #170 (the “Come On Down” edition)


There is still one week left to enter Medical Costs Price Is Right. The bids so far:

  • $10,000
  • $62,000
  • $64,250
  • $92,750
  • $117,684.34
  • $192,000

The official rules, along with a picture of the exiting prize package are here. Remember, there are three ways to enter:

  1. Posting a comment to the original blog post.
  2. Send a reply with your guess to @jonhyman on Twitter, using the hashtag #MedicalCostsPriceIsRight.
  3. Post your guess on the wall of the Ohio Employer’s Law Blog Facebook Page, also using the hashtag #MedicalCostsPriceIsRight.

Happy bidding!

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Employee Relations & HR

Social Media & Workplace Technology

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, March 24, 2011

BREAKING NEWS: EEOC releases its final regulations interpreting the ADA Amendments Act


Today, the EEOC made available to the public its final regulations interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAAA). The regulations will become official upon their formal publication in tomorrow’s Federal Register. The EEOC is providing a website that collects links to the final regulations, a Q & A on the regulations, a Q & A for small businesses, and a fact sheet discussing the regulations.

I am going to take the weekend to read the regulations, and will share my thoughts and analysis on Monday. In the meantime, Daniel Schwartz, at his Connecticut Employment Law Blog, reports that SHRM has advised its members “that they were pleased with several changes from the draft version.” There is at least some hope that the final regulations will not be as onerous on businesses as originally feared.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

How soon is too soon to fire a complaining employee?


More than three year ago, the 6th Circuit concluded that where an adverse employment action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a protected activity, the temporal proximity between events is significant enough to constitute evidence of a causal connection for the purposes of satisfying a prima facie case of retaliation. Yesterday, in Hill v. Air Tran Airways [pdf], the same court used a three-day gap between a complaint of discrimination and a termination to reverse a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in a retaliation case:
Although prior to the incident on April 10, 2007, Hill had not formally complained about Thornton in over five months, it is undisputed that Hill complained about Thornton only a few days before the termination. Hill complained to Hughes about Thornton on April 10, 2007, the day of the last incident with Thornton and a few days before Hill’s termination on April 13. Hill also complained about Thornton in an email to Hughes on April 10, the same day Hughes recommended Hill’s termination. Although these complaints were informal, they are relevant to an assessment of temporal proximity.
No employee is bulletproof, and employers should not shy away from firing a deserving employee merely because the employee complained about discrimination. Indeed, some employees, seeing the writing on the wall, complain in an effort to save their jobs or create a lawsuit. However, if you are going to terminate an employee close in time to the exercise of protected activity (and three days is pretty close), you should be prepared for the retaliation lawsuit that is likely to follow.

Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, March 23, 2011

File this one away: Supreme Court continues its trend of protecting complaining employees from retaliation


Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics asks a very simple question: does the word “file” in the Fair Labor Standards Act’s anti-retaliation provision only refer to written complaints, or does it also cover oral complaints? Yesterday, by a 6-2 majority, the Supreme Court concluded the latter, resolving a split among the federal appellate courts and, yet again, opening employers to more expansive liability for retaliation.

The Court spent nearly half of its analysis discussing the merits of various definitions of the word “file,” only to conclude that “the text, taken alone, cannot provide a conclusive answer to our interpretive question. The phrase ‘filed any complaint’ might, or might not, encompass oral complaints.” It instead reached its conclusion that the FLSA’s “antiretaliation provision cover[s] oral, as well as written, ‘complaint[s]’” based on policy concerns:

Why would Congress want to limit the enforcement scheme’s effectiveness by inhibiting use of the Act’s com­ plaint procedure by those who would find it difficult to reduce their complaints to writing, particularly illiterate, less educated, or overworked workers? …

To limit the scope of the antiretaliation provision to the filing of written complaints would also take needed flexi­bility from those charged with the Act’s enforcement. It could prevent Government agencies from using hotlines, interviews, and other oral methods of receiving com­ plaints. And insofar as the antiretaliation provision cov­ers complaints made to employers…, it would discourage the use of desirable informal workplace grievance procedures to secure compliance with the Act….

The Court concluded that the method of communication of a complaint is irrelevant to whether it qualifies as protected activity. A complaint is protected, whether oral or written, if it is “sufficiently clear and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their protection.”

This case merely brings the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision in line with most, if not all, other statutes. Employers simply need to be aware that they take must all complaints seriously, whether communicated verbally or in writing.

The takeaway that is significant for employers, however, is just how difficult oral complaints are to handle. Oral complaints often place employers in the difficult position of having to prove a negative—that is, that the employee did not complain. To combat this problem, employers should consider establishing a protocol that all complaints must be documented, whether by the employee making the complaint or the individual receiving it. Provided that this protocol is consistently and uniformly followed, an employer will at least have the benefit of an inference that an oral complaint was not made if no written record exists.

As always, I’m happy to share the thoughts of my fellow blawgers:


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

BREAKING NEWS: FLSA anti-retaliation provision covers oral complaints, per SCOTUS


This morning, the Supreme Court held that the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision includes oral, in addition to written, complaints.

I’ll have analysis of this opinion tomorrow, including what it means for employers.

[Hat tip: Lawffice Space]


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

6th Circuit disables the “cat’s paw” in ADA cases (for now)


Earlier this month, in Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the Supreme Court upheld the cat’s paw doctrine in discrimination cases. While Staub was a USERRA case, at the time I pointed out the likely broad-reaching implications of the holding:

While the Court limited its holding to USERRA, it pointed out that USERRA’s “motivating factor” causation standard is “very similar to Title VII.” It will be difficult for lower court’s to avoid this broad application of the cat’s paw in Title VII (and likely ADA) cases. The only hold-out will be ADEA cases, which, in light of Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., requires “but for” causation.

It took less than three weeks for the 6th Circuit to gut this holding in ADA cases. In Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp. (6th Cir. 3/17/11), Ohio’s federal appellate court upheld this circuit’s use of a “but for” causation standard in ADA cases. Because this circuit judges ADA cases under a “but for” standard, Staub’s application of the cat’s paw to discrimination statutes using a “motivating factor” standard has no application.

Employers should not get too excited about this victory. The 6th Circuit cautioned that its reading of the ADA’s causation standard is very much in the minority, and invited an appeal to the entire circuit to revisit (and likely overrule) the issue:

The ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of” disability.... Of the ten circuits that have considered the contours of this causation standard, eight currently apply a “motivating factor” (or a “substantial cause”) test; that is, a plaintiff must prove that his disability was only a motivating factor of the adverse employment action in order to prevail.... The current law in the Sixth Circuit, however, is that a plaintiff must prove that his disability was the “sole reason” for the adverse employment action....

“A panel of this Court cannot overrule the decision of another panel. The prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.” ...

Unless that holding is overruled by the full Sixth Circuit sitting en banc or is undermined by an inconsistent decision from the U.S. Supreme Court, it remains good law in this circuit.

For more on the implications of the Lewis decision on the continuing viability of the cat's paw in 6th Circuit ADA cases, I recommend my fellow bloggers at the Employer Law Report.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, March 21, 2011

Quicken Loans beats multi-million dollar overtime claim


The Department of Labor may not be the most hospitable place for employers these days. Federal juries, however, can prove to be just the opposite. Nearly a year ago, the DOL issued a game-changing Administrator’s Interpretation that mortgage loan officers are not exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Last Thursday, a federal jury concluded that a class of 350 specific mortgage loan officers employed by Quicken Loans are exempt administrative employees under the FLSA.

Here’s the jury’s verdict form:

What does this mean?

  1. The jury’s conclusion that the mortgage brokers are exempt is the complete opposite of the DOL’s conclusion in its March 2010 Administrator’s Interpretation. In other words, while employers should be wary of what the DOL is doing in this area, its words is not the gospel.
  2. Even though the jury concluded the plaintiffs were exempt, they took the time to fill in an unnecessary “0” on the line asking how many average hours the plaintiffs worked in a week. In other words, the jury simply did not believe the plaintiffs’ story. While lawyers are trained on the law, cases are won and lost on their facts.

The Detroit Free Press quotes Quicken Loans founder and Chairman Dan Gilbert, “It was never about money for us. It was always about right and wrong.” Crains Detroit Business estimates that the defense verdict saved Quicken Loans between $4 million and $30 million in damages for unpaid overtime. Sometimes, it absolutely pays to fight these battles.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, March 18, 2011

WIRTW #169 (the madness edition)


If you wonder why office productivity sinks like a rock for the next two weeks, look no further than all of your employees checking their brackets while clogging up your computer network watching live college basketball feeds. Three of my fellow bloggers shared their thoughts this week on March Madness’s effect on the workplace:

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Labor Relations

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, March 17, 2011

What does St. Patrick have to do with human resources?


Legend tells us that in the 5th century, St. Patrick banished all snakes from Ireland. In honor of the day that celebrates Ireland’s patron saint, consider banishing the following metaphorical snakes from your HR practices:

  • Illegal questions on employment applications, such as age, medical conditions, or workers compensation histories.
  • Irregularities in pre-hiring procedures, such as unlawful background checks, medical inquiries, and medical exams.
  • Overly broad policies in employee handbooks, such as anti-union no-solicitation policies or policies that ban discussions of wages and other workplace terms and conditions.
  • FMLA policies that do not comply with the law’s recent regulatory changes.
  • Absent technology and social media policies.
  • Harassment training done less frequently than ever other year.
  • Misclassified employees (non-exempt as exempt, and employees as independent contractors).
  • Managers and supervisors that have not been trained in the handling, discipline, and documentation of problem employees?
  • Missing EEO, DOL, and other mandatory employment law postings.
  • Key employees that are not locked down with appropriate confidentiality, no-solicitation, and/or non-competition agreements.

While there may never have been snakes in Ireland, we at least know that they haven’t bothered anyone on the Emerald Isle since the time of St. Patrick. Do yourself a favor by ensuring that these employment law snakes do not bother your business again.