Monday, November 22, 2010

EEOC poised to explore plight of older workers in current economy


Last Wednesday, the EEOC heard testimony that age discrimination is causing older workers to have a difficult time maintaining and finding new employment. The EEOC believes that the current economic climate is exacerbating this problem. At a minimum, it is increasing the number of employees who claim to be victims of age discrimination. Last year, the EEOC received 22,778 charges of age discrimination, which represented 24.4% of all charges filed, up from 16,548 charges and 21.8% in 2006.

The EEOC heard the following testimony:

EEOC Commissioner Stuart J. Ishimaru said, “The treatment of older workers is a matter of grave concern for the Commission. We must be vigilant that employers do not use the current economy as an excuse for discrimination against older workers.” Going forward, it is clear that the EEOC will target age discrimination as an enforcement priority. Any company that is either reducing ranks via layoffs, or hiring to re-staff as the economy rebounds, should pay extra attention to age discrimination issues in light of this administrative enforcement.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, November 19, 2010

WIRTW #153 (the redux edition)


Except for two huge stories (the failure of the Paycheck Fairness Act and on-going coverage of the NLRB’s complaint challenging a Connecticut company’s social media policy), it’s been a pretty quiet week.

For more on the Senatorial sinking of Paycheck Fairness, see Maryland Employment Law Developments, The Proactive Employer, Washington Labor & Employment Wire, Connecticut Employment Law Blog, Washington D.C. Employment Law Update, HR HQ, Colorado Employer's Law Blog, and the DOL’s Work in Progress blog (for a pro-employee viewpoint).

For more on the future legality of workplace social media policies, see The ChamberPost, Philip Miles’s Lawffice Space, HR Observations, New York Labor and Employment Law Report, The Labor and Employment Law Blog, Nolo’s Employment Law Blog, Delaware Employment Law Blog, Joe’s HR and Benefits Blog, Minnesota Labor & Employment Law Blog, TLNT, and Today's Workplace (for a pro-employee viewpoint).

Also this week, the EEOC issued a Q&A for small businesses on its GINA regulations, in addition to some background information on the regulations.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Social Networking

Discrimination

Trade Secrets and Non-Compete Agreements

Labor Relations

Employee Relations and HR

Wage & Hour


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, November 18, 2010

The failure of the Paycheck Fairness Act ends the golden age of employment law


The Democrats swept into office in January 2009 with promises of paradigm-shifting labor and employment law reforms: card check union recognition, Title VII coverage for sexual orientation and gender identity, expanded FMLA coverage, the end of arbitration agreements, and paid sick leave are but a few of the campaign issues on which the Democrats won the the White House and substantial majorities in both halves of Congress.

Yesterday, the Senate failed to vote to close debate on the Paycheck Fairness Act. That vote, coupled with the incoming Republican majority in the House, means that we likely have seen the end of any significant employment law reforms by the Obama administration’s first (only?) term. The scorecard is stunning. The lone significant employment law legislation to become law under Obama’s watch is the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, which, in and of itself, is not all that significant. It affects the timeliness of discrimination claims, and potentially exposes businesses to more lawsuits. Yet, if you ranked the various pieces of legislation discussed and debated over the last two years, Ledbetter would rank pretty low in terms of societal impact.

In comparison, President Bush passed three key pieces of employment legislation during his last year in office: the FMLA military leave amendments, the ADA amendments, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. The significance of these three laws will be felt for years to come.

In early 2009, I joined the chorus of employment lawyers who believed that President Obama would change the landscape of labor and employment law. No one ever likes to be wrong. For the sake of American businesses, many of which are still trying to climb out of the worse recession in 80 years, I have never been so happy to have been off the mark.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, November 17, 2010

Three steps to avoid a discriminatory hiring claim


Bartlett v. Gates (6th Cir. 11/16/10) [pdf] involved a plaintiff who claimed that he was passed over for a promotion because of his age and sex. The 6th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court’s dismissal of the discrimination claims for the following three reasons:

  1. The plaintiff was objectively as qualified as, if not more qualified than, the successful candidate. He had 24 years of experience as compared to eight. In addition, he possessed superior educational credentials, including a bachelor’s degree, whereas the successful candidate had not graduated from college. There was also some evidence of superior communication skills and job-specific work experience.

  2. The hiring manager had not conducted any job interviews and lacked basic knowledge about the successful candidate. Despite the employer’s explanation that it had hired the best-qualified candidate for the position, the hiring manager was unable to describe her credentials. The hiring manager testified that she was able to making a hiring decision without holding any interviews because of her personal knowledge and familiarity with the job applicants’ experience, backgrounds, and competency. Yet, she did not know whether the successful candidate even had a prior experience related to the core functions of the job.

  3. There was some direct evidence of discriminatory animus. The plaintiff’s supervisor and hiring manager made comments to and about the plaintiff such as informing him that his 34 years on the job were “enough,” joking about whether he had taken up “antiquing or traveling or something like that,” and suggesting that the plaintiff should retire.

What lessons can employers take away from this case to avoid a discriminatory hiring claim? Here’s three:

  1. If you are not going to hire the most qualified person, at least know what you are getting yourself into. Perform a comparison of candidates, including their qualifications, relevant experience, and key demographics. Have objectively supportable reasons why you chose the 29-year-old over the 53-year-old.

  2. Meet the candidates. When you whittle the field down to the final few, meet and interview them. Do not rely solely on paper. If you know the candidates, do not rely solely on past experience. Talk to them, avoid illegal questions, and form reasoned, objectively supportable pros and cons for each.

  3. Finally, if you feel the need to make racial, sexist, or ageist comments in the months before and after a hiring decision, wait until you get home, make sure all your doors and windows are closed, and yell them into a pillow.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, November 16, 2010

Do you know? Post-employment retaliation


The typical retaliation scenario involves an employer firing an employee who complained about discrimination or engaged in some other protected activity. What happens, however, if the employer retaliates after the end of the employment relationship? Do the anti-retaliation laws reach these allegations of post-employment misconduct? The short answer is yes.

The logical place to start in deciphering this “yes” is with the statues themselves. Ohio’s anti-retaliation provision, O.R.C. 4112.02(I), makes it illegal
for any person to discriminate in any manner against any other person because that person has opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice defined in this section or because that person has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing under sections 4112.01 to 4112.07 of the Revised Code.
All of the federal anti-discrimination laws (Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and GINA) contain similar prohibitions. In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the term “employees” in Title VII’s retaliation provision “includes former employees,” allowing an employee to “bring suit against his former employer for postemployment actions allegedly taken in retaliation.” Because of the similarity in language across the federal and state statutes, it’s safe to assume this result applies across the board.

What does this mean for employers? It means that retaliation does not stop on the last day of employment. It means that employers must treat ex-employees who have engaged in protected activity with the same kid gloves as current employees. And, it means that ex-employees can sue you for post-employment adverse actions such as:
Just one more concept to build into your EEO training for your managers and supervisors.

Monday, November 15, 2010

What dryer drums have to do with unpaid wages (or, a scathing judicial indictment of class action lawsuits as extortion)


clotheswashersmoney Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Company (7th Cir. 11/2/10) [pdf] involves the attempted litigation of multiple class action lawsuits in different states over the issue of whether the advertising of a stainless steel dryer drum was deceptive. In brief, after a district court dismissed a class action lawsuit brought by Thorogood against Sears in Tennessee, the same lawyers filed a similar claim in California on behalf of a different plaintiff, Murray. The case caught my attention because of judge’s scathing indictment of class action lawsuits (I apologize for the long quote, but it is worth reading):

The class action is a worthwhile device for economizing on the expense of litigation and enabling small claims, illustrated by Thorogood’s claim, capped at $3,000, to be litigated at all (though when the claim is deceptive advertising, a proceeding before the Federal Trade Commission is a more economical alternative to a class action suit). But the device also lends itself to abuse. [C]lass members are interested in relief for the class but the lawyers are primarily interested in their fees, and the class members’ stakes in the litigation are ordinarily (and in the present case or cases) too small to motivate them to supervise the lawyers in an effort to align the lawyers’ incentives with their own…. Defendants, wanting to minimize the sum of the damages they pay the class and the fees they pay the class counsel, are willing to trade small damages for high attorneys’ fees…. These convergent incentives forge a community of interest between class counsel, who control the plaintiff’s side of the case, and the defendants, but may leave the class members out in the cold….

An additional asymmetry, also adverse to defendants, involves the cost of pretrial discovery in class actions. One purpose of discovery—improper and rarely acknowledged but pervasive—is: “it makes one’s opponent spend money.” … In most class action suits, including this one, there is far more evidence that plaintiffs may be able to discover in defendants’ records (including emails, the vast and ever-expanding volume of which has made the cost of discovery soar) than vice versa. For usually the defendants’ conduct is the focus of the litigation and it is in their records, generally much more extensive than the plaintiffs’ (especially when as in a consumer class action the plaintiffs are individuals rather than corporations or other institutions), that the plaintiffs will want to rummage in quest for smoking guns.

The merit of Murray’s case, like Thorogood’s, of which it is a close copy, is slight. But the pressure on Sears to settle on terms advantageous to its opponent will mount up if class counsel’s ambitious program of discovery is allowed to continue. A letter from Mark Boling, Murray’s co-counsel, to Sears’s counsel, printed at the end of this opinion, illustrates the point. The letter reminds Sears that discovery is proceeding and “will involve Plaintiff’s counsel delving into the full extent of Defendants’ alleged wrongdoing” in order to justify not only equitable relief but also punitive damages—which are potentially very large given the size of the class and the possible preclusive use of any judgments favorable to the plaintiffs in suits brought in other states. The letter continues: “as we progress through the various stages of this litigation, the cost of settlement will necessarily increase…. At this point, we may want to consider whether an appropriate olive branch for resolution can be mutually created on a class wide basis commensurate with the status of the case. If interested, please pick up the telephone and call me. In the meantime, Plaintiff will continue to diligently and timely prosecute this case to an appropriate result.” In other words, unless Sears settles now (implicitly for modest relief for the class and an agreement with class counsel to recommend to the judge generous fees for Krislov and Boling), it will incur the considerable cost of responding to class counsel’s distended project of “delving” and assume the risk of a very large adverse judgment. And as Boling’s letter also points out, “if plaintiff is successful on a motion for class certification, the court as the gate keeper will demand a more significant recovery for resolution.”

This scenario is not all that much more different than the standard wage and hour class action.

  • Like the Sears example, employers in wage and hour class actions bear a disproportionately large share of time and expense in discovery. Employers have most, if not all, of the wage and hour records, many of which are archived and expensive to recover. Discovery of email exponentially adds to the discovery expense. These high costs bear heavily on an employer’s decision whether to settle or litigate a case.

  • Like Sears, employers feel an inordinate pressure to settle these claims. The exposure in wage and hour lawsuits can be large (sometimes, even “bet the company” like exposure). The risk of high attorneys’ fees award only serves to exacerbate that pressure to settle. It is not a secret that claimants use that exposure to their advantage to leverage early resolutions.

  • And, like the Federal Trade Commission in a consumer case, there exists a federal agency that can economically litigate a meritorious claim, the Department of Labor.

Now that we all know what dryer drums have in common with wages and hours, we can get back to defending class action lawsuits.

[Hat tip: PointofLaw.com]

Friday, November 12, 2010

WIRTW #152 (the Facebook firing edition)


Last week, I wrote about the NLRB’s complaint against a Connecticut company claiming that its social networking policy violated federal labor law. Since then, the story has exploded across the Internet, being picked up by the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, Law.com, the ABA, CNN, ABC News, MSNBC, Fox News, NPR, and cnet, to name a few. The NLRB itself has even gotten in on the act, updating its own Facebook page to publicly discuss the issue (not to pre-decide the case or anything). It’s also been a popular topic across the blogosphere:

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

HR and Employee Relations

Litigation

Technology

Wage & Hour


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, November 11, 2010

Court makes clear that an ADA reasonable accommodation does not require preferential treatment in filling open positions


In Garcia v. Whirlpool Corp. (N.D. Ohio 11/5/10) [pdf], the trial court dismissed a disability discrimination claim because the plaintiff agreed that the individuals hired into the open position for which she sought reassignment as a reasonable accommodation were more qualified.

Here are the facts. Garcia had a 10-year history of shoulder problems relating to workplace injuries suffered on a Whirlpool assembly line. After her third shoulder surgery, which did not correct the problem, her doctor informed her that she had reached maximum medical improvement. Accordingly, she could not return to her assembly line position.

Whirlpool had a job bidding procedure, in which hourly employees, like Garcia, could bid on open positions. Whirlpool’s policy and practice was to hire the most qualified candidate, which it generally considered to be the qualified employee with the most seniority. Garcia expressed interest in and applied for several administrative, salaried, or supervisory positions. Ultimately, all of her applications were unsuccessful. Whirlpool awarded the jobs to employees with prior management experience, prior job-specific experience, or a college degree.

Ultimately, Whirlpool fired Garcia pursuant to its medical leave policy, which allowed for a maximum of two years of leave.

The district court disagreed with Garcia that Whirlpool owed her a transfer to one of the open positions as a reasonable accommodation. While the ADA requires an employer to consider reassignment to a vacant position if the disabled employee cannot be reasonably accommodated in his or her current job, it does not require a promotion as a reasonable accommodation. Thus, because none of the jobs for which Garcia applied were comparable to her assembly line job, and many would have been promotions, she could not prove that she was qualified to work with a reasonable accommodation.

Additionally, Whirlpool was entitled to fill the vacancies by following its internal policy and bidding procedure to hire the most qualified candidates. The court made it clear —at least in the 6th circuit and majority of other circuits—that the ADA does not mandate preferential treatment:

[T]he ADA does not impose a mandatory obligation to reassign the disabled employee where the employer has a policy of awarding the transfer position to the most qualified candidate, and the employer would be required to turn away a superior candidate.

Because Garcia could not contest that the individuals Whirlpool hired were more qualified, her ADA claim failed.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

The 5 most interesting things about GINA


To have Gina, Gina all for my very own
It’s much too wonderful, so very wonderful
To know that Gina is mine alone
 – Gina, Johnny Mathis

Yesterday, the EEOC published the long-awaited regulations to the employment provisions of GINA [pdf], the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. According to the EEOC, GINA has 4 stated purposes:

  1. To prohibit the use of genetic information in employment decisions;
  2. To restrict employers and others from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information;
  3. To require that employers maintain genetic information as a confidential medical record, with strict limits on disclosure; and
  4. To provide remedies for individuals whose genetic information is acquired, used, or disclosed in violation of the Act. 

After taking a day to digest these regulations, here’s what I found to be the 5 most interesting things the regulations provide:

  1. GINA does not just cover employees’ genetic information. It also covers the genetic information of relations as attenuated as great-great-grandparents, great-great-grandchildren, and first cousins once-removed (the children of first cousins).

  2. GINA is intended to be a broad anti-discrimination statute. It not only prohibits discrimination against employees on the basis of genetic information in hiring, firing, compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, but also harassment on the basis of genetic information, and retaliation where an individual opposes any act made unlawful by GINA, files a charge of discrimination or assists another in doing so, or gives testimony in connection with a charge.

  3. GINA’s prohibition against the request of genetic information about an employee or family member includes Internet searches in a way that is likely to result in obtaining genetic information, even if the information is publicly available. However, if an employer “inadvertently learns genetic information from a social media platform which he or she was given permission to access by the creator of the profile at issue” (such as an employee who posts family medical history on his Facebook wall, and his supervisor, with whom he is a Facebook friend, sees it), GINA has not been violated. Employers are similarly protected for genetic information employees inadvertently disclose during casual “water cooler” conversations.

  4. GINA permits employers to obtain genetic information as part of employer-provided health or genetic services, such as voluntary wellness programs. While the regulation do not define “voluntary,” they do provide that employers can offer certain financial incentives to employees without stripping the wellness program of its voluntariness.

  5. GINA requires that employers keep all genetic information confidential, stored in separately maintained confidential medical files, consistent with the medical information storage obligations of the ADA. There is, however, a grandfather provision for genetic information obtained before November 21, 2009. Employers need not strip that information from non-confidential files.

As I noted above, there has been a lot of coverage around the blawgs about these regulations. If you are looking for more information and analysis on GINA’s regulations, I recommend the following:

In the face of these regulations, expect to see genetic discrimination claims as a growing trend in 2011.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, November 9, 2010

Do you know? FMLA & bereavement leave (or, what to do when a supervisors calls an unauthorized leave request “cool”)


The FMLA covers a lot of family emergencies. Death, however, is not one of them. There is no situation in which the FMLA, on its face, provides for a leave of absence for bereavement. Lots of employers allow for bereavement leave for lots of situations, but it is not required by the FMLA.

That is, it is not required by the FMLA unless you promise otherwise. In Murphy v. FedEx National (8th Cir. 8/26/10), an employee sought and received FMLA leave to care for her hospitalized husband. When he died a week later, she took three days’ bereavement leave. Thereafter, she told her supervisor she needed 30 more days to “take care of things.” The supervisor responded, “OK, cool, not a problem, I’ll let HR know.” As it turns out, the extra 30 days was a problem for HR, which denied the request and terminated the employee, who had not returned to work.

The 8th Circuit was not all that sympathetic to FedEx’s claim that Murphy didn’t qualify for FMLA leave. The court focused on the supervisor’s statement, “OK, cool, not a problem, I’ll let HR know.” It concluded that one could easily interpret that statement to be an approval of the request for leave.

This is known as coverage by estoppel. While the FMLA does not cover bereavement leave, an employer’s representation, on which an employee reasonably relies to his or her detriment, will create coverage under the statute. In other words, if an employee, based on all the facts the circumstances, reasonably believes that the employer approved the FMLA leave, the employer cannot deny the leave request.

How do you avoid situations like these from cropping up in your workplace? You cannot require all leave requests be in writing, but there are certain steps you can take.

  1. Train all managers and supervisors on the minutia of your leave policies. Anyone with any authority of any kind over employees must know what leave is authorized and what is not.
  2. Require that all leave requests of any kind go through a designated central person or persons, like an HR manager.
  3. Place a statement in your handbook that only leave granted by that central person or persons is authorized, and that no one else within the company has the authority or discretion to grant a leave of absence of any kind. That way, even if a supervisor tells an employee that leave is “cool,” it will not be reasonable for her to rely on that statement.

Do you want to read more on coverage by estoppel?


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, November 8, 2010

Are businesses cracking down on bandwidth?


I cannot work in silence. I never could, and I likely never will be able to. In high school, I did all my homework with the stereo blaring in my bedroom. In college, I studied in the common area of my dorm, with activity buzzing all around. And in law school, the student lounge was my study area. So, it comes as no surprise to me that I’ve never been able to practice law in silence either. These days, it’s either my iPod, or XM radio streaming through my desktop. The latter, however, is a bandwidth hog. Do the math. If you multiply me times a few dozen employees (or a few hundred, or a few thousand, depending on the size of the organization), it’s no surprise that corporate networks are being strained.

It’s also no surprise that employers are starting to fight back. According to the Silicon Valley Mercury News, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics announced to its employees that it would begin blocking music-streaming sites, online radio stations and gaming sites, and sites that stream sports and entertainment audio or video. Lockheed estimates that these recreational uses consumed up to 10% of its Internet bandwidth.

Decisions such as those taken by Lockheed are difficult ones. It’s often a struggle to balance corporate resources and employee morale. There is no right or wrong answer. You could frame the dilemma simply as “more bandwidth costs more money, ergo, bandwidth restrictions.” Or, you believe that happy employees are more productive employees, and determine that what you spend in extra bandwidth you will recoup in added productivity. Or, you can act like the HR manager in Dilbert and reward serious offenders by promoting them.

Bottom line – businesses need to make decisions about the appropriate allocation and use of bandwidth, and incorporate that decision into a workplace technology policy that sets out the dos and don’ts of workplace Internet use.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, November 5, 2010

WIRTW #151 (the election recap edition)


Here’s my 140-character recap of Tuesday’s election: Obama did not learn from Clinton’s 92 – 94 mistakes. Cost Dems huge. We’ll see if Boehner learned anything from Gingrich’s post-1994 gaffes. Craving a more substantive analysis of the 2010 mid-term elections?

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Employee Relations

Social Networking and Technology

Wage & Hour

Trade Secrets & Competition


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, November 4, 2010

6th Circuit holds that an individual must be disabled to challenge a selection criteria under the ADA (but does it matter?)


Employee use of prescription drugs has been in the news lately. Last week, the New York Times ran a piece discussing the drug testing of employees for prescription medications. The article discussed Dura Automotive Systems, which, over concerns about drug use and worker safety, hired an independent company to administer random drug tests of its employes. It chose to screen for 12 types of drugs, including hydrocodone and oxycodone. Seven Dura employees tested positive for lawful prescription medications and sued following their terminations.

Yesterday, in Bates v. Dura Automotive Systems, Inc. (6th Cir. 11/3/10) [pdf], the 6th Circuit dismissed the claims of any of the plaintiffs who are not disabled under the ADA.

Section 12112(b)(6) of the ADA prohibits discrimination based on qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria. It provides:

No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual [by] using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.

The 6th Circuit concluded that the plain language of the statute barred non-disabled employees from pursuing a claim:

Although non-disabled individuals may bring claims under some provisions of the Act, the plain text of subsection (b)(6) only covers individuals with disabilities. The text of subsection (a) and (b)(6) specifically refers to “qualified individual[s] with disabilit[ies],” and not … a broader class of individuals such as “employees.” … A straightforward reading of this statute compels the conclusion that only a “qualified individual with a disability” is protected from the prohibited form of discrimination described in subsection (b)(6)…. Although other sections of the Act apply to non-disabled individuals, the Act’s primary purpose is to prevent discrimination against disabled individuals…. Interpreting subsection (b)(6) as being limited to individuals with disabilities better gives effect to Congress’s decision not to use the word “employees” in this subsection.

This case may end up being much ado about nothing. Because terminations occurred before Jan. 1, 2009, the 6th Circuit decided this case under the pre-amendment ADA, which had a might tighter definition of “disability.” As I have previously discussed, the ADA Amendments Act expands the definition of “disability” so broadly that virtually every employee with a medical condition could be considered “disabled.” Therefore, future drug testing cases likely will not be decided on the issue of whether the tested employees were “disabled.” Instead, courts will decide future cases on whether the drug testing was job related and consistent with business necessity—an affirmative defense under the ADA. For this reason, it is important for businesses to contemporaneously document the job nexus and business need for all employee drug testing.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

Does your social networking policy violate federal labor laws?


It was only a matter of time before the NLRB inserted itself into the intersection of social networking and employment relations. It has Twitter account. Now, it has issued its first complaint challenging an employer’s social networking policy.

The NLRB has issued a complaint against a company that fired an employee after posting negative comments about her supervisor on her personal Facebook page. The Blog of Legal Times reports that the NLRB not only alleges that the employer illegally fired the employee for the posting, but that the company “maintained and enforced an overly broad blogging and Internet posting policy.”

An NLRB investigation found that the Facebook postings were “protected concerted activity,” and that the company’s blogging and Internet posting policy contained unlawful provisions, including one that barred employees from making disparaging remarks when discussing the company or supervisors and another that prohibited employees from depicting the company in any way over the Internet without company permission.

“Such provisions constitute interference with employees in the exercise of their right to engage in protected concerted activity,” the NLRB found.

This case could have far reaching implications for all employers—not just those that are collectively bargained. If the NLRB concludes that a singular posting on a personal website constitutes protected concerted activity, then it will be nearly impossible for an employer to regulate off-the-clock Internet activity. The NLRB will hold a hearing on this case on January 25, 2011. I will be very interested to read the ALJ’s decision.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Reading the tea leaves: Staub v. Proctor Hospital and the “Cat’s Paw”


Before we get into the specifics of the Staub case, let’s first discuss the relationship between a cat’s appendage and employment discrimination law. The “cat's paw” derives from a 17th century fable by French poet Jean de la Fontaine. In “The Money and the Cat,” a monkey tricks a cat into scooping chestnuts out of a fire so that the monkey can eagerly gobble them up, leaving none left for the cat. It generally describes a situation where one is unwittingly manipulated to do another’s bidding. Drawing the parallel between la Fontaine’s fable and discrimination law, one seeks to hold an employer (the cat) liable for the discriminatory animus of an employee who played no role in the decision, but nevertheless exerted some degree of influence (the monkey). As Mike Maslanka put it on his Work Matters blog, the question is what is an employer’s liability “when the guy who pulled the trigger is pure, but the guy who loads the gun is not?”

Thus, the argument in the case is framed like this:

  • Employers argue that federal discrimination laws make the employer liable only for the actions of the employee or supervisor who takes the discriminatory action.
  • Employees,  however, argue that the is enough that the person with the discriminatory animus (the money) played some role in the process, even if the decision maker (the cat) is completely unaware of the animus.

As for the specifics of the case, Staub brought his claim under USERRA, which, among other things, protects those in military service from discrimination upon their return to employment from active duty. Staub had been a long-time employee of Proctor Hospital before being called upon to serve in Iraq. Many at the hospital were critical of Staub’s military service because of the strain it put on those who had to cover from him in his absence. When the Vice President of HR, who held no hostility towards Staub, terminated him, he sued, claiming that although the decision maker was not personally biased against his military service, she fired him based on the hostility of Staub’s direct supervisors.

The 7th Circuit reversed a jury verdict for Staub, holding:

[W]here an employee without formal authority to materially alter the terms and conditions of a plaintiff’s employment nonetheless uses her “singular influence” over an employee who does have such power to harm the plaintiff for racial reasons, the actions of the employee without formal authority are imputed to the employer…. [W]here a decision maker is not wholly dependent on a single source of information, but instead conducts its own investigation into the facts relevant to the decision, the employer is not liable for an employee’s submission of misinformation to the decision maker.

In other words, under the 7th Circuit’s pronouncement of the cat’s paw, the employer can only be liable if the decision maker is only influenced by the animus of the non-decision makers.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court held oral argument [transcript, in pdf] in this case. It’s hard to read Supreme Court Justices at oral argument. Sometimes they play devil’s advocate, and sometimes they genuinely challenge the attorney. Regardless, I found the following question from Justice Breyer (one the Court’s more liberal justices) to the employer’s attorney to be insightful:

You have A and B, they are both supervisors; in the one case B fires the employee because he is in the Army, and he says it: Ha, ha, that’s why I’m doing it. In the second case he fires the employee … for a perfectly good reason, but A has lied about it. And the reason A lied about it was because she wanted to tell him a lie so B would fire the employee, and her reason is because he’s in the Army. Those two situations, the second seems to me one of … 80 million situations, fact-related, that could arise, and I don’t know why we want a special standard for such a situation. Why not just ask the overall question, was this action an action that was -­ in which the bad motive was a motivating factor. Forget psychoanalysis of A. B is good enough -- or vice versa.

I also found insightful the following exchange between Justices Alito and Kennedy and the employee’s attorney:

   Justice Alito: Even -- even if the employer at that time did every -- made every reasonable effort to investigate the validity of all the prior evaluations, still the employer would be on the hook?

   A: Yes. There is nothing in the statute or in the common law that creates a special rule for thorough investigation.

   Justice Kennedy: Well, that's a sweeping rule. I was going to ask a related hypothetical. Suppose the -- the officer who is in charge, charged with the decision to terminate or not to terminate says: I'm going to have a hearing. You can both have counsel. And you have who, is it -- suppose Buck -- suppose the two employees that were allegedly anti-military here testified and they said there was no anti-military bias, and the person is then terminated. Later the employee has evidence that those two were lying. Could he bring an action then?

   A: Yes. Yes.

   Justice Kennedy: That’s sweeping. That's almost an insurer’s liability insofar as the director of employment is concerned…. He has to insure. He has -- he has done everything he can, he has an hearing, and he has almost absolute liability.

Reading the tea leaves, it is likely that the cat’s paw will survive the Supreme Court’s review in a narrow form. I predict that the court will derive a standard that looks to the ultimate decision and the role that the animus of the non-decision maker played in that decision. I also think that the Court will craft an affirmative defense or other means to rebut the inference of the cat’s paw, such as the decision maker's independent investigation of the circumstances leading to the termination.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, November 2, 2010

Do you know? 10 provisions to include in severance and separation agreements


Last week, I wrote about problems in enforcing non-disparagement clauses in separation agreements. It got me to thinking—what other clauses should businesses prioritize for inclusion in separation agreements, other than the release and waiver? Here are my thoughts:
  1. Consideration: A statement that the consideration provided to the employee is more than that to which the employee is otherwise entitled to employment by way of employment. Otherwise, the release and waiver could fail for the employee not receiving anything of value in exchange.
  2. Confidentiality: A covenant as to the confidentiality of the agreement. You do not want other employees learning the terms of the separation, or that agreement was even reached. Otherwise, it could open the floodgates to other employees seeking separation packages.
  3. Secrets: A covenant as to the confidentiality of employer’s confidential and proprietary information.
  4. Return of Property: A covenant that all corporate property has been returned, or will be returned by a date certain.
  5. Transition: A promise to reasonably cooperate with the employer as to the transition of job duties and responsibilities.
  6. No-rehire: A promise that the employee will not apply for any positions in the future, and that the company is not obligated to consider him or her for future employment. Because there is some risk that a clause such as this could be viewed as retaliatory, indemnification language is not a bad idea.
  7. No Liability: A statement that the agreement is not an admission of liability.
  8. Governing law, Jurisdiction, and Venue: An agreement as to the law that will govern the agreement, and the jurisdiction and venue in which one must file any lawsuit regarding a breach of the agreement.
  9. Entire Agreement: An integration clause, stating that the written agreement is the parties’ entire agreement, that no other written or oral agreements exist, and that the parties may only amend the agreement in writing signed by all.
  10. Voluntariness: An acknowledgement that the employee read and understands the agreement, and had sufficient time and an opportunity to consult with his or her own legal advisor prior to signing the agreement.
What else are people including in their separation and severance agreements? Readers, did I miss any?


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, November 1, 2010

You deserve to be told who to vote for today … at McDonald’s


A McDonald’s franchisee in Canton finds itself in trouble this election season for including inside employees’ paychecks a pamphlet urging them to vote Republican. As if an employer’s inclusion of political literature with paychecks isn’t intimidating enough, the note stated, “If the right people are elected, we will be able to continue with raises and benefits at or above the current levels. If others are elected, we will not.”

These actions likely violate a little-known Ohio law that prohibits an employer from influencing the political opinions or votes of employees. O.R.C. § 3599.05 provides:

No employer or his agent or a corporation shall print or authorize to be printed upon any pay envelopes any statements intended or calculated to influence the political action of his or its employees; or post or exhibit in the establishment or anywhere in or about the establishment any posters, placards, or hand bills containing any threat, notice, or information that if any particular candidate is elected or defeated work in the establishment will cease in whole or in part, or other threats expressed or implied, intended to influence the political opinions or votes of his or its employees.

The lesson is simple—keep politics out of the workplace. It’s divisive, makes employees uncomfortable, and, at least in this instance, illegal.

For more on the intersection between election day and the workplace, see Time off to vote on election day.

[Hat tip: The Word on Employment Law with John Phillips and Joe’s HR and Benefits Blog]


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Is it illegal to ask employees to promise not to sign union authorization cards?


1888_vote While the Employee Free Choice Act has stalled in Congress, it does not mean that it is no longer newsworthy. For example, tomorrow, four states (Arizona, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah) will have ballot measures aimed at preventing the EFCA from being implemented on a state level.

For more evidence of the continued relevancy of the debate over the ECFA, consider the case of Regis Corp. The NLRB issued a complaint against Regis as a result of allegations that it asked its employees to sign a document revoking their future right to form a union by using an authorization card. According to Regis, the purpose of the document was to protect the workers’ ability to vote in a secret ballot election. Regis also contends that the agreement was completely voluntary—up to 20% of its workers have refused to sign it and none have been terminated. Yet, five employees complained to the NLRB that they felt their jobs were at risk if they didn’t sign the form, or who said they lost jobs because they questioned it.

Last week, the NLRB issued a complaint against Regis as a result of the secret ballot pledge:

The NLRB today issued a complaint against Minneapolis-based Regis Corporation … alleging it illegally solicited employees to promise in writing that they would not sign union authorization cards in the future.

The complaint also alleges that, in a DVD played to employees across the country, the company’s Chief Executive Officer warned that hair stylists would be blacklisted from the industry if they supported a union. In the recording, he exhorted employees to sign a “Protection of Secret Vote Agreement”, which would prospectively revoke any union authorization cards signed in the future. The complaint further alleges that a district manager threatened employees with job loss if they refused to sign the agreement.

The alleged events occurred in the fall and winter of 2009-2010, at a time when legislation was pending in Congress that would have required employers to recognize a union if a majority of employees signed authorization cards. It has not been enacted.

I have not done the research to conclude whether Regis’s pledge is legal or illegal. But, as this case illustrates, under the current pro-labor NLRB labor practices that come close to the line scrutinized before being put into practice. As the NLRB is currently constituted, this federal agency is a hostile audience for employers accused of anti-union measures. When dealing with labor unions or employee concerted activities, employers should view their measures through the same labor-tinted glasses as will the NLRB.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, October 29, 2010

WIRTW #150 (the sesquicentennial edition)


It’s hard to believe that I’ve been writing these wrap-ups for 150 weeks. When I started this feature on October 12, 2007, I never imagined I’d still be doing it three years later, let alone blogging three years later. Some other milestones from the week of October 12, 2007 (courtesy of Wikipedia):

  • U.S. athlete Marion Jones returns the five medals she won at the Sydney Olympics and accepts a two-year ban from the sport after admitting to her use of a prohibited substance.

  • The general election in the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador gives the Conservative government of Premier Danny Williams an enlarged majority at the expense of the Liberals.

  • Polish police evict about 65 rebellious ex-nuns who had illegally occupied a convent in Kazimierz Dolny, Poland, for more than two years in defiance of a Vatican order.

  • The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention warns consumers not to eat Banquet pot pies or other pot pies made by ConAgra with a printed code ending in C9 due to possible links with a salmonella outbreak.

  • Former U.S. Vice President Al Gore and the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) share the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize.

I’ll let you decide if WIRTW #1 was the most significant event of that week. Next week’s WIRTW #151 marks another milestone—my 1000th post. I promise I’m getting all my self-aggrandizing out of my system this week.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Social Networking & Workplace Technology

Discrimination

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

HR & Employee Relations

Litigation


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, October 28, 2010

Best remedy for sick day abuse is a clear policy


In a 2006 episode of The Office, Dwight goes undercover to spy on co-worker Oscar when he suspects sick day abuse. He discovers that Oscar was using his sick day to ice skate. He also nearly discovers Oscar’s closeted homosexuality. I bring this up because, yesterday, careerbuilder.com published its annual list of the most unusual excuses for calling in sick.

The nationwide survey of more than 2,400 employers uncovered that 16% of businesses have fired a worker for missing work without a proven excuse. 29% of employers reported checking up on an employee who called in sick. Of those employers:

  • 70% required a doctor’s note
  • 50% called the employee at home
  • 18% had another worker call the employee
  • 15% (including Dwight Schrute) drove by the employee’s home

Of the more creative (or intriguing, depending on your perspective) excuses given by employees:

  • A chicken attacking an employee’s mom
  • A finger stuck in bowling ball
  • A foot stuck in a garbage disposal
  • One employee even called in sick from a bar at 5 p.m. the prior night.

I suggest that you call a sick day a sick day, and if you want to allow employees to use days off for “mental health days,” call your time off Paid Time Off, and not Sick Leave.

The best way to curb sick day abuses is to clearly spell your business’s expectation in a sick leave policy. What are the legitimate reasons for using a sick day? When is a doctor’s note required? What level of specificity is required? And, most importantly, what are the consequences if an employee is discovered lying about sick leave? According to CareerBuilder’s survey, 60% of employers allow employees to use sick day for mental health days. You may not think an employee’s “mental health day” is that big of a deal. You will reconsider, however, when you face a discrimination lawsuit from an employee terminated for dishonesty and you have to explain when you did not discipline a white employee who lied about his sick days.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.