Thursday, February 11, 2010

Let your actions speak louder than your employees’ harassing words


Perhaps no single act can more quickly alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as “nigger” by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates.

So said the 7th Circuit in Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co. Harassments works on a sliding scale. To be actionable, the offensive conduct creating the hostile work environment has to either be severe or pervasive. Isolated incidents are not pervasive, but can be severe, depending on the language used. A white employee dripping an “N-bomb” on a black employee can certainly satisfy severity.

How then, did the employer escape liability for workplace “N-bombs” in Hargrette v. RMI Titanium Co. (Trumbull App. 2/5/10) [pdf]? It took swift remedial action.

In 2002, Kearns allegedly called McKinnon a “nigger.” … [T]he inappropriate comment occurred during an argument between Kearns and McKinnon. The argument resulted in both Kearns and McKinnon being suspended for three days. In his deposition, McKinnon states that Kearns was not a supervisor. In addition, this remark appears to be an isolated instant. While McKinnon stated he did not get along with Kearns, it is only alleged that Kearns called McKinnon a “nigger” on this single occasion. Finally, we note that, upon being informed of the incident, management investigated the situation and reprimanded Kearns for his misconduct.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

Do you have a severe weather policy?


I laugh at the east coast’s ongoing snow woes because (a) I grew up in Philadelphia, (b) my family is still there, and (c) last week notwithstanding, Philly’s winters don’t hold a candle to Cleveland’s. In fact, Forbes.com just crowned Cleveland as America’s worst winter weather city. (We’re also number 4 on the list of America’s most miserable cities – we’re nipping at your heels Chicago).

As I cleared my driveway this morning, I decided to share the following thoughts for drafting a severe weather policy for your workplace.

  1. Communication. How will your business communicate to its employees whether it is open for business or closed because of the weather? Are there essential personnel that must report regardless of whether the facility closes?

  2. Early closing. If a business decides to close early because of mid-day snowstorm, how will it account for the orderly shut-down of operations? Which employees will be able to leave early and which will have to remain to ensure that the facility is properly closed? Is there essential crew that must stay, or is there an equitable means to rotate who must stay and who can leave?

  3. Wage and hour issues. To avoid jeopardizing exempt employees’ status, they should be be paid their full salary when a company closes because of weather. For non-exempt employees, however, it is entirely up to the company whether to pay them for a full day’s work, for part of the day, or for no hours at all. Will employees have to use vacation or other paid time off if they want to be paid for the day, or will the company consider it a freebee? If your company closes but an employee does not get word and reports to work, will the company pay that employee anything for reporting?

  4. Attendance. Will the absence be counted against employees in a no-fault or other attendance policy, or defeat any perfect attendance bonuses?

  5. Telecommuting. If your area has frequent bouts of severe weather, consider whether you want to allow employees to telecommute. Even if your business does not typically permit employees to work from home, exceptions for exceptional weather could potentially save you lost productivity.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, February 9, 2010

Do you know? Why statistics are so important in reduction in force cases


For the past week, I’ve been examining the use of statistics in workforce reduction discrimination cases (6th Circuit downgrades importance of statistics in reduction-in-force cases and How small is too small? Litigating sample sizes in reduction in force cases). What’s been missing from this analysis, however, is an explanation of why raw numbers are so important in these cases, especially in age discrimination claims.

Many workforce reductions are accompanied by an offer of severance to the group of terminated employees. In fact, I don’t think any employer should pay severance without getting something in return from the employee, namely a release and waiver of liability.

The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act requires all releases and waivers of federal age discrimination claims provided as part of a severance program offered to a group of employees (such as in a reduction in force) to include a written disclosure of the job titles and ages of all eligible individuals selected for the program and all not selected for the the program. The EEOC, in its guidance on Understanding Waivers of Discrimination Claims in Employee Severance Agreements, provides the following example of what this disclosure should look like:

Job Title

Age

# Selected

# Not Selected

(1)

25

2

4

28

1

7

45

6

2

63

1

0

(2)

24

3

5

29

1

7

When the lone 63-year-old employee in Job Title 1 is going to decide whether to sign the waiver or pursue an age claim, the only fact he and his lawyer will have to go on is that within his job grouping, 7 out of the 9 oldest employees were RIFed, including the oldest employee. In other words, the raw statistics that the court discussed (and dismissed) in Schoonmaker will likely be the critical piece of information on which your employees will base their decision whether to sue or walk away. And, you have no choice but to turn this information over. Failing to do so will result in the invalidity of the age discrimination waiver.

Schoonmaker may question the relevance of raw statistics, but because the numbers must be disclosed to the terminated employees, they are nevertheless critical to any workforce reduction decision.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, February 8, 2010

How small is too small? Litigating sample sizes in reduction in force cases


Last week’s post on the use of statistics in reduction in force cases garnered some interest from a fellow blogger, Stephanie Thomas. She argues on her blog that small sample statistics still have a place in workforce reduction litigation. After reading Stephanie’s take on this issue, we carried the conversation over to Twitter (Are you following me on Twitter @jonhyman? If not, shame on you).

My conclusion is that the Schoonmaker decision merely begs the question of how small of a sample size is too small to make pure statistics irrelevant in a RIF case. Stephanie and I agree that you will see more expert witness battles on the issue of whether a sample size is large enough to be statistically relevant.

If I’m defending a RIF, the first thing I’m doing is hiring a statistical expert to opine that the sample size is too small to be statistically significant. From there, I’ll argue that under Schoonmaker the case should be dismissed, unless the plaintiff can come forward with some “plus” evidence of discrimination.

Conversely, if a RIFed employee wants to rely on statistics alone, he or she will have to hire an expert to opine that the sample size is large enough to be statistically significant. If you have competing experts, you very well might have a factual issue over the sample size. Or, the judge could decide as a matter of law that the sample size is too small and toss out the statistics as irrelevant.

On my first read through Schoonmaker, I thought it gave concrete answers on a plaintiff’s prima facie requirements in a workforce reduction. After more deliberation, and a healthy Twitter debate with Stephanie Thomas, I’ve now concluded that Schoonmaker may create more questions than it answers.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, February 5, 2010

WIRTW #113


The theme of this week’s review is déjà vu. In each category, I’ve linked back to at least one post I’ve written on a similar subject.

Social Media

Background Checks

Discrimination & Harassment

Courts and Litigation

Labor Law


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, February 4, 2010

6th Circuit downgrades importance of statistics in reduction-in-force cases


Yesterday, I discussed a 6th Circuit decision that provided guidance to employers on how not to RIF an employee on FMLA leave. Today, I’m going to examine another decision out of the 6th Circuit this week on the issue of RIFs, which clarifies what a laid-off employee has to prove to establish age discrimination following a reduction in force.

RIFs provide a built-in protection for employers in age discrimination cases, because the legitimate non-discrimination reason for the termination – the economic necessity for the workforce reduction – is established from the outset. Thus, employees challenging a RIF on account of age have a higher prima facie burden. When a termination arises as part of a work force reduction, the plaintiff must provide “additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons.”

In Schoonmaker v. Spartan Graphics Leasing (6th Cir. 2/3/10) [pdf], the plaintiff claimed that the fact that her employer retained younger employees in her position, and that her employer RIFed the two oldest employees, satisfied the “additional evidence” necessary to overcome the employer’s economic justification for the RIF. The 6th Circuit correctly rejected this assertion, and in doing so put a dagger through the heart of the use of bald statistics of small samples in RIF cases:

If the plaintiff’s case-in-chief is viewed as satisfying the requirements for a prima facie case of age discrimination, then every employer who terminates an employee between 40 and 70 years of age under any circumstances, will carry an automatic burden to justify the termination….

[S]tatistical evidence may satisfy the fourth element in a work force reduction case ... [but] such a small statistical sample is not probative of discrimination.

In other words, in RIFs with a small sample size, an employee will have to come up with evidence other than pure statistics to go forward with a discrimination claim – evidence that that RIFed employee was objectively more qualified than the younger retained employees.

Despite this case, employers act at their own peril by ignoring statistics. Before any RIF is finalized, businesses should be analyzing the numbers across all key demographics, in addition to comparing the relative qualities and qualifications of the departing versus the remaining. Performing this diligence may not prevent a lawsuit from being filed (especially if the raw numbers appear to look discriminatory), but it will give you the necessary ammunition to defend any subsequent discrimination lawsuits that are filed.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, February 3, 2010

Reduction in Force vs. Leave of Absence: How not to handle the convergence


There is no rule that says that you cannot terminate an employee on FMLA leave in a reduction in force. Conventional wisdom (and the real risk of being sued), though, dictates that it must be done carefully and with every “i” dotted and “t” crossed. It is also best to keep comments about the employee’s leave of absence out of the calculus used to determine who stays and who goes. Take Cutcher v. Kmart (6th Cir. 2/2/10) (unpublished) [pdf] as an example.

Susan Cutcher worked at Kmart from 1984 until her termination as part of a workforce reduction at the end of 2005. From 2000 on, she directly reported to Barbara Borrell, who evaluated Cutcher’s performance on an annual basis. Each of Borrell’s evaluations of Borrell resulted in an overall rating of either “Exceptional” or “Exceeds Expectations,” including her final performance review, which occurred just a month before Kmart announced a nation-wide RIF and which included Cutcher. On that final performance review, Cutcher received highest marks for customer service, but lost points for teamwork.

That nation-wide RIF occurred while Cutcher was out of work on an approved FMLA leave. Cutcher’s store eliminated 6 full-time employees. Employees’ performance evaluations and scores were converted to a different scale and re-ranked for purposes of the RIF. On Cutcher’s RIF appraisal, the following comment appeared: “Poor customer and associate relations. LOA.” Kmart did not eliminate Cutcher’s position, but gave it to a coworker with a higher RIF appraisal ranking. Cutcher sued, claiming that her inclusion in the RIF violated the FMLA.

Kmart correctly pointed out that an employer need not restore an employee who would have lost her job or been laid off even if she had not taken FMLA leave. Thus, it argued for dismissal of the FMLA claims on the grounds that it would have fired Cutcher even if she had not taken FMLA leave. The 6th Circuit disagreed:

Given Cutcher’s prior annual appraisal scores, the minimal amount of time that passed between her most recent annual appraisal and the RIF appraisal, Kmart’s admission that Cutcher’s performance did not change during that short period of time, the inclusion of the “LOA” notation on the Associate Performance Recap Form, and the lack of any documented evidence demonstrating a prior concern with her job performance, a jury could infer that her leave status impacted her RIF appraisal ratings, thus leading to her termination.

The takeaway from this case is that employers planning a reduction in force must be careful in the language used to discuss employees. If you don’t want a judge or jury to infer that you took an employee’s leave of absence into consideration, don’t write “LOA” anywhere near the employee’s name on any document concerning the RIF. It may sound trite, but in litigation, everything you wrote or said can and will be used against you.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, February 2, 2010

Do you know? What to do when you get sued


When you are sued in an employment case, the absolutely first thing you should do is call your lawyer. There are steps that must be taken as soon as you receive notice of the complaint, the failure of which could put your entire defense at risk.

  1. An answer or other response must be timely filed. You could waive the right to file certain counterclaims and raise certain jurisdictional and other defenses by missing this critical deadline.

  2. If you want to remove a case from state court to federal court, you only have 30 days to act. This is a hard and fast deadline, with no extensions possible. Counsel needs to be involved early to analyze whether the case is removable and to prepare the necessary paperwork.

  3. A litigation hold should be put in place to preserve emails, other electronic records, and paper documents that could bear on the litigation. Key documents should be gathered and secured. Your attorney can help make sure that documents aren’t deleted or destroyed, a flub that could submarine your entire case.

  4. Witnesses should be identified, and told that they should not communicate with anyone other that counsel about the case. If any employee is at risk for leaving your organization, potential testimony should be memorialized in an affidavit while the employee is still on favorable terms and under your control.

  5. If you have EPLI coverage, you should put your carrier on notice so that coverage is not jeopardized and any defense costs are properly credited against your deductible.

  6. Depending on the size and notoriety of the case, you may want to get out of the blocks early with some public relations. That message has to be crafted and managed by counsel so that it does not hurt a successful defense.

Tripping on any one of these important early steps can have serious consequences on your overall defense. Resist the D.I.Y. urge and lawyer-up as soon as you find out you’ve been sued.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, February 1, 2010

EEOC announces curious partnership as it expands community outreach


The EEOC has announced that it has partnered with Beachwood’s Maltz Museum of Jewish Heritage to help employees file discrimination complaints. The agency will set up a temporary charge intake station at the museum on the last Thursday of each month. According to EEOC Cleveland Field Office Director Dan Cabot, “It’s a good partnership for us and for the community.”

To me, it’s a weird partnership. I understand the theming – the EEOC fights intolerance in the workplace and the Maltz Museum advocates for tolerance among religions and ethnicities. But, anyone who knows Cleveland geography will understand that no one in Beachwood and its surrounding communities needs help getting to the EEOC’s main office downtown. While this staged synergy sounds like a publicity stunt, it is one that employers should pay close attention to. The EEOC is clearly empowered, and employers who ignore their EEO responsibilities in today’s political climate do so at their own risk.

[Hat tip: Warren & Hays Blog]


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, January 29, 2010

WIRTW #112


Here’s what you missed this week if you’re only reading my blog.

Labor

Sex Discrimination & Harassment

Non-Competition Agreements

Social Networking

Miscellaneous


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, January 28, 2010

Don’t forget about the retaliation


According to a story on NJ.com, a jury has ordered an adult novelty company to pay $500,000 to a fired saleswoman. She had sued for harassment and retaliation following her termination, claiming that she was fired after complaining about harassment by a co-worker. According to her attorney, “The president of the company yelled and screamed at her and disciplined her for the first time in the four years she’d worked there. He accused her of saying bad things about the company.”

We can debate whether someone who chooses sell adult products can be sexually harassed. What should not be open to debate, though, is that a company cannot berate, discipline, or terminate an employee following a harassment or discrimination complaint. Allegations of retaliation often turn a defensible EEO lawsuit into a huge liability risk. Unfortunately, this lesson is one that many companies do not learn until it’s too late.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, January 27, 2010

What’s good for the goose isn’t always good for the gander: legal fees in employment lawsuits


One of the questions clients often ask me is whether they can pursue a plaintiff for defense costs after a successful dismissal. It only seems fair to the client that if they have to pay legal fees if the employee wins a discrimination lawsuit, the employee should be held to the same standard.

The answer is that an employer can pursue a plaintiff for legal fees, but it has to prove that the lawsuit was brought frivolously, which is a tall order. Ohio law defines frivolous conduct as follows:

  • It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action or appeal or is for another improper purpose.

  • It is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the establishment of new law.

  • The conduct consists of allegations or other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support or are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

  • The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that are not warranted by the evidence or are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

While it is not impossible, it is very difficult to prove that a employee acted frivolously in filing an employment lawsuit. Instead of spending time and money worrying about recouping legal fees from ex-employees, employers would better served chalking up litigation expenses as a cost of doing business, or simply avoiding litigation in the first place.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Do you know? FMLA leave for unmarried fathers


Do you need another reason to get married? The FMLA provides husbands greater rights than unwed fathers.

The FMLA distinguishes between fathers and husbands based on the type of FMLA-leave sought:

  • Fathers are entitled to FMLA leave for the birth of their child and for paternity leave to be with the healthy newborn child (i.e., bonding time) during the 12-month period beginning on the date of birth.

  • However, only husbands are eligible to take leave to care for his incapacitated pregnant spouse, to care for her during her prenatal care, or to care for her following the birth of a child if she has a serious health condition.

The FMLA only grants unmarried fathers paternity leave rights. It gives no benefit to the unmarried for any leave to care for the baby’s mother, either prenatally or postnatally.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, January 25, 2010

Faith healing and the FMLA


The Smart HR Manager brought to my attention a recent case out of Massachusetts which held that an employee could not use FMLA leave to care for a spouse with a serious health condition who seeks to travel abroad for faith-based healing. The opinion, however, dodges the issue of whether faith-based healing is covered by the FMLA. Instead, it dismissed the FMLA claim because more than half of the trip was spent visiting family and friends and sightseeing, and the FMLA does not permit employees to vacation with a seriously ill spouse, even in a caregiving capacity.

The case, though, got me to thinking, is a faith-healer covered under the FMLA as a “health care provider?” The most logical place to look is the FMLA’s regulations. Section 825.125 defines a “health care provider” as—

  1. A doctor of medicine or osteopathy;

  2. Podiatrists, dentists, clinical psychologists, optometrists, and chiropractors;

  3. Nurse practitioners, nurse-midwives, clinical social workers and physician assistants;

  4. Christian Science Practitioners listed with the First Church of Christ, Scientist in Boston, Massachusetts; or

  5. Any health care provider from whom an employer or the employer’s group health plan’s benefits manager will accept certification of the existence of a serious health condition to substantiate a claim for benefits.

Faith-healers do not fall under any of these categories. This conclusion only resolves whether the FMLA covers leave for faith-healing. It does not address whether other laws – such as Title VII’s religious discrimination protections – protect these employees, which is a topic for another day.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, January 22, 2010

WIRTW #111


Conan O’Brien, Jay Leno, and NBC continue to dominate the headlines this week. I’ve previously shared my thoughts. Here’s what my fellow bloggers had to say this past week:

The other big story of the week was the election of Scott Brown to fill the late Ted Kennedy’s Senate seat. It cost the Democrats their super-majority, and will have long-lasting effects on the President’s agenda, including his ambitious slate of labor and employment reforms. Here’s what other have to say about the swing of the political tide in Washington:

As for other news of the week that you might have missed…


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, January 21, 2010

Warning – vulgar language ahead: 11th Circuit decides whether tasteless workplace behavior is actionable as sexual harassment


We recite the profane language that allegedly permeated this workplace exactly as it was spoken in order to present and properly examine the social context in which it arose. We do not explicate this vulgar language lightly, but only because its full consideration is essential to measure whether these words and this conduct could be read as having created “an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.”

So starts the 11th Circuit’s opinion in Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide (1/20/10) [pdf], which decides the issue of whether vulgar language to which all employees (male and female) are equally exposed is actionable as sexual harassment.

The court made a clear distinction between general vulgarities and sex-specific epithets:

While the record is replete with evidence of general, indiscriminate vulgarity, there is also ample evidence of gender-specific, derogatory comments made about women on account of their sex….

Reeves … identified a substantial corpus of gender-derogatory language addressed specifically to women as a group in the workplace. Her coworkers used such language to refer to or to insult individual females with whom they spoke on the phone or who worked in a separate area of the branch. Although not speaking to Reeves specifically, Reeves said that her male co-workers referred to individuals in the workplace as “bitch,” “fucking bitch,” “fucking whore,” “crack whore,” and “cunt.”

Thus, the court differentiated between general, gender-nonspecific swear words, such as shit and fuck, (maybe improper, but not necessarily unlawful) as compared to gender-specific epithets such as bitch, whore, and, the granddaddy of them all, cunt (unlawful harassment).

[T]he context may illuminate whether the use of an extremely vulgar, genderneutral term such as “fucking” would contribute to a hostile work environment. “Fucking” can be used as an intensifying adjective before gender-specific epithets such as “bitch.” In that context, “fucking” is used to strengthen the attack on women, and is therefore relevant to the Title VII analysis. However, the obscene word does not itself afford a gender-specific meaning. Thus, when used in context without reference to gender, “fuck” and “fucking” fall more aptly under the rubric of general vulgarity that Title VII does not regulate….

[W]ords and conduct that are sufficiently gender-specific and either severe or pervasive may state a claim of a hostile work environment, even if the words are not directed specifically at the plaintiff…. It is enough to hear co-workers on a daily basis refer to female colleagues as “bitches,” “whores” and “cunts,” to understand that they view women negatively, and in a humiliating or degrading way. The harasser need not close the circle with reference to the plaintiff specifically: “and you are a ‘bitch,’ too.”

To conclude:

  • General vulgarities are not actionable as harassment.
  • Severe or pervasive gender-specific words or phrases are actionable as harassment even if the words are not specifically directed at one employee, but merely generally used in the workplace.
  • Severe or pervasive conduct targeting a protected group also qualifies as actionable harassment.

The takeaway for employers – words are sometimes not just words, and businesses should respond to complaints about coarse or vulgar language as they would to any other complaint of harassment. An employer cannot just assume that words are harmless and bury its head in the sand.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, January 20, 2010

How much is a non-compete worth?


According to one Ohio appellate court, $500,000. Marketing Associates v. Gottlieb (1/14/10) [pdf] upheld a half-million dollar jury verdict against an employee who breached a non-compete by resigning and targeting his former employer’s largest client after opening his own shop.

Non-competition cases tend to follow a pattern. An employee resigns, the ex-employer’s attorney sends out a cease-and-desist letter if competitive activities are threatened or suspected, a lawsuit is filed, and injunctive relief is sought trying to prevent the employee from competing, soliciting customers and employees, and using trade secrets and other confidential information.

Separate from the injunctive relief, though, non-competition agreements have a value. Employees who compete against a former employer in the face of a non-compete not only run of the risk of a court entering an injunction and putting them out of work, but also that any money earned in violation of the non-compete will be paid over to the former employer as damages. And, if the employer can show that an employee breached a duty of loyalty while still employed (misappropriating files or information or diverting customers, for example), that damage figure will only go up.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, January 19, 2010

Do you know? Do you need a moonlighting policy?


moonlightingMoonlighting is when an employee works a job other than their primary job. In today’s world, for example, many people find it necessary to work second or even third jobs just to get by. Assuming you want to permit employees work a second job, it is best to have a policy in place to address how it affects your business.

Such a policy should, at a minimum, address the following issues:

  1. Interference with primary job. The main purpose of most moonlighting policies is to set out your expectation that employees will treat their work at your business as their primary job and will not allow other jobs to interfere with the performance of the primary job. You should make it clear that you expect the employee to put your job first.

  2. Conflict of interest. Above all else, you need to protect your business. A conflict of interest policy can help ensure that your employees don’t work for a competitor while working for you. You should also consider the potential impact – positive and negative – of an employee working for a customer or vendor. The same should also cover confidential and other proprietary information.

  3. What about leaves of absence? Employees should not be able to work a second job while on a leave of absence – medical, for example – from their primary job.

  4. Approval of employment. Consider including a clause that requires approval of any outside employment. In implementing such a clause, however, be sure to do it fairly and equitably across the board, and avoid any appearance of preferential or discriminatory treatment.

You do not have to permit employees to hold other jobs. If you do, however, consider putting a policy in place to set expectations up-front and to give you the protection you need should an employee’s outside work interfere with your business.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, January 15, 2010

WIRTW #110


While the tragedy in Haiti has pushed Jay and Conan off the front page, NBC’s late night debacle continues to be one of the week’s biggest stories. My fellow bloggers share their thoughts on the myriad employment law issues this story raises:

Other issues covered this week:

Race Discrimination

Wage & Hour

Harassment

Finally, two follow-ups to earlier posts of mine.

  • LaborPains.org reports that AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka is predicting that the Employee Free Choice Act will pass by March. His statement is the exact opposite of my prediction on this same issue.

  • The Evil HR Lady asks whether it is legal not to hire someone because she is the sister of a former employee that did not leave on good terms. Associational retaliation – that is, taking an action against someone because a close relation engaged in protected activity – is not illegal in the 6th Circuit. The Supreme Court, however, is considering reviewing this issue, so it is worth keeping an eye on it.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, January 14, 2010

Bills seeks to prohibit use of credit information in employment


Ohio House Bill 340 seeks to make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of credit history. If enacted, it would amend Ohio’s anti-discrimination law to include the following:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to use a person's credit rating or score or consumer credit history as a factor in making decisions regarding that person's employment, including hiring, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.

Unlike the federal bankruptcy discrimination statute we looked at on Tuesday, this law would prohibit any use of credit information in employment. While there is no doubt that many have been adversely affected by the ongoing economic crisis, this statute is an overreaction. There exist lots of valid reasons to use consumer credit as one factor in the hiring matrix. For example, if you can conclude that an applicant does not, for whatever reason, manage his personal finances properly, do you want to hire him to handle your business’s finances as its controller or have access to money in your cash register?

The federal Fair Credit Reporting Act already provides protections to consumers in how employers obtain their credit information, and prohibit access without consent. We do not need additional protection to limit how employers use this lawfully obtained information, especially when this information can give employers insight to an employee’s sense of personal responsibility.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.