Thursday, August 16, 2012

Piercing the bulletproof employee


Retaliation comes in two flavors: participation and opposition. The former protects employees who have “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under” the relevant statute; the latter protects employees who have “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice.” Jackson v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools (6th Cir. 8/15/12) [pdf] answers the question of how far the opposition clause goes to protect employees who make unreasonable or unfounded complaints about discrimination. It also teaches an important lesson that not every employee who complains about discrimination is bulletproof.

The Memphis City Schools employed Janice Jackson (African-American), as a teacher’s assistant. She worked at a school run by an African-American principal. Ninety-seven percent of the school’s staff was African-American, including 29 of the school’s 31 teacher’s assistants. After being admonished by the principal for unprofessional behavior, Jackson delivered a personal letter, in which she indicated that she felt unfairly singled out because her White co-workers were allowed “duty[-]free breaks,” while African-Americans were “criticized for taking breaks”—“a clear violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” After her transfer to a different school, she sued, claiming retaliation.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of her retaliation claim. The court noted that to support a claim of retaliation under the opposition clause, an employee’s opposition must “be based on a reasonable and good faith belief that the opposed practices were unlawful.” In this case, Jackson did not come forward with any evidence that the school principal treated African-American employees differently than White employees. Instead, the court concluded that she was merely addressing a legitimate personnel issue raised by Jackson’s unprofessional behavior.

Critically, the court went out of its way to point out that employers do not always need to fear taking action when faced with a poor-performing employee who happens to complain about discrimination.

To hold that opposition is reasonable when the employer is addressing an apparent and legitimate personnel matter in a way that does not explicitly or implicitly implicate Title VII, with no other testimony or evidence of racial discrimination, would hamper an employer’s ability to address legitimate issues for fear that doing so could leave the employer vulnerable to liability under Title VII.

Many employees believe they can make themselves bulletproof merely by raising the specter of discrimination. They wrongly believe that the anti-retaliation statutes will automatically protect their jobs. Conversely, many employers have a paralyzing fear of terminating a complaining employee no matter the circumstances. Jackson demonstrates that both of these fear can be unfounded. The potential of a retaliation claim certainly ups the ante when terminating an employee who has complained about discrimination. Yet, in the right circumstances and for the right reasons, employers do not need to live in fear of firing a deserving employee, provided that they take the right steps and have the proper documentation.

Wednesday, August 15, 2012

The language of the modern workplace


Merriam-Webster's Collegiate® Dictionary just released its list of new words for 2012. Three caught my eye.

cloud computing: the practice of storing regularly used computer data on multiple servers that can be accessed through the Internet

sexting: the sending of sexually explicit messages or images by cell phone

f-bomb:  the word fuck —used metaphorically as a euphemism

According to the publisher, Merriam-Webster adopts new words based on usage:

To decide which words to include in the dictionary and to determine what they mean, Merriam-Webster editors study the language as it's used. They carefully monitor which words people use most often and how they use them….

To be included in a Merriam-Webster dictionary, a word must be used in a substantial number of citations that come from a wide range of publications over a considerable period of time. Specifically, the word must have enough citations to allow accurate judgments about its establishment, currency, and meaning.

Because these words have crept into the American lexicon, they should be accounted for in your workplace policies. Technology policies should cover information stored in and accessed from the cloud. Harassment policies and training should teach employees about the dangers of texting and other co-worker communications via mobile phones, email, and social media. And, if you get into a hot legal mess because you omitted these ideas from your policies, drop a few f-bombs (then call your lawyer).

Tuesday, August 14, 2012

Don’t forget these 5 security issues in your BYOD policy


BYOD might be the corporate buzz word for 2012. If you’re in the dark, BYOD stands for Bring Your Own Device. It represents employees connecting their own mobile devices to corporate networks, instead of using employer-issued devices. There was a time, not all that long ago, when Blackberry was the mobile device of corporate America. Once iOS and Android started supporting email via Exchange, however, executives started questioning why they needed to carry a work device and a personal device. In short, they wanted their email and Angry Birds wrapped up in one tidy mobile package. Thus, the birth of BYOD. Today, Blackberry is going they way of Betamax, and BYOD is here to stay. I call the iPhone-ification of corporate America.

BYOD, however, is not without its risks. Over at The HR Capitalist, Kris Dunn offers the following sample BYOD Policy (c/o Scott Stone):

We expect each team member to provide their own device – you select it, you buy it, you pick the plan that makes the most sense for you.  Your phone, your phone number, your provider of choice, your contract with the provider

We strongly recommend a “Smartphone” of some type, to ensure you can receive emails or other critical communications on the device.

Our Company will provide you access to your work email address on the device, including assisting you with the setup.

If your device is a “Smartphone”, our company will reimburse you $75 per month to cover all work related communications on the device (email, text, voice, communications, etc).  We expect you to select a plan which can accommodate your business and personal needs for voice and data

If you select a PO Phone (plain ‘ol phone) which lacks the ability to receive and send emails, our company will reimburse you $15 per month for all work related communications

We won’t provide a “company phone” to anyone, preferring to allow you to “BYOD”, and provide everyone maximum flexibility.

If you ever choose to leave the company, take your phone, your number, and your existing agreement with a provider – no hassle, no number change, no problem.

These seven points have one glaring omission—security. The biggest risk that BYOD creates is the seemingly uncontrolled access to your network, both in terms of what information is accessed and take from it, and what happens to that information if a device is lost or stolen. In light of these security risks, any BYOD program should answer the following 5 questions:

  1. What devices are permitted? Does BYOD mean any device, or does it simply mean iPhones or Androids? What about iPads or other tablets? Employee-owned laptops? Stick drives and other portable memory?

  2. Are you going to mandate passwords or other security-screens on network-connected devices? Employees generally resist having to enter a four-digit pin code every time they turn on their iPhones. Your IT, legal, and risk management departments, however, should require them, since they make it that much harder for someone to access data on a lost or stolen device. If your organization deals in confidential information (e.g., doctors, lawyers, etc.), this requirement is that much more important (and might be mandated by law). Also, your BYOD policy should reference any other policies that address the handling of confidential and proprietary information.

  3. What happens when a device is lost or stolen? IT must have the ability to remote-wipe a missing mobile device. Guess what happens, though, if an employee’s first call upon losing a phone is to their mobile carrier? The carrier turns off the device, and your organization loses the ability to remote wipe any data from it. Employees should be told that if they lose a mobile device, their first call should be to IT so that the device can be wiped of any corporate data.

  4. Will you ban jailbreaks, roots, and other hacks? These practices void the phone’s warranty. Also, consider banning the installation of apps other than from the official iTunes App Store or Google Play. It will limit the risk of the installation of viruses, malware, and other malicious code on the devices.

  5. What happens when an employee leaves? You should not only address what happens with the physical device, but also what happens with the data that lives on the device. You need a protocol to re-acquire or wipe all corporate information on the device. Otherwise, you are putting your confidentiality at risk.

Any successful BYOD program results from a synergy among the C-suite, legal, IT, HR, and risk management. Involve all of these departments to make sure that your BYOD program is successful, and addresses all necessary security issues.

Monday, August 13, 2012

Confidential workplace investigations are under attack … by the EEOC?


Earlier this month, I took the NLRB to task for its holding in Banner Estrella Medical Center that an employer’s request to employees not to discuss a workplace investigation with their coworkers while the investigation was ongoing violated the employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity. Lorene Schaefer, writing at One Mediation, brings us news that the EEOC has joined the fray and is also attacking the confidentiality of workplace investigations.

According to Ms. Schaefer, the EEOC’s Buffalo, NY, office has notified an employer of an investigation of its policy of warning employees not to discuss harassment investigations with co-workers:

You have admitted to having a written policy which warns all employees who participate in one of your internal investigations of harassment that they could be subject to discipline or discharge for discussing “the matter,” apparently with anyone.

EEOC guidance states that complaining to anyone, including high management, union officials, other employees, newspapers, etc. about discrimination is protected opposition. It also states that the most flagrant infringement of the rights that are conferred on an individual by Title VII’s retaliation provisions is the denial of the right to oppose discrimination. So, discussing one’s complaints of sexual harassment with others is protected opposition. An employer who tries to stop an employee from talking with others about alleged discrimination is violating Title VII rights, and the violation is “flagrant” not trivial.

I’m speechless. Confidentiality is a cornerstone of any thorough and meaningful internal investigation. As one of my readers astutely stated in a comment to my post about the NLRB’s attack on confidentiality:

Permitting folks to talk about the investigation impacts the investigator’s strategy, possible spoliation of evidence by witnesses who now know about the investigation when under normal circumstances we would have at best a pretty good chance of keeping the investigation confidential, interfering with work relationships the more and more people talk about the investigation, the more things become both diluted and exaggerated (remember the game of telephone?), it is so much more than just the word “Confidential.”

The EEOC is supposed to prevent workplace discrimination and harassment. How can it possibly take issue with a key component of the crucial tool employers use to weed out unlawful harassment? This position simply does not make any sense. The EEOC should be championing confidential investigations, not signaling that they constitute a “flagrant” violation of Title VII. Prohibiting employers from keeping workplace investigations confidential will render investigations meaningless. I do not think this is a result the EEOC wants to foster.

Friday, August 10, 2012

WIRTW #237 (the “don’t judge a book by its cover” edition)


One of my earliest law school memories did not occur inside the lecture halls, but instead was a passing meeting in the hallway. I recall noticing a classmate’s turban, beard, and dark complexion, and thinking, “terrorist.” Soon thereafter, when Amardeep Singh and I became good friends, I learned he was a Sikh (and definitely not a terrorist). My initial reaction to seeing Amar for the first time embarrasses me to this day.

When I heard the news on Sunday about the tragedy in Wisconsin, I immediately thought of my old friend, who, after law school, co-founded the Sikh Coalition and currently serves as its National Director of Programs. Earlier this week, The Guardian ran a poignant piece written by Amar, entitled The post 9/11 prejudice that menaces American Sikhs. This is part of what he said:

Fed a steady diet of Bin Laden and Taliban images, most Americans simply associate the turban, which Sikh men wear as an expression of faith, with terrorism. Turban equals terrorist in the minds of too many.

In part, Sikh Americans are collateral damage of a modern climate that rarely has time for explanations of our culture, our heritage, and our beliefs. This enduring legacy of 9/11 continues to stubbornly attach itself to our community. Not only do many people not know of the peaceful beliefs of our faith, but they wrongly associate us with acts of unspeakable terrorism….

We all deserve to live in a society where no one need fear violent attack—whether at a temple, mosque, synagogue or church—simply because of our ethnic and religious identity.

As a society (especially one that calls itself a melting pot), we should not need an excuse to confront our own biases and prejudices. This awful catastrophe reminds us that we should view people as people, and not as colors, religions, or stereotypes.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, August 9, 2012

Richard Kimble and the ADA


Lt. Philip Gerard: Why don’t you stop running and turn yourself in, Kimble?

Dr. Richard Kimble: There’s a man I have to find. A one-armed man. When I find him, I’ll turn myself in.

Lt. Philip Gerard: Still sticking to that same tall tale? “A one-armed man killed my wife.” The truth is … you’re guilty not only in my eyes, but in the eyes of the law.

The Fugitive (1965).

In Rosebrough v. Buckeye Valley High Sch. (6th Cir. 8/8/12) [pdf], the 6th Circuit concluded that an individual born without a hand was qualified under the ADA to work as a bus driver trainee.

Here are the facts. Tammy Rosebrough, born without a left hand, applied for cook’s position at Buckeye Valley North High School. During the interview process, a supervisor told her that if she was interested in a position the school was in desperate need of bus drivers. Rosebrough applied for the bus driver job. The Ohio Department of Education requires a waiver before an individual missing a limb is allowed to operate a school bus, for which Rosebrough also applied. While she was waiting to receive her waiver, the school district began Rosebrough’s training. Perceiving bias against her because of her missing hand, Rosebrough never finished her training, and ultimately sued for disability discrimination.

The Court never reached the issue of whether the school district discriminated against Rosebrough on the basis of her disability. Instead, it reversed the trial court’s determination that she was not “qualified” to work as a bus driver trainee, and remanded the case to be decided on the remaining issues.

The plain language of the ADA covers discrimination on the basis of disability during job training…. The statutory inclusion of “job training” protects individuals while they receive the training required to perform the essential functions of their ultimate job position; it protects them from discrimination that could deny them the means to obtain qualifications necessary to undertake that position. It cannot be disputed that the ADA covers individuals in training without regard to whether they are called employees, conditionally-hired employees, trainees, or a title specific to one employer.

When the events at issue in this litigation occurred, Rosebrough was in the job training period necessary to obtain her CDL and learn how to perform as a school bus driver…. It is unnecessary to speculate as to whether she was “otherwise qualified” for the training position because Buckeye Valley concedes Rosebrough “was qualified to be a ‘trainee,’ was in fact a ‘trainee,’ and was given the training.”

In other words, the Court did not permit the school district to argue that Rosebrough wasn’t qualified to work as a bus driver training because it permitted her to train for the position.

The odds are slim that you will have a one-armed applicant seeking to drive one of your commercial vehicles. Yet, the lesson from Rosebrough is much broader. Allowing an employee to work in a position makes it difficult to argue later that the employee was not qualified for that same position.

Wednesday, August 8, 2012

Do your agreements provide for waivers of collective actions?


Earlier this year, KeHE Distributors underwent a reduction in force. It offered a retention bonus to any sales representatives who would continue their employment for a period of time, as long as they signed a Separation and Release Agreement. Each Agreement contained a “General Release of Claims and Covenant Not to Sue,” which included a promise not to join “any class or collective action” against KeHE arising under the FLSA or other federal laws. 69 employees accepted the retention bonus and signed the agreement. Within weeks, two employees launched collective actions under the FLSA claiming that KeHE unlawfully denied them overtime compensation. In Killion v. KeHE Distribubtor (N.D. Ohio 8/3/12) [pdf] the Court dismissed from the lawsuit any employees who had signed the Agreement.

The plaintiffs argued that because of the relatively small amount of money at stake in any individual wage and hour claim, preventing employees from joining collective actions would gut their substantive rights under the statute. The court, however, disagreed:

This Court recognizes that the ability to form a collective action necessarily implicates policy considerations regarding the enforcement of the FLSA. Because the amount of money at stake may be small, the right to join a larger pool of similarly situated individuals enables the pool to attract counsel who, if victorious, is entitled to recover fees….

Here, this Court has no idea how much money is at stake…. Nor does the record disclose how many potential Plaintiffs would comprise the collective action, whether Plaintiffs can afford to pursue their claims individually, or how much it would actually cost them to pursue individual claims. Moreover, attorneys’ fees are mandatory…, which means individual Plaintiffs will still be able to vindicate their rights under the FLSA….

The statute permits a collective action, but it does not require one…. Section 216(b) is clear: Plaintiffs may proceed collectively, not shall. By signing the Agreement they waived that right.

Simple enough, right? An employee is permitted to waive his or her right to file or join a collective action under the FLSA. Killion involved a separate agreement signed as part of a reduction in force. This rule, however, is not limited to post-employment covenants. The same rationale would apply to employment agreements, or other pre-employment documents such as employment applications, offer letters, or other documents signed by an employee incidental to his or her employment.

Of course, Killion is but one opinion of one district court, and this issue is unsettled enough to warrant some cautious deliberation. Before embarking on a campaign to require that your employees sign away their participation in collective actions, you might want to wait for the 6th Circuit to have its say on the issue.

Tuesday, August 7, 2012

Telecommuting as a reasonable accommodation


More than two years ago, I hypothesized that the breadth of the ADA’s 2009 amendments would likely cover fringe medical conditions such as chemical sensitivities. I wrote:

The ADA amendments are intended to make it much easier for individuals to demonstrate that they meet the definition of “disability.” To have a disability, an individual must be “substantially limited” in performing a “major life activity” as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment need not prevent, or even significantly or severely restrict, the individual’s performance of a major life activity…. Major life activities include daily functions, as well as the operation of major bodily functions (which would include, for example, the respiratory system).If an employee has a chemical sensitivity to certain smells, that allergy will likely substantially affect the employee’s respiratory system, thus rendering the employee “disabled” under the ADA.

Core v. Champaign County Board of County Commissioners (S.D. Ohio 7/30/12) [pdf], confirms my prediction. In that case, an Ohio federal court ruled that an employee sufficiently pleaded a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA based on an alleged sensitivity to perfume. The plaintiff, Pamela Core, claims that her employer failed to accommodate her chemical sensitivity to certain perfumes worn by her co-workers. She had asked that her employer ban certain scents in the workplace. When it ignored her requests, she asked to be allowed to work from home as an accommodation, which the employer rejected.

The issue of whether a sensitivity to perfume qualifies as a disability protected by the ADA only begs this question—what is the appropriate accommodation for this disability? The court in Core concluded that telecommuting may be a reasonable accommodation in this case:

With regard to the assertion that working from home is an unreasonable accommodation as a matter of law, such blanket assertion is not necessarily supported by Sixth Circuit precedent. Certainly, the Sixth Circuit has agreed with the general proposition that an employer is not required “to allow disabled workers to work at home[;]” however, the court also recognizes the possibility of exceptions to the general rule “in the unusual case where an employee can effectively perform all work-related duties at home[.]”

Certainly, communications technology has advanced to such a state that the proposition of employees working from home is not quite as burdensome or untenable…. Today, in this Court’s view, it may not “take a very extraordinary case for the employee to be able to create a triable issue of the employer’s failure to allow the employee to work at home.” Nevertheless, the ultimate determination of reasonableness is a fact specific inquiry and a question for the fact-finder.

The Court did not go as far to conclude that telecommuting is a proper reasonable accommodation in this or any other case, but instead ruled that a jury should decide the reasonableness of the accommodation in this case.

Some employers, rightly or wrongly, believe that employees need to be present in the workplace to effectively perform their jobs. If you fall on this side of the debate, what steps can you take to safeguard against a court second-guessing your decision to deny a telecommuting request as a reasonable accommodation?

  1. Prepare job descriptions that detail the need for time spent in the office.
  2. Document the cost of establishing and monitoring an effective telecommuting program.
  3. Engage in a dialogue with disabled employees to agree upon an alternative accommodation with which both sides can live.

The appropriateness of telecommuting as a reasonable accommodation will vary from case to case. As Core points out, telecommuting as a reasonable accommodation remains the exception, not the rule. The line that separates exception from rule, however, will continue to shift as technology makes telecommuting more feasible, widespread, and accepted.

[Hat tip: Employer Law Report]

Monday, August 6, 2012

Does a "good faith belief" about an illegal pay practice support an FLSA retaliation claim?



April Hurd worked as a nurse’s aide for Blossom 24 Hour We Care Center. The company fired her 10 days after she complained about unpaid overtime. Easy case for the employee? If you think this is an open and shut case of retaliation under the FLSA, you are mistaken.

In Hurd v. Blossom 24 Hour We Care Center, Inc. (Ohio Ct. App. 8/2/12) [pdf], the court quickly disposed of Hurd’s retaliation claim:
There is no evidence that Hurd engaged in protected activity by requesting overtime. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that home health care workers are not entitled to overtime compensation because they constitute FLSA-exempt “domestic service” employees. Thus, because Hurd is exempt, her request for overtime did not constitute a protected activity. 
Should this case have been this simple? In Title VII retaliation cases, there is a long-standing rule that an employee engages in protect activity by opposing an alleged unlawful employment practice with a reasonable a good-faith belief that the employer has violated Title VII. Some courts have extended this rule to retaliation cases brought under the FLSA.

If an exempt employee has a good faith belief that he or she is not exempt and complains about missing overtime pay, shouldn’t that employee receive the same benefit as an employee complaining about an alleged unlawful employment practice under Title VII? Shouldn’t the employee’s good faith belief in the perceived illegality be put to the test?

What is the lesson for employers? Despite the ruling in Hurd, if an employee you have classified as exempt complains about overtime pay, do not assume it is safe to retaliate. The court deciding that employee’s case might not be as generous as the court was in Hurd.

Friday, August 3, 2012

WIRTW #236 (the “reactions” edition)


Wednesday’s post dissecting the NLRB’s attack on confidential workplace investigations received a lot of feedback, on Twitter, in various LinkedIn groups, and in the comments. Here’s two of the best:

The NLRB does not understand how one sentence, in a determination, can alter an entire system, regardless of their actual intent.

I bet you $1 that investigators of workplace complaints at NLRB make standard confidentiality advisements, too.

The best comment, however, came via email from a reader who has asked to remain anonymous:

In its attempt to stay relevant, the NLRB has revealed how very out of touch it really is.

I couldn’t have said it better myself (and thanks to everyone for contributing to the discussion).

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, August 2, 2012

How late is too late for an FMLA medical certification?


Under the FMLA, an employee requesting leave for a serious health condition must provide a medical certification for the leave upon request by the employer. The employee has 15 days to return the requested certification, unless it is not practicable to do so under the particular circumstances. If an employee fails to provide certification, the employer may deny the FMLA leave.

What happens, however, if an employee returns the requested medical certification late—after the expiration of the 15-day time limit? According to the Northern District of Ohio, in Kinds v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. (7/30/12) [pdf], an employer can lawfully deny FMLA benefits when an employee submits the medical certification beyond the 15-day deadline, even if the employee only misses it by a short amount of time.

Ohio Bell’s decision to deny Kinds FMLA coverage due to untimely certification is justified…. In spite of ample notification by Ohio Bell, Kinds did not submit certification by the 13th…. Ohio Bell would have been justified in denying coverage for this failure alone, but the company nonetheless granted Kinds an extension. Kinds failed to submit certification by the January 27, 2010, deadline as well. Finally, on February 16, 2010, Kinds submitted the medical certification, but it failed to provide an explanation—a request made by FMLA Operations as a condition for giving Kinds a third extension—as to why she failed to submit certification earlier. As a matter of law, it cannot be said that Ohio Bell’s refusal to accept Kinds’s twice late and still inadequate certification—submitted one month past the FMLA required 15-day period—constituted interference with Kinds’s FMLA rights.

To sum up:

  • How late is too late for an employee to submit a medical certification to support a request for FMLA leave? One day.
  • Can you extend the 15-day period and accept a late certification? Yes.
  • Do you have to? No.

Wednesday, August 1, 2012

A letter to the NLRB on its latest position against confidential workplace investigations


Dear National Labor Relations Board,

You and I have not always seen eye to eye, especially on the issue of protected concerted activity. You might think I’m out to get you. I’m not. I just want to make sure that you fully understand the real-world implications of the rules you are making. For example, take your latest target: workplace investigations.

In Banner Estrella Medical Center [pdf], you concluded that an employer’s request to employees not to discuss a workplace investigation with their coworkers while the investigation was ongoing violated the employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity:

To justify a prohibition on employee discussion of ongoing investigations, an employer must show that it has a legitimate business justification that outweighs employees’ Section 7 rights…. Respondent’s generalized concern with protecting the integrity of its investigations is insufficient to outweigh employees’ Section 7 rights. Rather, in order to minimize the impact on Section 7 rights, it was the Respondent’s burden “to first determine whether in any give[n] investigation witnesses need[ed] protection, evidence [was] in danger of being destroyed, testimony [was] in danger of being fabricated, or there [was] a need to prevent a cover up.”

Workplace interviews are high-stakes affairs that carry serious liability repercussions for the employer. Moreover, it is often difficult to determine who is telling the truth and who is lying. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that those conducting these investigations are not trained detectives, but often HR personnel.

One sure-fire tool one can use to figure out who’s telling the truth and who’s lying is to see how everyone’s stories jive or contradict. For this reason, one of the key instructions that should given in any workplace investigatory interview is that the employee should keep everything said confidential. That way, later interviewees will not be influenced, and do not have an opportunity to compare (and prepare) their stories. 

By prohibiting employers from requiring that workplace investigations remain confidential, your decision in Banner Estrella neuters the ability of employers to make key credibility determinations. Limiting confidentiality in this manner will severely constrain the ability of employers to conduct thorough and accurate workplace investigations, which, in turn, limits the ability of employers to stop the workplace evils they are investigating (discrimination, harassment, theft, etc.).

NLRB, I implore you to consider the real-world implications of your rulings on protected concerted activity. Halting confidential workplace investigations serves no one’s interest, including the employees you are sworn to protect.

Very truly yours,

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Jon Hyman

Tuesday, July 31, 2012

“Bitch” as sexual harassment: context matters (sort of)


Bitch (n): 1) A lewd or immoral woman; or 2) a malicious, spiteful, or overbearing woman—sometimes used as a generalized term of abuse.
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary

According to a recent survey, half of all employees swear on the job. Passananti v. Cook County (7th Cir. 7/20/12) answers the question of whether there exists a line between swearing as workplace banter and swearing as unlawful harassment.

After losing her job as a deputy director with the Cook County Sheriff’s Department, Kimberly Passananti sued, claiming that her director had subjected her to sexual harassment by calling her a “bitch” on “numerous occasions” over a “progressive period of time.” A jury awarded Passananti $4.2 million in damages, of which $70,000 was compensation for the sexual harassment. The trial court set aside the entire verdict. The 7th Circuit reinstated the verdict on the sexual harassment claim.

The Court started its analysis of whether the use of the word “bitch” constitutes sex-based harassment by dismissing any argument that its common use has neutered the word:

We recognize that the use of the word “bitch” has become all too common in American society, and its use has permeated many workplaces. Common use, however, has not neutralized the word as a matter of law.

The Court concluded that even though “bitch” is sexually based, its use must be examined in context to determine whether it constitutes harassment “because of sex.”

We do not hold that use of the word “bitch” is harassment “because of sex” always and in every context…. [T]he use of the word in the workplace must be be viewed in context…. But we do reject the idea that a female plaintiff who has been subjected to repeated and hostile use of the word “bitch” must produce evidence beyond the word itself to allow a jury to infer that its use was derogatory towards women. The word is gender-specific, and it can reasonably be considered evidence of sexual harassment….

Whether its use is sufficient evidence of actionable sexual harassment is, of course, another matter. As with so many other things, when gender-specific language is used in the workplace, these cases and others recognize that context is key. We must proceed with “[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity” to that context to distinguish between general vulgarity and discriminatory conduct or language “which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.”

In other words, “bitch” is sufficiently gender-specific such that in most cases a jury should apply its common sense to determine whether the pejorative use of the word towards a female employee constitutes harassment because of sex.

In the day-to-day management of your employees, however, you should not get bogged down in legal minutia whether one employee calling another employee a “bitch” is actionable sexual harassment. If an employee complains that he or she is being called vulgarities or other offensive names, you have only one option—investigate and take appropriate corrective action.

[Hat tip: Judy Greenwald at Workforce]

Monday, July 30, 2012

More on educating your employees about being “profersonal”


Earlier this morning, I wrote about the confluence of our professional and personal personas, and the need for employers to educate employees about the importance of maintaining a proper online image. How do you go about engaging in this education? The U.S. Olympic Women’s Soccer team provides a great example.

Goalie Hope Solo took to Twitter (where else) to criticize media coverage of her team’s defensive play after their 3-0 win Saturday against Colombia.

Instead of disciplining Solo, coach Pia Sundhage sat her down and talked to her about the importance of her online image. Per ESPN:

“We had a conversation: If you look at the women’s national team, what do you want (people) to see? What do you want them to hear?” Sundhage told reporters at the team hotel. "And that’s where we do have a choice—as players, coaches, staff, the way we respond to certain things.”

Thank you Coach Sundhage for providing a perfect epilogue to my post from earlier this morning.

Does your social media policy educate about being “profersonal?”


Jason Seiden, the co-founder and CEO of Ajax Social Media, calls it profersonal: the inherent intertwining of our personal and professional personas online. Last week, Greek Olympian Voula Papachristou got a quick and dirty lesson on being profersonal. Greece removed her from its Olympic team over a tweet mocking African immigrants. Here’s the offending tweet:

According to The Huffington Post, the Hellenic Olympic Committee subsequently “banned all Greek athletes from using social media to express any personal opinions not related to the Olympics and to the preparation for their competitions.”

Voula’s story is a perfect illustration of the disappearing line between the professional and the personal online. If an employee doesn’t want something they say online to affect their employment, they shouldn’t post it. We can debate whether an employee should lose his or her job for something non-work-related he or she posts on his or her personal time. If, however, someone can connect an employee to his or her place of employment through an online profile, what is posted becomes fair game for an employment decision.

The takeaway might simply be that employers remind their employees to “be professional” online, and that businesses will hold employees accountable for what they post that could cast the company in a bad light. Amazingly, however, the NLRB might take issue with such a policy.

In his latest missive on workplace social media policies, NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon passed judgment on the following neutral provision in an employer’s social media policy:

Remember to communicate in a professional tone…. This includes not only the obvious (no ethnic slurs, personal insults, obscenity, etc.) but also proper consideration of privacy and topics that may be considered objectionable or inflammatory—such as politics and religion.

Mr. Solomon concluded that such a policy, which merely reminds employees “to communicate in a professional tone,” unlawfully restricts employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity:

We found this rule unlawful…. [R]eminding employees to communicate in a “professional tone,” the overall thrust of this rule is to caution employees against online discussions that could become heated or controversial. Discussions about working conditions or unionism have the potential to become just as heated or controversial as discussions about politics and religion.

What’s the real lesson here? Social media is an evolving communication tool. Employees have not yet figured out what it means to be “profersonal.” Employees need to realize that anything they say online can impact their professional persona, and that every negative or offensive statement could lead to discipline or termination (even if employers can overreact in these situations). Until people fully understand that social media is erasing (has erased?) the line between the personal and the professional, these issues will continue to arise. It is our job as employers to help educate our employees about living in a “profersonal” world, even at the risk of offending the NLRB’s prickly sensitivities.

Friday, July 27, 2012

WIRTW #235 (the “exciting announcement” edition)


The Employer Bill of Rights remains one of my most popular posts. In fact, it’s so popular it got its own book deal. All joking aside, I am very proud to announce that I have been hard at work on my second book, The Employer Bill of Rights. Since I just received the cover art, I figured now is as good a time as any to break the news. Apress will publish the book by year’s end. I’ll update with links to Amazon and other points-of-sale when they go live (which I’m told will be soon).

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Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Thursday, July 26, 2012

Co-worker complaints about revised schedules may not be enough to create undue hardship for religious accommodation


Four days after the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, hired Kimberly Crider, she informed her supervisor that she was a Seventh Day Adventist, which precluded her from working from sundown Friday through sundown Saturday. Crider’s job responsibilities included monitoring an emergency cell phone on a rotating basis during weekends. When Crider’s co-workers refused to exchange shifts to accommodate her, the university determined she was unable to fulfill her job duties and terminated her. As you would guess, Crider sued, claiming religious discrimination under Title VII.

Title VII requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee whose sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance conflicts with a work requirement, unless doing so would pose an undue hardship. An accommodation poses an undue hardship if it causes more than de minimis cost on the operation of the employer’s business. In Crider v. University of Tennessee, Knoxville (6th Cir. 7/23/12) [pdf], the 6th Circuit applied these principles and concluded that a jury should decide whether the university lawfully refused to force its employees to change shifts to accommodate a co-worker’s religion.

UTK insists that requiring its employees to work Saturday shifts every other weekend would have created an undue hardship for Crider’s former co-workers…. UTK … insist[s] that a significant effect on a co-worker will suffice to establish an undue hardship…. Title VII does not exempt accommodation which creates undue hardship on the employees; it requires reasonable accommodation “without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”

The Court concluded that “employee dissatisfaction or inconvenience alone” does not create an undue hardship. Instead, “it is the effect such dissatisfaction has on the employer’s ability to operate its business that may alleviate the duty to accommodate.”

According to the EEOC, “It would pose an undue hardship to require employees involuntarily to substitute for one another or swap shifts.” Some might argue that this case undercuts the EEOC’s position. In reality, I think that the employer simply failed to prove the undue hardship with actual facts and data relative to its operations.

If you are planning on rejecting an employee’s request for a shift change as a religious accommodation, you must be able to support the claim of hardship with facts.

  • How does it impact your scheduling?
  • Do you have to hire additional staffing to cover for the missed shifts?
  • How much would it cost you in added overtime or other premium wages?
  • How often would you have to pay overtime or other premium wages?

Without providing answers to these questions, you will be hard-pressed to prove that a shift swap creates an undue hardship.

Wednesday, July 25, 2012

FMLA guarantee of reinstatement is never absolute


When an employee returns from FMLA leave, that employee is entitled to be reinstated to the same or equivalent position he or she held prior to the leave. As Winterhalter v. Dykhuis Farms (6th Cir. 7/23/12) [pdf] illustrates, however, that right to reinstatement is never guaranteed. 

Dykhuis Farms terminated Winterhalter’s employment on the day that Winterhalter was scheduled to return from FMLA leave, allegedly due to economic hardship and Winterhalter’s status as the highest-paid and lowest-performing of the workers in his unit. The court concluded that despite the fact that he was fired on the day he returned from leave, his employer neither retaliated against her nor interfered with her job restoration rights under the statute. The farm came forward with well-documented evidence that its economic hardship and its need to take "drastic measures to improve its financial performance,” motivated the termination, not Winterhalter's FMLA leave.

As the 6th Circuit correctly pointed out, the FMLA's reinstatement "provisions do not create a greater right to reinstatement or protection against termination than the employee would receive if he had not taken FMLA leave. Therefore, an employer may dismiss an employee who has taken FMLA leave, but only if the employer has a legitimate reason unrelated to the exercise of FMLA rights for engaging in the challenged conduct.”

Notifying an employee of a termination the day he or she returns from FMLA leave is a risky proposition. It will likely draw a lawsuit. The key to winning the lawsuit is having a legitimate and documented reason to support the termination. In this case, it was economic hardship. In others, it could be the discovery of serious performance deficiencies. Despite the FMLA's job restoration guarantee, you can terminate an employee who is out on an FMLA leave. You just have a really good reason, and you have to be able to back it up.

 

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Don’t estop believing: employer backs itself into FMLA claim for ineligible employee


I’ve written before about the FMLA’s unique rules for when an employer is covered and when an employee becomes eligible to take leave.

  • The FMLA covers any private employer that has 50 or more employees on the payroll during 20 or more calendar workweeks in either the current or the preceding calendar year.
  • An employee becomes eligible to take leave under the FMLA once the employee has worked for at least 12 non-consecutive months, worked 1,250 hours during the prior 12 month period, and works at a location where the employer has 50 or more employees within a 75-mile radius.

What happens, however, if a non-covered employer mistakenly grants FMLA leave to an employee, or if a covered employer mistaken grants FMLA to an ineligible employee? If the employer catches its mistake and fires the employee for taking unexcused absences, can the employee sue for retaliation under the FMLA? According to the court in Medley v. County of Montgomery (E.D. Pa. 7/16/12), the answer is yes.

Medley requested intermittent leave because of her son’s serious health conditions. Even though she had worked less than 1,250 hours during the prior 12 months, county officials told her that she qualified for FMLA leave and provided her with various FMLA forms. Once she started taking the intermittent leave, however, the county began to write her up. Within days, the county fired her for taking unauthorized leaves.

The court concluded that Medley could pursue her FMLA retaliation claim under an estoppel theory:

“The doctrine of equitable estoppel is used to prevent ‘one party from taking unfair advantage of another when, through false language or conduct, the person to be estopped has induced another person to act in a certain way, with the result that the other person has been injured in some way.’” …

In the context of the FMLA, “equitable estoppel may, in an appropriate factual scenario, provide a means of redress for employees who detrimentally rely on their employers' misrepresentations about FMLA eligibility.” … “[A]n employer who without intent to deceive makes a definite but erroneous representation to his employee that she is an ‘eligible employee’ and entitled to leave under the FMLA, and has reason to believe that the employee will rely upon it, may be estopped to assert a defense of non-coverage” if the employee reasonably relied on the misrepresentation to her detriment.

This case underscores the importance of training those who manage your FMLA program on the law’s special coverage and eligibility requirements. These employees must intrinsically understand the numerical thresholds and how to apply them. As the Medley case illustrates, you could be bound to mistakes (computational or otherwise), which could prove costly.

[Hat tip: Employment Law Matters]

Monday, July 23, 2012

Bag of Bones = age discrimination


realviewStephen King’s Bag of Bones is about an author who moves to a lakeside house to confront his nightmare in the wake of his pregnant wife’s death. EEOC v. Hawaii Healthcare Professionals, Inc., concerns a nightmare of a different kind.

In 2008, Hawaii Healthcare’s owner, Carolyn Frutoz-De Harne, ordered the firing of then 54-year-old Debra Moreno. Frutoz-De Harne proceeded with the termination over the protest of the facility manager, who hired and supervised Moreno, and who thought she was a thorough and efficient worker. In ordering the termination, Frutoz-De Harne allegedly told the manager that Moreno “looks old,” “sounds old on the telephone,” and is “like a bag of bones.” After the termination, the manager reported the ageist comments to Moreno, who in turn filed an age discrimination charge with the EEOC. The agency subsequently filed a lawsuit on Moreno’s behalf.

Last week, a federal court ordered Hawaii Healthcare Professionals to pay Moreno $193,236 for the discrimination. According to the EEOC:

Age should never be a factor when evaluating an employee or job applicant’s worth. What makes this case especially appalling is the flagrant disregard for a worker’s abilities, coupled with disparaging ageist remarks and thinking.

Procedurally, this case is unique because the district court entered a default judgment against Hawaii Healthcare after it failed to respond to the EEOC’s amended complaint. Even if this case proceeded to trial, however, Hawaii Healthcare would have faced an uphill battle. An executive terminating an employee over a manager’s objections and after referring to the fired employee as “bag of bones”? Sounds to me like a tough age case to defend.

Friday, July 20, 2012

WIRTW #234 (the “have it your way” edition


Recently, Reddit listed the nine menu items that fast food workers say you should never eat at one of their restaurants. I think number 10 should be anything with lettuce on it from a Mayfield Heights, Ohio, Burger King. Earlier this week, the franchise owner fired three employees who believed they had anonymously posted the following photo of one of them using bins of lettuce as shoes:

24xnppws

Here’s the full story, as reported by WKYC:

The lesson for employers and employees? Online photos are not really anonymous. They almost always contain something called “metadata,” which tells when and where the photo was taken. In this instance, the metadata enabled the franchise to track down, and fire, the offending employee. In fact, according to Mashable, it took all of 20 minutes for someone to decipher the metadata, post the address of the store, contact the news, and inform Burger King’s corporate website.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, July 19, 2012

820,000 reasons to have a social media policy


Yesterday, I read an article entitled, Companies Should Think Twice Before Creating Social Media Policy, which argued that “companies who scrutinize their employees’ personal accounts and social media activity may be doing more harm than good.” Yet, companies that ignore employees’ social media activities squarely put themselves at risk.

For example, consider Espinoza v. County of Orange (Calif. Ct. App. 2/9/12). The plaintiff, Ralph Espinoza, a deputy juvenile corrections officer, was born without fingers on his right hand. Co-workers started an anonymous blog, where they referred to Espinoza as the “one handed bandit” and the “rat claw.” The blog became increasingly offensive, culminating in posts such as, “Fuck you one hand bandit! You can shove that claw of yours up your ass!” and “hey rat claw, wrote a poem 4 you: Roses are red; Violets are blue; I fucked your mother in the ass; And she had you!!!!!!!!!”

Espinoza learned of the blog from a sympathetic coworker. Espinoza complained to management, who did little other than asking employees to put the blog to rest. Indeed, the blog continued unabated for eight weeks while management investigated.

A jury awarded Espinoza $820,000 for the harassment.

The court of appeals upheld the verdict, concluding that an employer can be liable for off-duty harassment conducted by employees:

Defendant seems to be taking the position all of the complained of conduct occurred outside the workplace and summarily claims there was no evidence “a current employee” posted any of the comments…. But even on the merits the argument fails….

Employees accessed the blog on workplace computers as revealed by defendant’s own investigation. The postings referred both directly and indirectly to plaintiff, who was specifically named in at least some of them, and the postings discussed work-related issues. It was reasonable for the jury to infer the derogatory blogs were made by coworkers.

There are many risks to employers from the un-monitored use of social media by employees. Harassment, such as that seen in the Espinoza case is just the tip of the iceberg. Employers also need to worry about retaliation, defamation, and breaches of confidentiality, not to mention harm to the corporate reputation. For these reasons, employers need social media policies to establish the rules of road for employees, who do not understand that they can be held responsible for their off-duty, online activities.

[Hat tip: Technology for HR Blog]

Wednesday, July 18, 2012

Disability services provider sued for, what else, disability discrimination


I’m four years older than my brother. For this reason, growing up I would sometimes get punished for things for which my brother was let off the hook. The reasoning? You should know better. And, I’m sad to say that now that I have two kids of my own, I have found myself repeating this refrain to my older child. The sins of the father, I guess.

Apparently, “you should know better” carries over to the world of employment law. The EEOC has filed a disability discrimination lawsuit against Pace Solano, a California disability services provider. According to the EEOC:

After interviewing for a position to teach developmentally disabled adults … Katrina Holly was immediately offered a job and asked to take a pre-employment physical exam. Holly successfully completed all of the tests and disclosed that she had partial paralysis in one hand to the examiner, so that he would have her complete medical information. Despite written verification from its own doctor that Holly was cleared to do the job, Pace Solano withdrew its job offer due to her hand. When she asked the company to reconsider, the response was, “Your injury makes you a liability; you don’t want to get hurt any more than you already are, do you?”

I agree wholeheartedly with these words from EEOC District Director Michael Baldonado: “While we admire the work that Pace Solano performs for the community, there is simply no excuse for rejecting an applicant because of a disability which in no way impacts her performance.” A lawsuit is simply a set of unproven allegations. If, however, there is any whiff of truth in this lawsuit, Pace Solano should settle this case and train its people so that this public relations nightmare is not repeated.

Tuesday, July 17, 2012

The “cat’s paw” strikes back


In Staub v. Proctor Hosp., the Supreme Court passed judgment on the “cat’s paw” theory of liability in discrimination cases—an employer’s liability for the discriminatory animus of an employee who played no role in the decision, but nevertheless exerted some degree of influence over the ultimate decision maker. The Staub Court concluded that an employer can be liable for the discriminatory animus of a non-decision making supervisor who intends to cause, and does proximately cause, an adverse employment action.

In Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am. (6th Cir. 7/13/12) [pdf], the 6th Circuit applied Staub to reverse summary judgment in a race discrimination case. Chattman alleged that his employer’s HR director, Tullock, who recommended his termination for horseplay and fabricated that other supervisors supported the decision, was racially biased.

In support of this allegation of race-based animus, Chattman pointed to three separate incidents:

  1. Tullock told a “joke” that O.J. Simpson was innocent and that Nicole Brown was killed by their son because O.J. Simpson responded to a question from his son by answering “go axe your mother.”
  2. Tullock responded to another employee’s complaint that her son had gotten into trouble at school for fighting by saying “you know what my grandmother always says about boys scuffling? That’s how the nigger graveyard got full.”
  3. Tullock commented about then-Presidential candidate Barack Obama by saying “well you better look close at Obama’s running mate because Americans won’t allow a nigger president.”

Even though Tullock was not the decision maker, the court concluded that a jury question existed under the cat’s paw theory:

Chattman has shown that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Tullock intended that Chattman be disciplined…. There can be little doubt that Tullock desired Chattman’s termination when he made his recommendation and fabricated the agreement of the other supervisors….

Chattman alleges that Tullock knew that white employees engaged in horseplay but never reported any of those incidents to upper management, instead reporting the only incident on record of a black employee engaging in horseplay.

Tullock was the Human Resources manager, and he actively inserted himself in the decisionmaking process. He both misinformed and selectively informed … about the incident. A reasonable factfinder could find Tullock’s actions were a proximate cause of the adverse decisions.

When the Supreme Court decided Staub last year, I cautioned that it upped the ante for employers in discrimination cases:

The Court’s holding hinges on ideals such as “intent” and “proximate cause,” which are almost always fact-based inquiries. Because it is very difficult for an employer to win summary judgment on these issues, the Court has turned nearly every “cat’s paw” case into a jury case—an expensive proposition for employers.

Chattman does nothing to dissuade me of my earlier opinion.

What is the practical takeaway for employers? You better know who you have managing and supervising your employees. Companies do not make personnel decisions in a vacuum. Executives often rely on the front-line managers and supervisors for advice on who and when to discipline or fire. Yet, under Staub, businesses are on the hook for the discriminatory animus of these managers and supervisors, even if they have nothing to do with the ultimate decision. You never want a bigot managing your employees. The cat’s paw, however, provides employers added incentive to purge them from your managerial ranks.

Monday, July 16, 2012

Despite what some think, employers also do not set out to cheat and steal


Earlier this year, I engaged in a debate with plaintiff’s attorney (and author of the excellent employee-side blog, Screw You Guys, I’m Going Home) Donna Ballman over whether discrimination lawsuits are sins of commission or omission. I argued that most employers are well-intentioned, but sometimes act out of inexperience with the complexities of myriad employment laws. Donna argued that many employers act out of malice and deserve to be on the receiving end of discrimination lawsuits.

Last week, writing at Aol Jobs, Donna turned her attention to wage and hour laws. She listed “10 tricks employers use to cheat workers out of overtime.” Donna’s premise, however, is faulty. Managers and executives are not spending their days in locked, smoke-filled conference rooms scheming how to cheat extra hours and steal overtime pay from their employees. Paychecks and timesheets are neither a ploy nor a tactic. Instead, most employers are well-intentioned but ignorant. They are ignorant of the myriad, twisted rules and regulations that govern why, when, to whom, and how much overtime is to be paid.

It’s no secret that I believe the Fair Labor Standards Act is woefully outdated and needs a modernized, top-to-bottom rewrite. As I’ve written before:

Congress enacted the FLSA during the Great Depression to combat the sweatshops that had taken over our manufacturing sector. In the 70+ years that have passed, it has evolved, via a complex web of regulations and interpretations, into an anachronistic maze of rules that even the best-intentioned employer cannot hope to comply with. I would bet any employer in this country a free wage and hour audit that I can find an FLSA violation in your pay practices. A regulatory scheme that is impossible to meet does not make sense to keep alive. Instead, what employers and employees need is a more streamlined system to ensure that workers are paid a fair wage.

Reforming the system into a manageable and understandable set of rules is the best means to ensure that workers are paid a full wage for all hours worked. The system, as it is currently set up, dooms even the most well-meaning employer to failure.