Monday, August 6, 2012

Does a "good faith belief" about an illegal pay practice support an FLSA retaliation claim?



April Hurd worked as a nurse’s aide for Blossom 24 Hour We Care Center. The company fired her 10 days after she complained about unpaid overtime. Easy case for the employee? If you think this is an open and shut case of retaliation under the FLSA, you are mistaken.

In Hurd v. Blossom 24 Hour We Care Center, Inc. (Ohio Ct. App. 8/2/12) [pdf], the court quickly disposed of Hurd’s retaliation claim:
There is no evidence that Hurd engaged in protected activity by requesting overtime. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that home health care workers are not entitled to overtime compensation because they constitute FLSA-exempt “domestic service” employees. Thus, because Hurd is exempt, her request for overtime did not constitute a protected activity. 
Should this case have been this simple? In Title VII retaliation cases, there is a long-standing rule that an employee engages in protect activity by opposing an alleged unlawful employment practice with a reasonable a good-faith belief that the employer has violated Title VII. Some courts have extended this rule to retaliation cases brought under the FLSA.

If an exempt employee has a good faith belief that he or she is not exempt and complains about missing overtime pay, shouldn’t that employee receive the same benefit as an employee complaining about an alleged unlawful employment practice under Title VII? Shouldn’t the employee’s good faith belief in the perceived illegality be put to the test?

What is the lesson for employers? Despite the ruling in Hurd, if an employee you have classified as exempt complains about overtime pay, do not assume it is safe to retaliate. The court deciding that employee’s case might not be as generous as the court was in Hurd.

Friday, August 3, 2012

WIRTW #236 (the “reactions” edition)


Wednesday’s post dissecting the NLRB’s attack on confidential workplace investigations received a lot of feedback, on Twitter, in various LinkedIn groups, and in the comments. Here’s two of the best:

The NLRB does not understand how one sentence, in a determination, can alter an entire system, regardless of their actual intent.

I bet you $1 that investigators of workplace complaints at NLRB make standard confidentiality advisements, too.

The best comment, however, came via email from a reader who has asked to remain anonymous:

In its attempt to stay relevant, the NLRB has revealed how very out of touch it really is.

I couldn’t have said it better myself (and thanks to everyone for contributing to the discussion).

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, August 2, 2012

How late is too late for an FMLA medical certification?


Under the FMLA, an employee requesting leave for a serious health condition must provide a medical certification for the leave upon request by the employer. The employee has 15 days to return the requested certification, unless it is not practicable to do so under the particular circumstances. If an employee fails to provide certification, the employer may deny the FMLA leave.

What happens, however, if an employee returns the requested medical certification late—after the expiration of the 15-day time limit? According to the Northern District of Ohio, in Kinds v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co. (7/30/12) [pdf], an employer can lawfully deny FMLA benefits when an employee submits the medical certification beyond the 15-day deadline, even if the employee only misses it by a short amount of time.

Ohio Bell’s decision to deny Kinds FMLA coverage due to untimely certification is justified…. In spite of ample notification by Ohio Bell, Kinds did not submit certification by the 13th…. Ohio Bell would have been justified in denying coverage for this failure alone, but the company nonetheless granted Kinds an extension. Kinds failed to submit certification by the January 27, 2010, deadline as well. Finally, on February 16, 2010, Kinds submitted the medical certification, but it failed to provide an explanation—a request made by FMLA Operations as a condition for giving Kinds a third extension—as to why she failed to submit certification earlier. As a matter of law, it cannot be said that Ohio Bell’s refusal to accept Kinds’s twice late and still inadequate certification—submitted one month past the FMLA required 15-day period—constituted interference with Kinds’s FMLA rights.

To sum up:

  • How late is too late for an employee to submit a medical certification to support a request for FMLA leave? One day.
  • Can you extend the 15-day period and accept a late certification? Yes.
  • Do you have to? No.

Wednesday, August 1, 2012

A letter to the NLRB on its latest position against confidential workplace investigations


Dear National Labor Relations Board,

You and I have not always seen eye to eye, especially on the issue of protected concerted activity. You might think I’m out to get you. I’m not. I just want to make sure that you fully understand the real-world implications of the rules you are making. For example, take your latest target: workplace investigations.

In Banner Estrella Medical Center [pdf], you concluded that an employer’s request to employees not to discuss a workplace investigation with their coworkers while the investigation was ongoing violated the employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity:

To justify a prohibition on employee discussion of ongoing investigations, an employer must show that it has a legitimate business justification that outweighs employees’ Section 7 rights…. Respondent’s generalized concern with protecting the integrity of its investigations is insufficient to outweigh employees’ Section 7 rights. Rather, in order to minimize the impact on Section 7 rights, it was the Respondent’s burden “to first determine whether in any give[n] investigation witnesses need[ed] protection, evidence [was] in danger of being destroyed, testimony [was] in danger of being fabricated, or there [was] a need to prevent a cover up.”

Workplace interviews are high-stakes affairs that carry serious liability repercussions for the employer. Moreover, it is often difficult to determine who is telling the truth and who is lying. This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that those conducting these investigations are not trained detectives, but often HR personnel.

One sure-fire tool one can use to figure out who’s telling the truth and who’s lying is to see how everyone’s stories jive or contradict. For this reason, one of the key instructions that should given in any workplace investigatory interview is that the employee should keep everything said confidential. That way, later interviewees will not be influenced, and do not have an opportunity to compare (and prepare) their stories. 

By prohibiting employers from requiring that workplace investigations remain confidential, your decision in Banner Estrella neuters the ability of employers to make key credibility determinations. Limiting confidentiality in this manner will severely constrain the ability of employers to conduct thorough and accurate workplace investigations, which, in turn, limits the ability of employers to stop the workplace evils they are investigating (discrimination, harassment, theft, etc.).

NLRB, I implore you to consider the real-world implications of your rulings on protected concerted activity. Halting confidential workplace investigations serves no one’s interest, including the employees you are sworn to protect.

Very truly yours,

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Jon Hyman

Tuesday, July 31, 2012

“Bitch” as sexual harassment: context matters (sort of)


Bitch (n): 1) A lewd or immoral woman; or 2) a malicious, spiteful, or overbearing woman—sometimes used as a generalized term of abuse.
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary

According to a recent survey, half of all employees swear on the job. Passananti v. Cook County (7th Cir. 7/20/12) answers the question of whether there exists a line between swearing as workplace banter and swearing as unlawful harassment.

After losing her job as a deputy director with the Cook County Sheriff’s Department, Kimberly Passananti sued, claiming that her director had subjected her to sexual harassment by calling her a “bitch” on “numerous occasions” over a “progressive period of time.” A jury awarded Passananti $4.2 million in damages, of which $70,000 was compensation for the sexual harassment. The trial court set aside the entire verdict. The 7th Circuit reinstated the verdict on the sexual harassment claim.

The Court started its analysis of whether the use of the word “bitch” constitutes sex-based harassment by dismissing any argument that its common use has neutered the word:

We recognize that the use of the word “bitch” has become all too common in American society, and its use has permeated many workplaces. Common use, however, has not neutralized the word as a matter of law.

The Court concluded that even though “bitch” is sexually based, its use must be examined in context to determine whether it constitutes harassment “because of sex.”

We do not hold that use of the word “bitch” is harassment “because of sex” always and in every context…. [T]he use of the word in the workplace must be be viewed in context…. But we do reject the idea that a female plaintiff who has been subjected to repeated and hostile use of the word “bitch” must produce evidence beyond the word itself to allow a jury to infer that its use was derogatory towards women. The word is gender-specific, and it can reasonably be considered evidence of sexual harassment….

Whether its use is sufficient evidence of actionable sexual harassment is, of course, another matter. As with so many other things, when gender-specific language is used in the workplace, these cases and others recognize that context is key. We must proceed with “[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity” to that context to distinguish between general vulgarity and discriminatory conduct or language “which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.”

In other words, “bitch” is sufficiently gender-specific such that in most cases a jury should apply its common sense to determine whether the pejorative use of the word towards a female employee constitutes harassment because of sex.

In the day-to-day management of your employees, however, you should not get bogged down in legal minutia whether one employee calling another employee a “bitch” is actionable sexual harassment. If an employee complains that he or she is being called vulgarities or other offensive names, you have only one option—investigate and take appropriate corrective action.

[Hat tip: Judy Greenwald at Workforce]

Monday, July 30, 2012

More on educating your employees about being “profersonal”


Earlier this morning, I wrote about the confluence of our professional and personal personas, and the need for employers to educate employees about the importance of maintaining a proper online image. How do you go about engaging in this education? The U.S. Olympic Women’s Soccer team provides a great example.

Goalie Hope Solo took to Twitter (where else) to criticize media coverage of her team’s defensive play after their 3-0 win Saturday against Colombia.

Instead of disciplining Solo, coach Pia Sundhage sat her down and talked to her about the importance of her online image. Per ESPN:

“We had a conversation: If you look at the women’s national team, what do you want (people) to see? What do you want them to hear?” Sundhage told reporters at the team hotel. "And that’s where we do have a choice—as players, coaches, staff, the way we respond to certain things.”

Thank you Coach Sundhage for providing a perfect epilogue to my post from earlier this morning.

Does your social media policy educate about being “profersonal?”


Jason Seiden, the co-founder and CEO of Ajax Social Media, calls it profersonal: the inherent intertwining of our personal and professional personas online. Last week, Greek Olympian Voula Papachristou got a quick and dirty lesson on being profersonal. Greece removed her from its Olympic team over a tweet mocking African immigrants. Here’s the offending tweet:

According to The Huffington Post, the Hellenic Olympic Committee subsequently “banned all Greek athletes from using social media to express any personal opinions not related to the Olympics and to the preparation for their competitions.”

Voula’s story is a perfect illustration of the disappearing line between the professional and the personal online. If an employee doesn’t want something they say online to affect their employment, they shouldn’t post it. We can debate whether an employee should lose his or her job for something non-work-related he or she posts on his or her personal time. If, however, someone can connect an employee to his or her place of employment through an online profile, what is posted becomes fair game for an employment decision.

The takeaway might simply be that employers remind their employees to “be professional” online, and that businesses will hold employees accountable for what they post that could cast the company in a bad light. Amazingly, however, the NLRB might take issue with such a policy.

In his latest missive on workplace social media policies, NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon passed judgment on the following neutral provision in an employer’s social media policy:

Remember to communicate in a professional tone…. This includes not only the obvious (no ethnic slurs, personal insults, obscenity, etc.) but also proper consideration of privacy and topics that may be considered objectionable or inflammatory—such as politics and religion.

Mr. Solomon concluded that such a policy, which merely reminds employees “to communicate in a professional tone,” unlawfully restricts employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity:

We found this rule unlawful…. [R]eminding employees to communicate in a “professional tone,” the overall thrust of this rule is to caution employees against online discussions that could become heated or controversial. Discussions about working conditions or unionism have the potential to become just as heated or controversial as discussions about politics and religion.

What’s the real lesson here? Social media is an evolving communication tool. Employees have not yet figured out what it means to be “profersonal.” Employees need to realize that anything they say online can impact their professional persona, and that every negative or offensive statement could lead to discipline or termination (even if employers can overreact in these situations). Until people fully understand that social media is erasing (has erased?) the line between the personal and the professional, these issues will continue to arise. It is our job as employers to help educate our employees about living in a “profersonal” world, even at the risk of offending the NLRB’s prickly sensitivities.

Friday, July 27, 2012

WIRTW #235 (the “exciting announcement” edition)


The Employer Bill of Rights remains one of my most popular posts. In fact, it’s so popular it got its own book deal. All joking aside, I am very proud to announce that I have been hard at work on my second book, The Employer Bill of Rights. Since I just received the cover art, I figured now is as good a time as any to break the news. Apress will publish the book by year’s end. I’ll update with links to Amazon and other points-of-sale when they go live (which I’m told will be soon).

=

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Thursday, July 26, 2012

Co-worker complaints about revised schedules may not be enough to create undue hardship for religious accommodation


Four days after the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, hired Kimberly Crider, she informed her supervisor that she was a Seventh Day Adventist, which precluded her from working from sundown Friday through sundown Saturday. Crider’s job responsibilities included monitoring an emergency cell phone on a rotating basis during weekends. When Crider’s co-workers refused to exchange shifts to accommodate her, the university determined she was unable to fulfill her job duties and terminated her. As you would guess, Crider sued, claiming religious discrimination under Title VII.

Title VII requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee whose sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance conflicts with a work requirement, unless doing so would pose an undue hardship. An accommodation poses an undue hardship if it causes more than de minimis cost on the operation of the employer’s business. In Crider v. University of Tennessee, Knoxville (6th Cir. 7/23/12) [pdf], the 6th Circuit applied these principles and concluded that a jury should decide whether the university lawfully refused to force its employees to change shifts to accommodate a co-worker’s religion.

UTK insists that requiring its employees to work Saturday shifts every other weekend would have created an undue hardship for Crider’s former co-workers…. UTK … insist[s] that a significant effect on a co-worker will suffice to establish an undue hardship…. Title VII does not exempt accommodation which creates undue hardship on the employees; it requires reasonable accommodation “without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”

The Court concluded that “employee dissatisfaction or inconvenience alone” does not create an undue hardship. Instead, “it is the effect such dissatisfaction has on the employer’s ability to operate its business that may alleviate the duty to accommodate.”

According to the EEOC, “It would pose an undue hardship to require employees involuntarily to substitute for one another or swap shifts.” Some might argue that this case undercuts the EEOC’s position. In reality, I think that the employer simply failed to prove the undue hardship with actual facts and data relative to its operations.

If you are planning on rejecting an employee’s request for a shift change as a religious accommodation, you must be able to support the claim of hardship with facts.

  • How does it impact your scheduling?
  • Do you have to hire additional staffing to cover for the missed shifts?
  • How much would it cost you in added overtime or other premium wages?
  • How often would you have to pay overtime or other premium wages?

Without providing answers to these questions, you will be hard-pressed to prove that a shift swap creates an undue hardship.

Wednesday, July 25, 2012

FMLA guarantee of reinstatement is never absolute


When an employee returns from FMLA leave, that employee is entitled to be reinstated to the same or equivalent position he or she held prior to the leave. As Winterhalter v. Dykhuis Farms (6th Cir. 7/23/12) [pdf] illustrates, however, that right to reinstatement is never guaranteed. 

Dykhuis Farms terminated Winterhalter’s employment on the day that Winterhalter was scheduled to return from FMLA leave, allegedly due to economic hardship and Winterhalter’s status as the highest-paid and lowest-performing of the workers in his unit. The court concluded that despite the fact that he was fired on the day he returned from leave, his employer neither retaliated against her nor interfered with her job restoration rights under the statute. The farm came forward with well-documented evidence that its economic hardship and its need to take "drastic measures to improve its financial performance,” motivated the termination, not Winterhalter's FMLA leave.

As the 6th Circuit correctly pointed out, the FMLA's reinstatement "provisions do not create a greater right to reinstatement or protection against termination than the employee would receive if he had not taken FMLA leave. Therefore, an employer may dismiss an employee who has taken FMLA leave, but only if the employer has a legitimate reason unrelated to the exercise of FMLA rights for engaging in the challenged conduct.”

Notifying an employee of a termination the day he or she returns from FMLA leave is a risky proposition. It will likely draw a lawsuit. The key to winning the lawsuit is having a legitimate and documented reason to support the termination. In this case, it was economic hardship. In others, it could be the discovery of serious performance deficiencies. Despite the FMLA's job restoration guarantee, you can terminate an employee who is out on an FMLA leave. You just have a really good reason, and you have to be able to back it up.

 

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Don’t estop believing: employer backs itself into FMLA claim for ineligible employee


I’ve written before about the FMLA’s unique rules for when an employer is covered and when an employee becomes eligible to take leave.

  • The FMLA covers any private employer that has 50 or more employees on the payroll during 20 or more calendar workweeks in either the current or the preceding calendar year.
  • An employee becomes eligible to take leave under the FMLA once the employee has worked for at least 12 non-consecutive months, worked 1,250 hours during the prior 12 month period, and works at a location where the employer has 50 or more employees within a 75-mile radius.

What happens, however, if a non-covered employer mistakenly grants FMLA leave to an employee, or if a covered employer mistaken grants FMLA to an ineligible employee? If the employer catches its mistake and fires the employee for taking unexcused absences, can the employee sue for retaliation under the FMLA? According to the court in Medley v. County of Montgomery (E.D. Pa. 7/16/12), the answer is yes.

Medley requested intermittent leave because of her son’s serious health conditions. Even though she had worked less than 1,250 hours during the prior 12 months, county officials told her that she qualified for FMLA leave and provided her with various FMLA forms. Once she started taking the intermittent leave, however, the county began to write her up. Within days, the county fired her for taking unauthorized leaves.

The court concluded that Medley could pursue her FMLA retaliation claim under an estoppel theory:

“The doctrine of equitable estoppel is used to prevent ‘one party from taking unfair advantage of another when, through false language or conduct, the person to be estopped has induced another person to act in a certain way, with the result that the other person has been injured in some way.’” …

In the context of the FMLA, “equitable estoppel may, in an appropriate factual scenario, provide a means of redress for employees who detrimentally rely on their employers' misrepresentations about FMLA eligibility.” … “[A]n employer who without intent to deceive makes a definite but erroneous representation to his employee that she is an ‘eligible employee’ and entitled to leave under the FMLA, and has reason to believe that the employee will rely upon it, may be estopped to assert a defense of non-coverage” if the employee reasonably relied on the misrepresentation to her detriment.

This case underscores the importance of training those who manage your FMLA program on the law’s special coverage and eligibility requirements. These employees must intrinsically understand the numerical thresholds and how to apply them. As the Medley case illustrates, you could be bound to mistakes (computational or otherwise), which could prove costly.

[Hat tip: Employment Law Matters]

Monday, July 23, 2012

Bag of Bones = age discrimination


realviewStephen King’s Bag of Bones is about an author who moves to a lakeside house to confront his nightmare in the wake of his pregnant wife’s death. EEOC v. Hawaii Healthcare Professionals, Inc., concerns a nightmare of a different kind.

In 2008, Hawaii Healthcare’s owner, Carolyn Frutoz-De Harne, ordered the firing of then 54-year-old Debra Moreno. Frutoz-De Harne proceeded with the termination over the protest of the facility manager, who hired and supervised Moreno, and who thought she was a thorough and efficient worker. In ordering the termination, Frutoz-De Harne allegedly told the manager that Moreno “looks old,” “sounds old on the telephone,” and is “like a bag of bones.” After the termination, the manager reported the ageist comments to Moreno, who in turn filed an age discrimination charge with the EEOC. The agency subsequently filed a lawsuit on Moreno’s behalf.

Last week, a federal court ordered Hawaii Healthcare Professionals to pay Moreno $193,236 for the discrimination. According to the EEOC:

Age should never be a factor when evaluating an employee or job applicant’s worth. What makes this case especially appalling is the flagrant disregard for a worker’s abilities, coupled with disparaging ageist remarks and thinking.

Procedurally, this case is unique because the district court entered a default judgment against Hawaii Healthcare after it failed to respond to the EEOC’s amended complaint. Even if this case proceeded to trial, however, Hawaii Healthcare would have faced an uphill battle. An executive terminating an employee over a manager’s objections and after referring to the fired employee as “bag of bones”? Sounds to me like a tough age case to defend.

Friday, July 20, 2012

WIRTW #234 (the “have it your way” edition


Recently, Reddit listed the nine menu items that fast food workers say you should never eat at one of their restaurants. I think number 10 should be anything with lettuce on it from a Mayfield Heights, Ohio, Burger King. Earlier this week, the franchise owner fired three employees who believed they had anonymously posted the following photo of one of them using bins of lettuce as shoes:

24xnppws

Here’s the full story, as reported by WKYC:

The lesson for employers and employees? Online photos are not really anonymous. They almost always contain something called “metadata,” which tells when and where the photo was taken. In this instance, the metadata enabled the franchise to track down, and fire, the offending employee. In fact, according to Mashable, it took all of 20 minutes for someone to decipher the metadata, post the address of the store, contact the news, and inform Burger King’s corporate website.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, July 19, 2012

820,000 reasons to have a social media policy


Yesterday, I read an article entitled, Companies Should Think Twice Before Creating Social Media Policy, which argued that “companies who scrutinize their employees’ personal accounts and social media activity may be doing more harm than good.” Yet, companies that ignore employees’ social media activities squarely put themselves at risk.

For example, consider Espinoza v. County of Orange (Calif. Ct. App. 2/9/12). The plaintiff, Ralph Espinoza, a deputy juvenile corrections officer, was born without fingers on his right hand. Co-workers started an anonymous blog, where they referred to Espinoza as the “one handed bandit” and the “rat claw.” The blog became increasingly offensive, culminating in posts such as, “Fuck you one hand bandit! You can shove that claw of yours up your ass!” and “hey rat claw, wrote a poem 4 you: Roses are red; Violets are blue; I fucked your mother in the ass; And she had you!!!!!!!!!”

Espinoza learned of the blog from a sympathetic coworker. Espinoza complained to management, who did little other than asking employees to put the blog to rest. Indeed, the blog continued unabated for eight weeks while management investigated.

A jury awarded Espinoza $820,000 for the harassment.

The court of appeals upheld the verdict, concluding that an employer can be liable for off-duty harassment conducted by employees:

Defendant seems to be taking the position all of the complained of conduct occurred outside the workplace and summarily claims there was no evidence “a current employee” posted any of the comments…. But even on the merits the argument fails….

Employees accessed the blog on workplace computers as revealed by defendant’s own investigation. The postings referred both directly and indirectly to plaintiff, who was specifically named in at least some of them, and the postings discussed work-related issues. It was reasonable for the jury to infer the derogatory blogs were made by coworkers.

There are many risks to employers from the un-monitored use of social media by employees. Harassment, such as that seen in the Espinoza case is just the tip of the iceberg. Employers also need to worry about retaliation, defamation, and breaches of confidentiality, not to mention harm to the corporate reputation. For these reasons, employers need social media policies to establish the rules of road for employees, who do not understand that they can be held responsible for their off-duty, online activities.

[Hat tip: Technology for HR Blog]

Wednesday, July 18, 2012

Disability services provider sued for, what else, disability discrimination


I’m four years older than my brother. For this reason, growing up I would sometimes get punished for things for which my brother was let off the hook. The reasoning? You should know better. And, I’m sad to say that now that I have two kids of my own, I have found myself repeating this refrain to my older child. The sins of the father, I guess.

Apparently, “you should know better” carries over to the world of employment law. The EEOC has filed a disability discrimination lawsuit against Pace Solano, a California disability services provider. According to the EEOC:

After interviewing for a position to teach developmentally disabled adults … Katrina Holly was immediately offered a job and asked to take a pre-employment physical exam. Holly successfully completed all of the tests and disclosed that she had partial paralysis in one hand to the examiner, so that he would have her complete medical information. Despite written verification from its own doctor that Holly was cleared to do the job, Pace Solano withdrew its job offer due to her hand. When she asked the company to reconsider, the response was, “Your injury makes you a liability; you don’t want to get hurt any more than you already are, do you?”

I agree wholeheartedly with these words from EEOC District Director Michael Baldonado: “While we admire the work that Pace Solano performs for the community, there is simply no excuse for rejecting an applicant because of a disability which in no way impacts her performance.” A lawsuit is simply a set of unproven allegations. If, however, there is any whiff of truth in this lawsuit, Pace Solano should settle this case and train its people so that this public relations nightmare is not repeated.

Tuesday, July 17, 2012

The “cat’s paw” strikes back


In Staub v. Proctor Hosp., the Supreme Court passed judgment on the “cat’s paw” theory of liability in discrimination cases—an employer’s liability for the discriminatory animus of an employee who played no role in the decision, but nevertheless exerted some degree of influence over the ultimate decision maker. The Staub Court concluded that an employer can be liable for the discriminatory animus of a non-decision making supervisor who intends to cause, and does proximately cause, an adverse employment action.

In Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am. (6th Cir. 7/13/12) [pdf], the 6th Circuit applied Staub to reverse summary judgment in a race discrimination case. Chattman alleged that his employer’s HR director, Tullock, who recommended his termination for horseplay and fabricated that other supervisors supported the decision, was racially biased.

In support of this allegation of race-based animus, Chattman pointed to three separate incidents:

  1. Tullock told a “joke” that O.J. Simpson was innocent and that Nicole Brown was killed by their son because O.J. Simpson responded to a question from his son by answering “go axe your mother.”
  2. Tullock responded to another employee’s complaint that her son had gotten into trouble at school for fighting by saying “you know what my grandmother always says about boys scuffling? That’s how the nigger graveyard got full.”
  3. Tullock commented about then-Presidential candidate Barack Obama by saying “well you better look close at Obama’s running mate because Americans won’t allow a nigger president.”

Even though Tullock was not the decision maker, the court concluded that a jury question existed under the cat’s paw theory:

Chattman has shown that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Tullock intended that Chattman be disciplined…. There can be little doubt that Tullock desired Chattman’s termination when he made his recommendation and fabricated the agreement of the other supervisors….

Chattman alleges that Tullock knew that white employees engaged in horseplay but never reported any of those incidents to upper management, instead reporting the only incident on record of a black employee engaging in horseplay.

Tullock was the Human Resources manager, and he actively inserted himself in the decisionmaking process. He both misinformed and selectively informed … about the incident. A reasonable factfinder could find Tullock’s actions were a proximate cause of the adverse decisions.

When the Supreme Court decided Staub last year, I cautioned that it upped the ante for employers in discrimination cases:

The Court’s holding hinges on ideals such as “intent” and “proximate cause,” which are almost always fact-based inquiries. Because it is very difficult for an employer to win summary judgment on these issues, the Court has turned nearly every “cat’s paw” case into a jury case—an expensive proposition for employers.

Chattman does nothing to dissuade me of my earlier opinion.

What is the practical takeaway for employers? You better know who you have managing and supervising your employees. Companies do not make personnel decisions in a vacuum. Executives often rely on the front-line managers and supervisors for advice on who and when to discipline or fire. Yet, under Staub, businesses are on the hook for the discriminatory animus of these managers and supervisors, even if they have nothing to do with the ultimate decision. You never want a bigot managing your employees. The cat’s paw, however, provides employers added incentive to purge them from your managerial ranks.

Monday, July 16, 2012

Despite what some think, employers also do not set out to cheat and steal


Earlier this year, I engaged in a debate with plaintiff’s attorney (and author of the excellent employee-side blog, Screw You Guys, I’m Going Home) Donna Ballman over whether discrimination lawsuits are sins of commission or omission. I argued that most employers are well-intentioned, but sometimes act out of inexperience with the complexities of myriad employment laws. Donna argued that many employers act out of malice and deserve to be on the receiving end of discrimination lawsuits.

Last week, writing at Aol Jobs, Donna turned her attention to wage and hour laws. She listed “10 tricks employers use to cheat workers out of overtime.” Donna’s premise, however, is faulty. Managers and executives are not spending their days in locked, smoke-filled conference rooms scheming how to cheat extra hours and steal overtime pay from their employees. Paychecks and timesheets are neither a ploy nor a tactic. Instead, most employers are well-intentioned but ignorant. They are ignorant of the myriad, twisted rules and regulations that govern why, when, to whom, and how much overtime is to be paid.

It’s no secret that I believe the Fair Labor Standards Act is woefully outdated and needs a modernized, top-to-bottom rewrite. As I’ve written before:

Congress enacted the FLSA during the Great Depression to combat the sweatshops that had taken over our manufacturing sector. In the 70+ years that have passed, it has evolved, via a complex web of regulations and interpretations, into an anachronistic maze of rules that even the best-intentioned employer cannot hope to comply with. I would bet any employer in this country a free wage and hour audit that I can find an FLSA violation in your pay practices. A regulatory scheme that is impossible to meet does not make sense to keep alive. Instead, what employers and employees need is a more streamlined system to ensure that workers are paid a fair wage.

Reforming the system into a manageable and understandable set of rules is the best means to ensure that workers are paid a full wage for all hours worked. The system, as it is currently set up, dooms even the most well-meaning employer to failure.

Friday, July 13, 2012

WIRTW #233 (the “Duck Soup” edition)


Yesterday, my friend Dan Schwartz (an A+ employment law blogger) published his (Not So) Definitive Top 10 List of Employment Lawyers To Follow Online (in response to another list published by the HR Examiner). Needless to say, I want to thank Dan for featuring me so prominently on his list. Thanks also to Molly DiBianca (another A+ employment law blogger) and Heather Bussing (writing at HR Examiner), who both had some very kind words to say about yours truly on their blogs in the last 24 hours.

If I was acting as curator of a list such as Dan’s, the only change I’d make is to swap Dan’s name for mine. You cannot go wrong reading the content of anyone he lists, and I’m proud to have all as colleagues and friends. If you are not following each of the employment lawyers recommended by Dan, you are missing out.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, July 12, 2012

When defending employment cases, chasing attorneys’ fees is a snipe hunt


My summer reading list includes Joel Stein’s Man Made: A Stupid Quest for Masculinity. The book recounts the self-proclaimed effete Stein’s journey to become more masculine in the wake of the birth of his son. In one chapter, Stein spends a weekend with a boy scout troop to learn how to camp. The troop’s hazing includes sending Stein on a snipe hunt. For the uninitiated, a snipe hunt is a practical joke played on inexperienced campers, who are sent to hunt an imaginary bird or animal (the snipe).

Believe it or not, snipe hunts have something to do with defending discrimination cases. Often, I hear this outrage from clients: “I can’t believe we’re being sued for this. I want to counter-sue to collect our attorneys’ fees!” Yes, there are statutes and rules in place that permit a defendant, in certain and extreme circumstances, to collect their attorneys’ fees from the plaintiff. But, there are few cases that will meet this high threshold for recovery. In reality, the likelihood of a judge ordering that a plaintiff-employee pay the defendant-employer’s attorneys’ fees under one of these fee-shifting mechanisms is on par with winning the lottery.

If you want to take any solace from this loser-doesn’t-pay system, consider these words, published yesterday by the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals, in Gibson v. Solideal USA, Inc. [pdf]:

As an initial general proposition, we are not entirely unsympathetic to Solideal’s position. Statutes designed to empower employees in the vindication of their rights may, at times, be used as bases on which a plaintiff asserts claims that are later determined to be without merit. Undeniably, large employers may be forced to incur significant litigation expenses in defending against such claims. However, if this Court were to follow the course now advocated by Solideal, it would effectively hold that a plaintiff who elects to forgo formal discovery and whose claims are unable to withstand summary judgment is responsible for paying all fees and costs the defendant incurred in connection with the litigation. This is a bridge too far.

Litigation is time consuming and expensive. Some cases (such as the one discussed yesterday by Dan Schwartz, at his Connecticut Employment Law Blog) can go on for a decade. We all have principles. We don’t like to pay money to an undeserving plaintiff when we know that we are right. And, when we prove that we are right, we think the plaintiff should pay us for our grief and aggravation. The system, however, is not set up to reward even the most deserving of employers in this way. The sooner employers realize that chasing reimbursement of their attorneys’ fees is a litigation snipe hunt, the sooner they can focus their efforts on the task at hand, concluding the case as quickly and cost-effectively as possible.

Wednesday, July 11, 2012

The season of the witch? The ADA and seasonal affective disorder


One thing we Clevelanders are really good at is complaining about the weather. For much of last week we approached 100 degrees, and we complained it was too hot. Yet, if it was a temperate 70, we’d complain that it’s too cool for July. And don’t even get me started about winter—too cold, too much snow, when is it going to get warm. Well, it’s been plenty warm, and the complaints keep on flowing.

Did you know that there exists a genuine psychiatric condition based on people’s weather-related moods? It’s called seasonal affective disorder, a mood disorder in which people who have normal mental health throughout most of the year experience depressive symptoms as the seasons change.

Like most psychiatric conditions, seasonal affective disorder has made its way into the workplace. In Ekstrand v. School District of Somerset (7th Cir. 6/26/12), the court upheld a jury verdict on a teacher’s claim under the ADA that her employer failed to accommodate her seasonal affective disorder by refusing to transfer her to a classroom with natural light.

If an employee asks for an office with a view, do not necessarily write him or her off as a complaining, high-maintenance pain-in-the-you-know-what. If, like Ranae Ekstrand, an employee presents a physician’s note documenting a condition, take it seriously by seriously considering whether it presents that much of an imposition to find the employee some natural light during the work day. Some consideration and a small reasonable accommodation might save you a half-million dollar judgment.

Tuesday, July 10, 2012

The EEOC and racial harassment: calling a spade a s---e


The EEOC has published a website detailing 42 racial harassment cases it has litigated over the past three years. The purpose of the website, I think, is to bring awareness to the agency’s efforts to combat this insidious form of discrimination. Sexual harassment cases often get the headlines, but racial harassment is just as damaging, if not more so, to its victims. By raising awareness of the fact that racial harassment is just as illegal as its more well-known cousin, the EEOC can increase the number of charges filed, helping to bring an end to this awful antebellum remnant.

The EEOC’s micro-site discusses racist workplace practices such as nooses, racially offensive comments such as “coon,” “gorilla,” and “porch monkey,” and jokes, cartoons and images that denigrate African-Americans.

What I find curious, though, is that while the agency rightfully has no problem recounting any of these allegations, it apparently has a huge problem republishing the word “nigger.” While several of the reported cases allege the use of that word, the word itself does not appear anywhere in the EEOC’s microsite. Instead, the agency uses shorthand such as “n----r” or “N-word.” Of course, we all know what these abbreviations mean. When reading, no one says “n-hyphen-hyphen-hyphen-hyphen-r” in their heads; you repeat the word, unabbreviated, in all of its ugliness.

Employment law can be dirty, and no cases are dirtier than harassment cases. Sexual harassment cases can involve words such as “bitch” and “cunt.” Sexual orientation harassment cases can involve words such as “fag.” And, racial harassment cases can involve words like “nigger.” Repeating the words in the context of the litigation neither facilitates nor perpetrates their hatred. In fact, the converse is true. Exposing the words for what they are is the most effective means to eliminate them from our workplaces. No problem was ever solved by sweeping it under the rug, and the EEOC’s politically-correct blinders are not helping rid America’s workplaces of this hateful word.

Monday, July 9, 2012

Of new dogs and new employees: communicating value is key


Last Thursday, my family and I drove to Battle Creek, Michigan, to pick up our new puppy. I cannot give the breeder (Jon Peck, Midnight Run Vizslas) higher marks. He spent two hours with us explaining the ins and outs of what we could expect with our new dog. He provided pointers on the peculiarities of the breed, and what he had observed with our particular pup over the eight weeks since she had been born. He even cleaned her ears and bathed her before we took her home. I don't know what your experiences have been when acquiring a new dog, but, based on mine and my wife's, this was above and beyond. Most importantly, it made us feel valued—that Jon truly and deeply cares not only about his dogs, but also about the homes to which they are going and the positive experiences of new owners. We are making a substantial investment of time in our new dog, and the time spent with us before we took her home shows that out commitment is valued.

This lesson translates well to the workplace. Each employee you hire is an investment. Yet, what is the first day of work like for many employees? A quiet room with a stack of forms to sign, maybe a cursory explanation of the employee handbook, and a tour of the facility? What does this half-assed stab at an orientation say about value? Does your new hire feel like a valued part of a team, or like a fungible and replaceable cog? An employee's first day of work—the orientation to your workplace and culture—should be the first step in communicating to that employee the investment you are making (i.e., that they are valued). It should not be viewed as an administrative burden to be overcome before the employee can start producing.

We would not love our dog any less if our experience was a simple exchange of a check for a pup. Yet, the time spent with us reinforces that we made a great choice for our family. The same should hold true for your relationship with your employees. Teach them their import from day one by making orientation a meaningful, and memorable, experience.

Friday, July 6, 2012

WIRTW #232 (the “welcome to the family” edition)



Everyone say hello to Loula Mae, our new family member (a vizsla, in case you’re curious).



Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination
Social Media & Workplace Technology
HR & Employee Relations
Wages, Hours, & Benefits
Labor Relations

Thursday, July 5, 2012

Associational retaliation is not the FMLA’s peanut butter cup


In Thompson v. North Am. Stainless, the Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits associational retaliation; an employer cannot retaliate against an employee by taking an adverse action against that employee’s close family member. The FMLA permits an employee to take up to 12 weeks of annual leave for the serious health condition of a close family member (spouse, child, or parent). Putting these two ideas together, one would assume that the FMLA protects against associational retaliation. The FMLA and Title VII, however, do not combine like chocolate and peanut butter to create an associational retaliation FMLA claim.

In Gilbert v. St. Rita’s Professional Services, LLC (N.D. Ohio 6/20/12), the Northern District of Ohio refused to recognize a claim for associational retaliation under the FMLA. Gilbert involved three plaintiffs, all of whom worked for St. Rita’s: Amy Gilbert, the mother of Shannon Kirby, who, in turn, was the mother-in-law of Mary Haught. After St. Rita’s fired all three, they sued. Kirby claimed that St. Rita’s retaliated her under the FMLA because her termination coincided with the end of Haught’s FMLA leave.

The court disagreed. It concluded that because the FMLA’s anti-retaliation language is more narrow than Title VII’s language, which the Supreme Court construed in Thompson, the FMLA does not provide for associational retaliation claims:

The Court rested its holding specifically on the broad “person … aggrieved” language of Title VII, language that is notably absent from the FMLA. In contrast to Title VII, the FMLA delineates certain specific classes of individuals who may bring an action — those who have been denied a right protected by the Act (“interference” plaintiffs) and those who opposed an employer’s unlawful action under the Act (“retaliation” plaintiffs)…. [I]t stands to reason that Congress’s intentional omission of Title VII's broad language in the FMLA specifically prohibits Plaintiffs’ interpretative extension of Thompson.

Not all statutes are created equal. Just because an employee has a remedy under one statute does not mean that the same remedy exists under another. When interpreting statutes, words matter, a lot. 

This case also gives me the opportunity to share this astonishingly bad 32-year-old Reese’s Peanut Butter Cup commercial. Enjoy the nostalgia, and ask yourself how an advertisement this hokey sold anything, let alone helped birth a candy institution.

Tuesday, July 3, 2012

6th Circuits provides much needed guidance on pleading standards


Today’s post is going to be a tad dry, for which I apologize. Its dryness, however, does not belittle the importance of the case I am going to discuss.

To file a lawsuit, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure merely require a plaintiff to state in his or her complaint “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal the Supreme Court defined what satisfies this requirement. A plaintiff must plead enough facts to raise a right to relief above mere speculation and from which a court can draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. In other words, one must be able to read the complaint and understand the specific misconduct that the plaintiff is alleging to be unlawful.

In discrimination cases, do these pleading standards require a plaintiff to specifically plead the elements of the discrimination claim under McDonnell Douglas, or is it sufficient for a plaintiff merely to allege facts that enable the court to infer discrimination?

In Keys v. Humana, Inc. (7/2/12) [pdf], the 6th Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal of a discrimination complaint because it had failed to allege facts that plausibly established a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. The 6th Circuit reversed, re-affirming that Twombly and Iqbal do not mandate the rote recitation of McDonnell Douglas’s prima facie elements:

The Amended Complaint contains allegations that are neither speculative nor conclusory; it alleges facts that easily state a plausible claim. The Amended Complaint alleges Humana had a pattern or practice of discrimination against African American managers and professional staff in hiring, compensation, promotion, discipline, and termination. It details several specific events in each of those employment-action categories where Keys alleges she was treated differently than her Caucasian management counterparts; it identifies the key supervisors and other relevant persons by race and either name or company title; and it alleges that Keys and other African Americans received specific adverse employment actions notwithstanding satisfactory employment performances.

If courts are not going to require plaintiffs to use McDonnell Douglas at the pleading stage, and instead focus on whether the complaint pleads a plausible claim of discrimination, is it time that we consider ending the charade that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is a useful tool? Why make litigants jump through imaginary hoops at the summary judgment stage, when we can all analyze the ultimate issue (was the adverse action discriminatory) just fine on our own?

Monday, July 2, 2012

Contingency plans


My family and I spent last night with friends at Crocker Park’s Liberty Fest. If you’re not from the Cleveland area, Crocker Park is what marketers call a “Life Style Center.” I call it a really nice outdoor shopping mall. Liberty Fest is Crocker Park’s take on a July 4th celebration, with music, dancing, and stilt walkers. It all culminates with a performance by the Cleveland Pops Orchestra and fireworks. With a 4-year-old and a 6-year-old, we were there for the fireworks.

A line of thunderstorms, though, wreaked havoc on the event’s timing. The fireworks, which were scheduled for 10 pm, did not go off until close to 11. As you could imagine, my kids were not the only ones getting antsy waiting … and waiting … and waiting, as we listened to the Cleveland Pops run through its litany of patriotic songs, led by the emceeing of a local morning radio host who made me remember why I love my Sirius/XM subscription.

As we waited, I got to thinking—why didn’t the event have a contingency plan. Evening thunderstorms are common in Cleveland in the summer. It could not be that difficult to have a back-up itinerary in the event that rain delayed the proceedings. The Pops could have played 5 songs instead of 15. The radio guy could have cut out his not-so-witty banter. And, fireworks could have gone off closer to 10 instead of closer to 11.

The same holds true for your business. I’m sure you have star employees, without whom your business would suffer. Yet, do you know if they are content with their job. Or, do they feel underpaid, under-appreciated, or overworked. Tomorrow, one could walk out the door. Do you have a plan to keep your operations running at peak performance? Or would the departure of even one employee grind your company to a temporary halt.

Employees aren’t indentured to you, and there is nothing you to do to guarantee each works for you until retirement. Yet, let me suggest three simple steps to help you plan for the contingency of a key employee leaving.

  1. Feedback: You cannot fix a problem that you don’t know exists. Talk to your employees. Gauge their level of contentment. Make adjustments where necessary to ensure, as best as possible, their continuity.
  2. Cross-training: In the event an employee leaves, having others cross-trained to perform their tasks will help you ease the transition until you find the right permanent replacement. It will also help you in the event of unexpected medical and other leaves of absences.
  3. Non-competition agreements: Even the most strongly drafted non-competition agreement cannot guarantee your keys employees won’t leave you. But, in the event that they do, these agreements will prevent the compounding of the harm by keeping these employees away from your chief competition.