Friday, June 1, 2012

WIRTW #228 (the “Sound Odyssey” edition)


Where were you in 1983? I was in the 5th grade at Loesche Elementary School in Northeast Philly. I’ll get back to 1983 in a second.

Today is my daughter’s last day of kindergarten. Her (amazing) teacher (see #13 below) assigned the class a time capsule project. Each child had to answer 14 questions, which, along with a letter from mom and dad, will be sealed in a time capsule, to be opened at their graduation in 2024. Here’s my daughter’s submission:

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When I posted this photo to Facebook, one of my grade school classmates reminded me of the time capsule our 5th grade class buried in 1983. He even had the article from The Jewish Times discussing the project (page 1 / page 2). For the record, I sacrificed the instruction manual from our Smurfs ColecoVision game. I’m not sure what’s more shocking, that I’m admitting to owning a Smurfs game, or that people paid $569.99 for a VCR (check out the Sound Odyssey ad at the bottom of page 2, and bonus points to anyone who can name any other store that was in the Leo Mall).

I am taking a much needed vacation next week. Enjoy some of my greatest hits spanning the past 6 months. I’ll be back on June 11 with brand new content.


Thanks to Tom Mighell for featuring me on Wednesday as the Blawg of the Day at Inter Alia. Tom’s blawg is one of the originals, dating all the way back to 2002. It’s always nice to be recognized by one of the trailblazers.  


Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Litigation

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, May 31, 2012

NLRB’s position on social media policies remains a bungled mess


Oh! what a tangled web we weave
When first we practice to deceive!
Walter Scott, Marmion, Canto VI, Stanza 17 (1808)

Yesterday, NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon issued his third report on social media cases brought to the agency [pdf]. This report focuses entirely on “policies governing the use of social media by employees.” If you read the employment law blogs today, my guess is that you will find a whole bunch of management-side employment bloggers critical of Mr. Solomon (Molly DiBianca, Eric Meyer, and Dan Schwartz, for starters). Allow me to add my name to the mix. I apologize in advance for my treatise-length post.

As you might recall, I was very critical of Mr. Solomon’s 2nd report in its treatment of employer policies. Has the Acting GC solved any conundrums for employers with his latest missive? Can a company draft a social media policy with any teeth that the NLRB will conclude passes muster? Don’t count on it. In fact, Mr. Solomon's latest missive is as galling of a piece of legal analysis I have ever read. It's nothing short of intellectual dishonesty masquerading as hair splitting. How else can you explain the following razor-thin distinctions?

  • A policy that prohibits the “release [of] confidential guest, team member or company information” is illegal, but a policy that cautions employees to be suspicious when asked to disclose confidential information is okay.
  • This policy is illegal: “When in doubt about whether the information you are considering sharing falls into one of the [prohibited] categories, DO NOT POST. Check with [Employer] Communications or [Employer] Legal to see if it’s a good idea.” And this policy is illegal: “Offensive, demeaning, abusive or inappropriate remarks are as out of place online as they are offline" are illegal.” Yet, this policy is legal: “Employees should avoid harming the image and integrity of the company and any harassment, bullying, discrimination, or retaliation that would not be permissible in the workplace is not permissible between co-workers online, even if it is done after hours, from home and on home computers”.
  • “Get permission before reusing others’ content or images” is illegal, while “Respect all copyright and other intellectual property laws. For [Employer’s] protection as well as yours” is legal.

Other baffling illegal policies?

  • “Think carefully about ‘friending’ co-workers.”
  • “Report any unusual or inappropriate internal social media activity.”
  • “Don’t comment on any legal matters, including pending litigation or disputes.”
  • “Adopt a friendly tone when engaging online. Don’t pick fights…. Remember to communicate in a professional tone…. Don’t make any comments about [Employer’s] customers, suppliers or competitors that might be considered defamatory.”
  • “You are encouraged to resolve concerns about work by speaking with co-workers, supervisors, or managers.”
  • “Avoid harming the image and integrity of the company.”

Mr. Solomon also invalidated various “savings clauses,” including one that provided:

This policy is for the mutual protection of the company and our employees, and we respect an individual’s rights to self-expression and concerted activity. This policy will not be interpreted or applied in a way that would interfere with the rights of employees to self organize, form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from engaging in such activities.

This unlawful policy is not all that different from the workplace posting that the NLRB wanted to have in every break room in America, yet it’s not good enough for any employer’s social media policy? Where is the logic and consistency? This is the exact breed of intellectual relativism that makes me furious.

Here’s the kicker. If challenged, Mr. Solomon would have to take issue with his own agency’s internal social media policy. Thanks to Mike VanDervort’s The Human Race Horses and Human Resources Executive Online, we can take a peek at the NLRB’s own social media policy, which prohibits: “Comments that the NLRB Office of Public Affairs deems inappropriate.” How is the NLRB’s own policy substantively different than any of the policies Mr. Solomon thinks are overly restrictive of employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activity?

So, what’s the takeaway? The NLRB’s position on social media policies remains an absolute mess. If anything, it’s more confusing now than before Mr. Solomon issued his 3rd report. Employers need to be able to adopt bright line rules to guide their employees towards proper conduct. Yet, this report puts employers in the dangerous position of being fearful of drawing even the simplest of lines. The result, I’m afraid, is that businesses won’t adopt any rules, creating online anarchy among their employees.

As a emerging communication tool, social media is unstructured enough. Do we really want to create unnecessary legal impediments to disincentivize employers from drafting the rules their employees desperately need?

Perhaps the answer for employers lies in this policy, which Mr. Solomon concluded was lawful:

Use your best judgment and exercise personal responsibility. Take your responsibility as stewards of personal information to heart. Integrity, Accountability and Respect are core [Employer] values. As a company, [Employer] trusts—and expects—you to exercise personal responsibility whenever you participate in social media or other online activities. Remember that there can be consequences to your actions in the social media world—both internally, if your comments violate [Employer] policies, and with outside individuals and/or entities. If you’re about to publish, respond or engage in something that makes you even the slightest bit uncomfortable, don’t do it.

Think before you click? My four-word social media policy might be a whole lot closer to reality.

Epilogue: If you scroll down to the last 3 pages of Mr. Solomon’s report, you will find a form social media policy on which the NLRB signed off. If you want to err on the side of abundant caution, this policy is the one you should be using (with the input of your attorney). Until the federal courts weigh in on this issue, however, we will have to live in world of uncertainty over the permissible scope, reach, and breadth of social media and other workplace communication policies.

Wednesday, May 30, 2012

BREAKING: NLRB issues 3rd report on social media


Hot off the presses, NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon has issued his third report on social media cases brought to the agency [pdf]. This report focuses entirely on “policies governing the use of social media by employees.” I am digesting the report and will share my thoughts first thing tomorrow morning. Here’s a preview: if you are holding your breath for a sign that the NLRB will allow employers to draw lines to guide employees about what’s right and wrong (or permissible and impermissible), you will suffocate.

Time to re-read your non-competition agreements; Ohio Supreme Court issues ruling on enforceability by successors


Acordia of Ohio, L.L.C. v. Fishel [pdf], decided last week by the Ohio Supreme Court, is a pretty straight-forward case. In this case, four ex-employees claimed that Acordia could not enforce their non-competition agreements. They argued that the under the plain language of their covenants, the agreements were limited to the predecessor employer, and that there were no allowances in the agreements for a successor entity such as Acordia, which had acquired the original employer.

The Supreme Court agreed:

The agreements defined the “Company” only as “Frederick Rauh & Company,” the predecessor employer. Because the agreements did not extend the definition of “Company” to include successor entities, Acordia could not enforce them. Simply, the agreements lacked any language that specifically assigned rights to the new company….

The noncompete agreements between the employees and their original employers specified that they applied only to the specific companies that had originally hired each employee. Because the agreements made no provision for the continuation of the agreement upon any acquisition of the original company by another company, the agreements are not enforceable by the L.L.C. according to the agreements’ original terms past the two-year noncompete period agreed to by the employees and their original employers.

In other words, if have any current non-competition agreements that operate under Ohio law, you need to review them to ensure that they allow for successor entities. Otherwise, even a simple change in corporate structure could render your agreement unenforceable.

Going forward, non-competition agreements should:

  1. Define “employer” to include the current entity, in addition to any successors and assigns.
  2. Include a specific clause in the agreement, which provides that all rights in the agreement flow to “successors and assigns,” which are entitled to enforce the agreement against the employee.

Luckily for employers, Ohio law provides that continued employment is sufficient consideration to support a non-competition agreement. In other words, you should be contacting your counsel to review all non-competition agreements for compliance with the Acordia case, and redrafting and reissuing to employees where necessary.

Tuesday, May 29, 2012

Ohio joins the fray on employers asking for social media passwords


It was only a matter of time before Ohio joined the list of states to introduce legislation that would prohibit employers from asking for social media passwords. Senate Bill 351, introduced late last week, would amend Ohio’s employment discrimination statue to make it an “unlawful discriminatory practice” for employers to do any of the following:

  • Ask or require an applicant or employee to disclose usernames or passwords associated with, or otherwise provide access to, a private electronic account of the applicant or employee;
  • Fail or refuse to hire an applicant for employment, or discharge, discipline, threaten to discharge, discipline, or otherwise penalize an employee, if the applicant or employee refuses.

The bill defines “private electronic account” as “a collection of electronically stored private information regarding an individual, including such collections stored on social media internet web sites, in electronic mail, and on electronic devices.” It then broadly defines “social media internet web site” as “an internet web site that allows individuals to do all of the following”:

  1. Construct a public or semipublic profile within a bounded system created by the service;
  2. Create a list of other users with whom the individual shares a connection within the system; or
  3. View and navigate the list of users with whom the individual shares a connection and those lists of users made by others within the system.

The bill does not prohibit an employer from monitoring the electronic accounts of employees or applicants on the employer’s own Email or Internet system.

As far an enforcement, the bill would permit aggrieved individuals to file a charge of discrimination with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, or a private cause of action in court. It also allows the OCRC to levy fines of up to $1,000 for the first violation and up to $2,000 for each subsequent violation.

I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again, this is not a problem that needs fixing. Companies simply aren’t engaging in the type of conduct this bill seeks to legislate. I am troubled that the path this legislature chose is to seek to make this an unlawful discriminatory practice, on the same plane as race, sex, age, and disability discrimination. Moreover, there are no exceptions for industries that might have a legitimate reason to know what applicants or employees are doing on social sites (schools, police departments, financial services). The lack of any exceptions is a glaring omission from this legislation.

This bill is in its infancy. I will continue to monitor its status and update you with any movement in Columbus.

6th Circuit applies “but for” causation to ADA claims (but does it matter?)


More than a year ago, the 6th Circuit upheld its use of a “sole reason” causation standard in ADA cases, but invited the full 6th Circuit to revisit (and overrule) this issue. That en banc panel issued its ruling last Friday, and, expectedly, it overruled the Court’s prior use of the “sole reason” causation standard. Unexpectedly, however—in Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp. (6th Cir. 5/25/12) [pdf]—the Court replaced it with a similarly restrictive “but for” causation standard.

Relying on the linguistic similarities between the ADA and the ADEA, the Court looked to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services for the appropriate causation standard:

[W]hat standard should trial courts use in instructing juries in ADA cases? Gross [v. FBL Financial Services] points the way. The ADEA and the ADA bar discrimination “because of” an employee’s age or disability, meaning that they prohibit discrimination that is a “‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.”

Case closed. Or is it? As one of the dissenting opinions points out, the 6th Circuit is very much in the minority in its interpretation of the ADA’s causation standard. “Significantly, a majority of our sister circuits have embraced the motivating factor standard in reviewing ADA claims.” (citing to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, and 11th Circuits). Could this conflict among the circuits now head to the United States Supreme Court for resolution?

Or, is this issue a mere academic exercise? The ADA Amendments Act changed the ADA’s operative causation language. Pre-amendments, the ADA provided: “No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual.” The ADAAA, however, changed the “because of” causation standard to a “discriminate … on the basis of disability” standard. This alteration is significant, because it changes the key language in the ADA that had mirrored the ADEA, and upon which the 6th Circuit based its opinion that the rationale of Gross also applies to ADA claims. Is is splitting hairs to say that “because of” is materially different than “on the basis of?” Maybe. But, it is not insignificant that the ADAAA altered this key phrase.

As you can see, these issues are complex and, despite the en banc ruling, are far from settled. For employers, you are infinitely better off making reasonable accommodations and avoiding disability discrimination claims, so that you do not place yourselves in positions to have to worry about proper burdens of proof and causation standards. In other words, if you don’t put yourself in a position to be sued, because-ofs and but-fors simply don’t enter the equation.

Friday, May 25, 2012

WIRTW #227 (the “replay” edition)


Yesterday afternoon, I appeared on the The Proactive Employer, talking all things workplace social media with host Stephanie Thomas, fellow guest Molly DiBianca (of the Delaware Employment Law Blog and @MollyDiBi). Thanks to Stephanie for a great hour.

Luckily for you, if you missed yesterday’s hour live, its available for replay two different ways:

Now there’s no excuse for not listening. Enjoy your holiday weekend.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Social Media & Workplace Technology

HR & Employee Relations

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

Thursday, May 24, 2012

Ohio Supreme Court upholds statewide workplace smoking ban


On November 7, 2006, Ohio voters passed a ballot initiative to
enact the Smoke Free Workplace Act. It became effective on December 7, 2006, and is codified in R.C. Chapter 3794.

Generally, to adhere to the Act, businesses must do four things:

  • Prohibit smoking in any enclosed “public place” or “place of employment,” including areas immediately adjacent to locations of ingress or egress.
  • Post no-smoking signs—with the toll-free enforcement number, 1-866-559-OHIO (6446)—at all entrances or areas of transition between non-regulated and regulated areas.
  • Remove ashtrays and other tobacco receptacles.
  • Not discharge, refuse to hire, or in any manner retaliate against anyone for exercising any rights under the workplace smoking ban law.

Yesterday—in Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc. [pdf]—the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the Smoke Free Workplace Act.

If you have been dragging your feet in enforcing this law in your business, or have been hoping for a reprieve from the Ohio Supreme Court, you are out of luck. You need to ensure that your business complies with the Act and is smoke free.

In addition, whether you are in Ohio or another state, and your business is to be smoke-free, you should adopt a formal smoke-free policy, which includes formally designating where on your property employees are allowed to smoke (if allowed at all).

Wednesday, May 23, 2012

Even terminations over “genitalia sandwiches” can generate lawsuits


The court properly granted summary judgment because reasonable minds could only conclude that appellant’s actions in photographing an inmate placing his penis on a sandwich and then feeding the sandwich to another inmate were manifestly outside the scope of employment.

I can promise you read that sentence correctly. It is the Ohio Supreme Court’s digest summary for Cantwell v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (Ohio Ct. App. 5/22/12) [pdf] You can do a double-take, a triple-take, or as many takes as you need. It is still going to say that a Franklin County jail guard, while delivering bologna sandwiches to inmates, asked an inmate to place his penis on a sandwich, took of cell phone photo of said penis sandwich, and fed said sandwich (sans penis) to another unsuspecting inmate while taunting him.

The lawsuit concerned whether these actions were in good faith, and not manifestly outside the scope of Cantwell’s employment or official responsibilities, which would determine whether the county had a duty to defend Cantwell in the prisoners’ subsequent civil rights lawsuits.

What could Cantwell possibly argue?

It was commonplace for jokes and pranks to take place at the Franklin County jail between inmates, as well as hazing to take place between deputies, and such, if not condoned, were certainly not discouraged. Thus, appellant contends, because these jokes were encouraged, promoted, and tolerated, his “joke” to give Copeland a genital-tainted sandwich was not manifestly outside the scope of his employment.

The explanation is a whole lot funnier than the joke. Needless to say, none of this amused the court, which affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Cantwell’s claim.

From this mess of a case, I draw the following lesson. You cannot always guard against lawsuits by ex-employees. I am certain that given these facts, the county never dreamed it would be defending a lawsuit by this employee. Yet, he found a reason to sue. No termination (no matter the reason) is bulletproof. Even the most rock-solid termination can result in a lawsuit. That fear, however, should not hamstring employers from making appropriate termination decisions based on legitimate reasons. The best you can do with any termination is to make sure every “i” is dotted and every “t” is crossed (with the help of counsel, if needed), and let the chips fall where they may.

Tuesday, May 22, 2012

Radio/Podcast appearance: Being Smart About Social Media in the Workplace


This Thursday, May 24, at 3 pm, Molly DiBianica (proprietor of the Delaware Employment Law Blog and tweeter extraordinaire @MollyDiBi) and I will be guests on The Proactive Employer, hosted by Stephanie Thomas

We will be discussing all things social media for employers, including providing tips on workplace social media policies, offering suggestions on how to ensure employees are using social media safely, and talking about how companies can be be smart about social media.

We will also be taking live questions, both via Twitter with the hashtag #TPE, and via call-in at (866) 472-5790. If you can’t join us live, the episode will also be available for streaming or download.

Molly and I go way back in the blawgosphere. She also contributed the chapter on privacy to my social media book, Think Before You Click, Strategies for Manging Social Media in the Workplace. Please tune in for what should be a very engaging and interesting conversation.

The obligatory post about the EEOC’s charge filing data


The EEOC has released state-by-state charge filing statistics for the past three years. Which types of discrimination are popular (and not so popular) with Ohio employees?

  • Race discrimination: 35.4% of all charges
  • Retaliation: 32.9%
  • Disability: 29.6%
  • Age: 28.6%
    • Sex: 27.3%
    • National Origin: 5.3%
    • Religion: 3.5%
    • Color: 1.7%
    • Equal Pay: 0.9%
    • Genetic Information: 0.3%

    These numbers shouldn’t be that much of a surprise to any businesses.

    What is more interesting (at least to me) is how Ohio fairs when compared to the other 49 states. For fiscal year 2011, there were 3,137 total charges of discrimination filed with the EEOC in Ohio. Overall, that number comprises 3.1 percent of all charges filed nationwide, placing Ohio 12th among the 50 states.

    Ohio is 7th in overall population, yet 12th in EEOC filings. Is is possible that Ohio is more friendly to employers than smaller states such as Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, and Alabama, all of which rank ahead of Ohio in the number of EEOC filings per year? Probably not. Instead, let me offer a different explanation. Ohio’s employment discrimination statute is quirky. It allows employees to proceed directly to court without first exhausting their administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC (or its state equivalent).

    Ohio businesses are facing their fair share of discrimination claims; they are just facing them in courts instead of in the agencies. This quirk fails Ohio businesses. Employees are able to bypass the EEOC’s crucial role in filtering out frivolous claims. Until Ohio’s legislators step up to the plate and fix this anomaly of our discrimination statute, our state’s business community will continue to be disadvantaged by defending the bulk of discrimination claims in a more costly and time-consuming judicial venue.

    Monday, May 21, 2012

    Can a poor performance review count as an “adverse action?”


    For an act to be considered an “adverse employment action” sufficient to support a discrimination claim, it must constitute
    ”a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Traditionally, a negative performance review does not constitute an adverse employment action, unless “the evaluation has an adverse impact on an employee’s wages or salary.” Or does it?

    In Goldfaden v. Wyeth Laboratories (5/14/12) [pdf], the Sixth Circuit concluded that a warning letter issued to an employee constituted an “adverse action” even though the employee quit her job before she could suffer any consequences from the warning:

    She received a warning letter in September that limited her year-end performance evaluation to a three on a scale of one to five. However, she never made it to the year-end evaluation, as she resigned three weeks after receiving the evaluation. The parties dispute what the effect of the lower evaluation would have been…. We cannot know for sure what would have happened, but there was a possibility that she would have received a lower bonus. This doubt is sufficient to survive summary judgment….

    This result is even more troubling because the same opinion affirmed summary judgment for the employer on Goldfaden’s constructive discharge claim. In other words, the warning letter was not so intolerable that it compelled Goldfaden to quit, but it nevertheless could rise to the level of an adverse employment action because it could, maybe, have resulted in a lower year-end bonus.

    It’s cases like this one that make it so difficult (and often frustrating) to attempt to predict outcomes for clients.

    Friday, May 18, 2012

    WIRTW #226 (the “press 9 for more options” edition)


    You’d think that with all the posting I do about Labor & Employment Law, it’s the only area in which my law firm—Kohrman Jackson & Krantz—practices. You’d also be very wrong. Our diverse practice also covers, for example, telemarketing law.

    In fact, my parter, Brett Krantz, recently co-published an article on this issue:

    Brett Krantz, Chair of the Litigation group, and associate Melissa Yasinow have co-authored an article with Mark Rasch, the director of Cybersecurity and Privacy Consulting at technology company CSC. The article, entitled Please Press #5 Now: How Businesses Can Use UETA and E-SIGN to Create Signed, Written Contracts Over the Telephone, explains how businesses can use recent federal and state pro-technology laws to create signed, written contracts over the telephone. Connections Magazine, the nation’s premier magazine for the telemarketing and teleservices industry, will be publishing a shortened version of the article in its upcoming July/August Issue. The full article has already been published online in Connections Magazine’s “White Papers” Section. Please click here to access the full article.

    Enjoy!

    Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

    Discrimination

    Social Media & Workplace Technology

    HR & Employee Relations

    Wage & Hour

    Labor Relations

    Thursday, May 17, 2012

    6s wild! 6th Circuit affirms contractual 6 month limitation for employment claims


    Between the following two options—a federal statute or a private employment agreement—which wins?

    • The federal statute (USERRA), which, at the time, provided for a four-year statute of limitations, and which states that it “supersedes any … contract, agreement, … or other matter that reduces, limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by this chapter.”

    –or–

    • The employment agreement, which provides, “I … agree that any action, claim or suit against [Defendant] arising out of my application for employment, employment, or termination including, but not limited to, claims arising under State or Federal civil rights statutes must be brought within one hundred and eighty (180) days of the event giving rise to the claim or be forever barred. I waive any and all limitation periods to the contrary.”

    In Oswald v. BAE Industries (5/16/12) [pdf], the 6th Circuit ruled that the contract trumped USERRA.

    After returning from serving with the Marines in Iraq, Jerome Oswald claimed that BAE limited his duties and responsibilities compared to his pre-deployment work, failed to give him a raise, transferred him to a lesser position, and ultimately fired him.

    Unfortunately for Oswald, he waited until almost three years after his termination to file suit against BAE. The 6th Circuit concluded that his feet-dragging doomed his lawsuit:

    Plaintiff’s employment contract does not eliminate all procedural rights in that it only shortens the time frame that Plaintiff can raise a USERRA claim. Because the contractual period of limitations diminished a right under USERRA that was merely procedural, [it] does not override the contractual limitations period on that basis….

    Because Plaintiff’s complaint was untimely under the 180-day period in the contract, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendant….

    There are two key takeaways from this case:

    1. This case might no longer good law under USERRA. In 2008, the Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act provided that there “shall be no limit on the period for filing the complaint or claim” under USERRA. If there cannot exist any “limit on the period for filing,” it is unlikely that a contract can impose such a bar.
    2. Even if employers no longer can shorten the statutory period to file a claim under USERRA, this case serves as a good reminder that employers can use contractual provisions to shorten the statutory period for host of other claims. In a state like Ohio, which has a six-year limitations period for all discrimination claims except age, the ability to significantly shorten the filing period is a powerful weapon that too few employers deploy.

    Wednesday, May 16, 2012

    Terminated CFO illustrates the confidentiality risks social media pose


    According to a recent survey by Intel (h/t: Lifehacker), 85% of American adults share information about themselves online, while 90% think others are sharing too much. Maybe the former CFO of Francesca’s Holdings Corp., Gene Morphis, should have heeded the latter and shared less about his company’s inner workings.

    On Monday, Francesca’s announced that it fired Morphis for improperly communicating company information through social media. A quick review of Morphis’s Twitter feed and (very public) Facebook Wall offers some possible suspects.

    Maybe it was this tweet:

    Dinner w/Board tonite. Used to be fun. Now one must be on guard every second.

    Or maybe it was this one:

    Board meeting. Good numbers=Happy Board.

    Or maybe this one:

    Earnings released. Conference call completed. How do you like me now Mr. Shortie?

    Or, maybe it was this Facebook post:

    Audit Committee. Damn you Paul Sarbanes! Damn you Michael Oxley!

    Or, maybe it was this one:

    Roadshow completed. Sold $275 million of secondary shares. Earned my pay this week.

    Social media presents a real risk of corporate breaches of confidentiality. It is easy to tell your employees, “Think before you click.” (Hey, that’s a catchy title for a book.) Yet, 76% of the Inc. 500 lack a social media policy for their employees, and 73% of all employers conduct no social media training. If you aren’t educating your employees about the risks and benefits of social media, both in and out of the workplace, you are not only missing a golden opportunity, but you also leaving yourself exposed to breaches of confidentiality such as that which befell Francesca’s. These issues are not going away.

    Businesses that ignore the possibility that their employees can divulge trade secrets and other confidential and proprietary information via Twitter, Facebook, and other social media do so at their own peril. Did Morphis’s disclosure harm his ex-employer? Probably not. But, the company’s swift and decisive reaction to any breach of confidentiality will make it easier down the road for it to protect its confidential information when it really matters. Mark my words. The day will come when a court will invalidate a corporate trade secret because of a lax social media policy.

    As an aside, I’m leading off tomorrow’s NLRB Region 8 Labor Law Conference [pdf], discussing social media policies and protected concerted activity. NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon is the lunch speaker. I am very interested to hear his thoughts on how employers can balance their right to limit disclosures of confidential information against his perception that social media policies that prohibit such disclosures violate the NLRA.

    Tuesday, May 15, 2012

    Reasonable accommodations and commute times


    How far do you have to go to accommodate an employee’s disability? In Regan v. Faurecia Automotive Seating (5/10/12), the 6th Circuit provides some boundaries, and teaches us a lesson about accommodation best practices.

    Alisha Regan—an assembly line worker at Faurecia—suffers from narcolepsy, a sleep disorder that causes excessive sleepiness and frequent daytime sleep attacks. When her supervisor pushed back by an hour the start and end times of her shift, Regan advised that her narcolepsy would make it difficult for her to get to work, as it would push her commute into rush hour, causing longer commute times and a greater likelihood of sleepiness.

    When the company refused to allow her to work her original schedule, Regan resigned, noting the “tremendous consequence” the change in work hours would have on her narcolepsy. She then filed suit, claiming that the company’s refusal violated the disability discrimination laws.

    The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision that the ADA does not require an employer to accommodate an employee’s commute to and from work:

    While an employer is required to provide reasonable accommodations that eliminate barriers in the work environment, an employer is not required to eliminate those barriers which exist outside the work environment. We find … that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not require Faurecia to accommodate Regan’s request for a commute during more convenient hours.

    This case is not the first I’ve covered discussing whether an employer has an obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s commute. For example, in Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., the 3rd Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, finding that an employer must change an employee’s work hours if needed to enable a disabled employee to commute to and from work.

    The real lesson here isn’t whether employers do, or do not, have to accommodate a disabled employee’s commute to and from work. Given the conflict between Regan and Colwell, I’d say this issue of open for interpretation (even though Regan is controlling in Ohio). Instead, the lesson is how employers should handle these issues when they arise. The ADA requires that the employer and employee engage in an interactive process (a back and forth to determine whether and what type of accommodation would be effective).

    What shouldn’t you do in a situation such as this one? Don’t dismiss the employee’s request outright (as the employer appears to have done in Regan). Don’t force the employee to take FMLA leave as a prerequisite to the interactive process (as the employer in Regan appears to have done).

    Each conversation with an employee (which should be documented in his or her confidential medical file) is an opportunity to establish your consideration of the employee’s specific needs in light of the specific and essential job requirements. If you legitimately cannot start a production line an hour early to accommodate an employee’s commuting schedule request, then so be it. But, how can you (and a court) judge the reasonableness of your decision if you never even have the conversation in the first place?

    Monday, May 14, 2012

    I don’t like this opinion; Facebook “like” as free speech?


    10bhbbaaOne of the biggest misnomers that people have about their rights in the workplace relates to free speech and the 1st Amendment. I could comfortably retire if I had a dollar for every time in my career that I have heard, “But I have a right to free speech; I can say what I want and not get fired.” The reality is that private-sector employees have no right to free speech. The 1st Amendment only protects public employees.

    The issue of free speech arose in a novel context in Bland v. Roberts (E.D. Va. 4/24/12). B.J. Roberts, the sheriff of Hampton, Virginia, was running for reelection. He learned that some of his employees supported his opponent, Jim Adams, after discovering that they had “liked” Adams’s Facebook page. After Roberts won reelection, he decided not to retain the services of the Adams supporters. The employees claimed that Roberts had violated their free speech rights (as exercised via their Facebook “like” of his opponent).

    The court disagreed, concluding that merely clicking the “like” button on a Facebook page is not Constitutionally protected speech:

    It is the Court’s conclusion that merely “liking” a Facebook page is insufficient speech to merit constitutional protection…. It is not the kind of substantive statement that has previously warranted constitutional protection. The Court will not attempt to infer the actual content of [the] posts from one click of a button…. For the Court to assume that the Plaintiffs made some specific statement without evidence of such statements is improper.

    I was going to write a long, detailed, explanation of how the court got it wrong in this case, how “liking” a Facebook page expresses one’s support for, or positive opinion about, that Page. But, Professor Eugene Volokh, writing at The Volokh Conspiracy, beat me to it:

    A Facebook “like” is a means of conveying a message of support for the thing you’re liking. That’s the whole point of the “like” button; that’s what people intend by clicking “like,” and that’s what viewers will perceive. Moreover, the allegation is that the employees were fired precisely because the Sheriff disapproved of the message the “like” conveyed. I would treat “liking” as verbal expression—though it takes just one mouse-click, it publishes to the world text that says that you like something….

    To be sure, the message isn’t highly detailed; it doesn’t explain why one is supporting the “liked” person or cause. But the First Amendment protects speech even when the speech is not rich with logical argument, or is even vague or ambiguous….

    Putting a “Jim Adams” bumper sticker on one’s car would be constitutionally protected. Putting such a sign on one’s lawn would be constitutionally protected. “Liking” Jim Adams on Facebook is equally constitutionally protected. If the plaintiffs appeal, I expect the Fourth Circuit will reverse the district court on this point.

    Thanks Professor Volokh. I couldn’t have said it better myself.

    [Hat tip: Lawffice Space and Delaware Employment Law Blog]

    Friday, May 11, 2012

    WIRTW #225 (the “drive thru” edition)


    Did you catch my appearance on DriveThruHR yesterday? You mean you weren’t glued to your computer at 1 pm, hanging on my every word about HR, employment law, social media, background checks, the EEOC, and the NLRB? I’ll put aside my offense, and offer you a second chance to hear my musings.

    Listen to internet radio with Wempen and Tincup on Blog Talk Radio

    Thanks to William Tincup and Bryan Wempen for having me on. Let’s do it again soon.

    Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

    Discrimination

    Social Media & Workplace Technology

    HR & Employee Relations

    Wage & Hour

    Labor Relations

    Thursday, May 10, 2012

    The FMLA and the honest belief rule: monitoring leave of absence abuse


    Last week, I discussed the bounds of the “honest belief rule” as a defense to a discrimination claim. Yesterday, in Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. [pdf], the 6th Circuit used that same defense to affirm the termination of an employee who claimed retaliation under the FMLA. This case, though, has wider implications for employer who use surveillance to monitor the legitimacy of their employees’ medical leaves.

    Tom Seeger took an approved leave of absence under the FMLA for a herniated lumbar disc. Four days after Seeger’s doctor certified him as completely unable to work—including any light duty, which entitled him to receive paid disability leave under the employer’s policy—two of Seeger’s co-workers saw him walking, seemingly unimpaired, at the Cincinnati Oktoberfest. One of the employees, who knew Seeger was collecting paid disability leave, reported his sighting to CBT’s human resources manager.

    CBT conducted an investigation, which consisted of obtaining sworn statements from the two employees who saw Seeger, reviewing Seeger’s medical records, disability file, and employment history, and consulting with CBT’s internal medical manager. Based on the inconsistency between Seeger’s reported medical condition and his reported behavior at Oktoberfest, CBT terminated Seeger for “disability fraud” (over-reporting his symptoms to avoid light-duty and continue collecting disability payments).

    Relying on the “honest belief rule,” the 6th Circuit concluded that CBT’s termination decision did not violate the FMLA:

    CBT made a “reasonably informed and considered decision” before it terminated him, and Seeger has failed to show that CBT’s decisionmaking process was “unworthy of credence.” … The determinative question is not whether Seeger actually committed fraud, but whether CBT reasonably and honestly believed that he did….

    CBT never disputed that Seeger suffered from a herniated disc…. Seeger’s ability to walk unaided for ten blocks and remain at the crowded festival for ninety minutes understandably raised a red flag for CBT, giving it reason to suspect that Seeger was misrepresenting his medical condition in an attempt to defraud CBT’s paid-leave policy.

    This case has wide implications. There are many laws that entitle employees to take time off from work: FMLA, ADA (disability), PDA (pregnancy), Title VII (religious accommodation), and state workers’ compensation laws, to name a few. Many companies use surveillance to curb leave of absence abuses. I am not suggesting that you surveil every employee who takes leave from your workplace. Without a good faith belief supporting the surveillance, a court could conclude that your actions are unlawful.

    If, however, you have a good faith reason to test the legitimacy of an employee’s leave via surveillance or other monitoring, Seeger's invocation of the honest belief rule will offer you some protection if you misinterpret the results of your investigation.

    Wednesday, May 9, 2012

    I’ll be guesting at Lunch with DriveThruHR, tomorrow at 1 pm


    Tomorrow, I’ll be spending my lunch with DriveThruHR, human resource’s #1 daily radio show. You can listen live at 1 pm EDT at www.drivethruhr.com, which will also archive the show for future listening.

    I’m looking forward to my half-hour with hosts Bryan Wempen and William Tincup, talking about HR and whatever else keeps me up at night with corporate organizations. Questions or comments during the show? You can call in at (347) 996-5600, or tweet using #dthr or @drivethruhr.

    New pregnancy legislation is unneeded; the law already requires accommodation of expecting employees


    On the New York Times’s Motherlode blog, KJ Dell’Antonia discusses her belief that we need another law to protect pregnant women in the workplace:

    Pregnancy is specifically not covered under the Americans With Disabilities Act, which requires that employers provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees who need them to do their jobs…. But to have a healthy pregnancy, women must make adjustments—call them accommodations—for the baby they’re carrying…. Pregnant women are protected by the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act, but protection against discrimination does not require accommodation. Sometimes equal treatment is not enough to allow a woman to stay on the job—and no one benefits from pregnant women being forced to choose between her doctor’s advice and her supervisor’s demands.

    Ms. Dell’Antonia then lends her support to a nascent piece of federal legislation, The Pregnant Workers Fairness Act.

    I take issue with Ms. Dell’Antonia’s central premise that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not require accommodations for pregnant workers. The PDA requires employers to treat pregnant employees the same (no better and no worse) as other employees based on their ability or inability to work. In other words, the law already requires that employers provide the same accommodations for an expectant worker that you do for any un-pregnant employee unable to perform his or her regular job duties.

    Have you ever offered light duty to an employee returning from an injury? Have you ever reassigned job functions to assist an injured worker? Unless you are among the tiniest minority of employers that provides no accommodations for any employees’ medical issues or injuries, then the PDA already requires you to accommodate your employees’ pregnancies.

    We do not need legislation to require an employer to make a reasonable accommodation for pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions. The PDA already implicitly allows for these accommodations. I’m not taking a stand against the rights of pregnant women (which I support). I am, however, taking a stand against duplicative legislation, regardless of the soundness of the policy or the worthiness of the beneficiary.

    Tuesday, May 8, 2012

    Revenge is a dish best never served at all in the workplace


    Section 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint … related to” wages paid or hours worked. It has been over a year since the U.S. Supreme Court held—in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics—that this anti-retaliation provision covers oral complaints. The Court, however, left open the issue of whether an intracompany complaint suffices as protected activity under the FLSA.

    Federal courts are starting to sort out the answer to this important question. And, it doesn’t look good for employers. For example, in Minor v. Bostwick Laboratories, Inc., the notoriously conservative 4th Circuit held that “the remedial purpose of the statute requires that it protect from retaliation employees who file intracompany complaints.”

    The court highlighted some the policy considerations behind this ruling:

    The protection of internal complaints encourages resolution of FLSA violations without resort to drawn-out litigation—and that failure to protect internal complaints may have the perverse result of encouraging employers to fire employees who believe they have been treated illegally before they file a formal complaint.

    While Kasten left open the issue of whether internal complaints suffice as protected activity under the FLSA, lower federal courts are quickly closing this door. Any time you, as an employer, are thinking about exacting revenge on an employee who even arguably engaged in protected activity, think twice, or three times, or as many times as is necessary to dissuade you of your inclination to retaliate. Courts are increasingly resistant to giving free passes to employers who retaliate. If you think you can rely on a legal technicality as a defense (e.g., Kasten), think again. The deck is stacked against you.

    Monday, May 7, 2012

    Stop, thief! Polygraph testing and workplace theft


    The Employee Polygraph Protection Act regulates (and restricts) the use of polygraph tests in the workplace. For example, it prohibits an employer from disclosing to anyone an employee’s polygraph results without the employee’s consent, and also prohibits an employer from taking an adverse action against an employee based on the results of a polygraph.

    Bass v. Wendy’s of Downtown, Inc. (N.D. Ohio 5/1/12) discusses the limits of both of these prohibitions. More importantly, however, this case raises a more practical question about the use of polygraphs in the workplace.

    In 2007, a cash deposit went missing from Wendy’s. As part of its investigation, Wendy's asked Donald Bass to submit to a polygraph examination, which he failed. Despite the failed test, Bass continued to work for Wendy’s as a part-time employee. More than two years later, Wendy’s passed over Bass for a promotion to General Manager. A few months later, it fired him for inappropriately touching a female employee.

    Bass claimed that Wendy’s violated the EPPA by: 1) disclosing the results of his 2007 polygraph to the Ohio Civil Rights Commission in support of its position that the store did not discriminate against him; and 2) relying on the 2007 polygraph to deny him the promotion.

    The court dismissed both claims:

    • The court dismissed the wrongful disclosure claim because Bass could not articulate how he had been damaged by the statement to the OCRC.
    • The court dismissed the failure-to-promote claim because Wendy’s would have denied him the position even if he had not failed the polygraph. 

    Here’s my question. If Bass failed a polygraph in 2007, why was he around years later to grope a female employee and claim discrimination? If you are going to jump through all of the legal hoops necessary to use a polygraph to confirm an employee’s theft, use the results. As this case shows, nothing good comes from retaining an employee who steals from you.

    Friday, May 4, 2012

    WIRTW #224 (the “5 is the magic number” edition)


    On May 9, 2007, I launched the Ohio Employer’s Law Blog. It’s unfathomable to me that I’ve been writing this blog for five years. Thanks to all of my readers for a great half-decade (which I’m celebrating a few days early). Here’s to many, many more.

    Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

    Discrimination

    Social Media & Workplace Technology

    HR & Employee Relations

    Wage & Hour

    Labor Relations

    Thursday, May 3, 2012

    The NLRB’s dangerous course: arbitration waivers and protected concerted activity


    The NLRB has announced the filing of a complaint against 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., claiming that the company’s requirement that its employees submit all employment-related disputes to individual arbitration violated federal labor law.

    According to the NLRB, 24 Hour Fitness, which is non-unionized, requires employees to agree, in writing and as a condition of employment, to forego any rights to collective or class action lawsuits or arbitrations, and instead resolve all employment dispute in single-employee arbitrations. The company permits employees to opt-out of this waiver, but only by submitting a company-drafted written form within 30 days of signing the original waiver.

    Earlier this year—in D. R. Horton, Inc. (currently on appeal)the NLRB held that an employer violated the federal labor law by maintaining, as a condition of employment, a mandatory arbitration agreement that did not allow its employees to file joint, class, or collective employment-related claims in any forum, arbitral or judicial. In 24 Hour Fitness, the Board seeks to extend D. R. Horton to include the 30-day opt-out. As is the case with social media, the NLRB is expanding its attacks on workplace policies in non-unionized workplaces.

    I’ll give NLRB Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon credit—he has taken an agency that had been relegated to near-obsolescence and made it very relevant. Less than 7 percent of private-sector workers belong to a labor union. By shifting its enforcement priorities to issues surrounding protected concerted activity, the NLRB has extended its reach to the 93 percent of non-unionized workers. It has also made itself the go-to agency for employees fired for complaining about work.

    This focus by the Board on protected concerted activity is only going to increase. According to Mr. Solomon’s latest memo [pdf] (discussing his attendance at the Midwinter meeting of the Practice and Procedure Committee of the ABA Labor and Employment Law Section), the NLRB will be adding a page to its website “dedicated to Protected Concerted Activity matters.” In other words, businesses need to prepare themselves for increased knowledge by their employees on these issues, in addition to increased enforcement efforts by the NLRB.

    Mr. Solomon and I will be sharing the dais at the NLRB Region 8 Labor Law conference. I’m kicking the conference off by moderating a panel on social media. Mr. Solomon is the lunch speaker. His topic is titled, The NLRB Today: Maintaining an Even Keel While the Storm Rages. I am very curious to hear how he describes today’s NLRB as an “even keel.” The SS NLRB leans a little too much to the port side for my (and most businesses’)taste.

    Wednesday, May 2, 2012

    $27,000 buys a lot of chalupas: Taco Bell settles religious discrimination lawsuit with EEOC


    Last year, I discussed lawsuit filed by the EEOC agains a North Carolina Taco Bell franchise, claiming that it had failed to accommodate an employee's religion by requiring him to cut his hair.

    Last week, the EEOC announced that it had settled the charge on behalf of the employee:

    According to the lawsuit, Christopher Abbey is a practicing Nazirite who, in accordance with his religious beliefs, has not cut his hair since he was 15 years old.... When Abbey explained that he could not cut his hair because of his religion, the company told Abbey that unless he cut his hair, he could no longer continue to work at its Taco Bell restaurant....
    In addition to monetary damages ($27,000), the two-year consent decree resolving the suit requires Family Foods, Inc. to adopt a formal religious accommodation policy and conduct annual training on Title VII and its prohibition against religious discrimination and retaliation in the workplace....


    Does your workplace have a religious accommodation policy? Do your managers and supervisors know how to accommodate an employee's sincerely held religious beliefs (as long as it does not impose an undue hardship)? Do your managers and supervisors even understand that they have a legal obligation to accommodation employees' religious beliefs?

    If you answer "no" to any of these questions, you should consider this case a reminder of your religious accommodation obligations under Title VII (and similar state laws). Implement a religious accommodation policy. Train your managers and supervisors on what that policy means and how they need to implement it. The EEOC is watching. Taking these two simple steps will help keep you off the agency's bothersome radar.