Friday, November 12, 2010

WIRTW #152 (the Facebook firing edition)


Last week, I wrote about the NLRB’s complaint against a Connecticut company claiming that its social networking policy violated federal labor law. Since then, the story has exploded across the Internet, being picked up by the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, Law.com, the ABA, CNN, ABC News, MSNBC, Fox News, NPR, and cnet, to name a few. The NLRB itself has even gotten in on the act, updating its own Facebook page to publicly discuss the issue (not to pre-decide the case or anything). It’s also been a popular topic across the blogosphere:

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

HR and Employee Relations

Litigation

Technology

Wage & Hour


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, November 11, 2010

Court makes clear that an ADA reasonable accommodation does not require preferential treatment in filling open positions


In Garcia v. Whirlpool Corp. (N.D. Ohio 11/5/10) [pdf], the trial court dismissed a disability discrimination claim because the plaintiff agreed that the individuals hired into the open position for which she sought reassignment as a reasonable accommodation were more qualified.

Here are the facts. Garcia had a 10-year history of shoulder problems relating to workplace injuries suffered on a Whirlpool assembly line. After her third shoulder surgery, which did not correct the problem, her doctor informed her that she had reached maximum medical improvement. Accordingly, she could not return to her assembly line position.

Whirlpool had a job bidding procedure, in which hourly employees, like Garcia, could bid on open positions. Whirlpool’s policy and practice was to hire the most qualified candidate, which it generally considered to be the qualified employee with the most seniority. Garcia expressed interest in and applied for several administrative, salaried, or supervisory positions. Ultimately, all of her applications were unsuccessful. Whirlpool awarded the jobs to employees with prior management experience, prior job-specific experience, or a college degree.

Ultimately, Whirlpool fired Garcia pursuant to its medical leave policy, which allowed for a maximum of two years of leave.

The district court disagreed with Garcia that Whirlpool owed her a transfer to one of the open positions as a reasonable accommodation. While the ADA requires an employer to consider reassignment to a vacant position if the disabled employee cannot be reasonably accommodated in his or her current job, it does not require a promotion as a reasonable accommodation. Thus, because none of the jobs for which Garcia applied were comparable to her assembly line job, and many would have been promotions, she could not prove that she was qualified to work with a reasonable accommodation.

Additionally, Whirlpool was entitled to fill the vacancies by following its internal policy and bidding procedure to hire the most qualified candidates. The court made it clear —at least in the 6th circuit and majority of other circuits—that the ADA does not mandate preferential treatment:

[T]he ADA does not impose a mandatory obligation to reassign the disabled employee where the employer has a policy of awarding the transfer position to the most qualified candidate, and the employer would be required to turn away a superior candidate.

Because Garcia could not contest that the individuals Whirlpool hired were more qualified, her ADA claim failed.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

The 5 most interesting things about GINA


To have Gina, Gina all for my very own
It’s much too wonderful, so very wonderful
To know that Gina is mine alone
 – Gina, Johnny Mathis

Yesterday, the EEOC published the long-awaited regulations to the employment provisions of GINA [pdf], the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. According to the EEOC, GINA has 4 stated purposes:

  1. To prohibit the use of genetic information in employment decisions;
  2. To restrict employers and others from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information;
  3. To require that employers maintain genetic information as a confidential medical record, with strict limits on disclosure; and
  4. To provide remedies for individuals whose genetic information is acquired, used, or disclosed in violation of the Act. 

After taking a day to digest these regulations, here’s what I found to be the 5 most interesting things the regulations provide:

  1. GINA does not just cover employees’ genetic information. It also covers the genetic information of relations as attenuated as great-great-grandparents, great-great-grandchildren, and first cousins once-removed (the children of first cousins).

  2. GINA is intended to be a broad anti-discrimination statute. It not only prohibits discrimination against employees on the basis of genetic information in hiring, firing, compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, but also harassment on the basis of genetic information, and retaliation where an individual opposes any act made unlawful by GINA, files a charge of discrimination or assists another in doing so, or gives testimony in connection with a charge.

  3. GINA’s prohibition against the request of genetic information about an employee or family member includes Internet searches in a way that is likely to result in obtaining genetic information, even if the information is publicly available. However, if an employer “inadvertently learns genetic information from a social media platform which he or she was given permission to access by the creator of the profile at issue” (such as an employee who posts family medical history on his Facebook wall, and his supervisor, with whom he is a Facebook friend, sees it), GINA has not been violated. Employers are similarly protected for genetic information employees inadvertently disclose during casual “water cooler” conversations.

  4. GINA permits employers to obtain genetic information as part of employer-provided health or genetic services, such as voluntary wellness programs. While the regulation do not define “voluntary,” they do provide that employers can offer certain financial incentives to employees without stripping the wellness program of its voluntariness.

  5. GINA requires that employers keep all genetic information confidential, stored in separately maintained confidential medical files, consistent with the medical information storage obligations of the ADA. There is, however, a grandfather provision for genetic information obtained before November 21, 2009. Employers need not strip that information from non-confidential files.

As I noted above, there has been a lot of coverage around the blawgs about these regulations. If you are looking for more information and analysis on GINA’s regulations, I recommend the following:

In the face of these regulations, expect to see genetic discrimination claims as a growing trend in 2011.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, November 9, 2010

Do you know? FMLA & bereavement leave (or, what to do when a supervisors calls an unauthorized leave request “cool”)


The FMLA covers a lot of family emergencies. Death, however, is not one of them. There is no situation in which the FMLA, on its face, provides for a leave of absence for bereavement. Lots of employers allow for bereavement leave for lots of situations, but it is not required by the FMLA.

That is, it is not required by the FMLA unless you promise otherwise. In Murphy v. FedEx National (8th Cir. 8/26/10), an employee sought and received FMLA leave to care for her hospitalized husband. When he died a week later, she took three days’ bereavement leave. Thereafter, she told her supervisor she needed 30 more days to “take care of things.” The supervisor responded, “OK, cool, not a problem, I’ll let HR know.” As it turns out, the extra 30 days was a problem for HR, which denied the request and terminated the employee, who had not returned to work.

The 8th Circuit was not all that sympathetic to FedEx’s claim that Murphy didn’t qualify for FMLA leave. The court focused on the supervisor’s statement, “OK, cool, not a problem, I’ll let HR know.” It concluded that one could easily interpret that statement to be an approval of the request for leave.

This is known as coverage by estoppel. While the FMLA does not cover bereavement leave, an employer’s representation, on which an employee reasonably relies to his or her detriment, will create coverage under the statute. In other words, if an employee, based on all the facts the circumstances, reasonably believes that the employer approved the FMLA leave, the employer cannot deny the leave request.

How do you avoid situations like these from cropping up in your workplace? You cannot require all leave requests be in writing, but there are certain steps you can take.

  1. Train all managers and supervisors on the minutia of your leave policies. Anyone with any authority of any kind over employees must know what leave is authorized and what is not.
  2. Require that all leave requests of any kind go through a designated central person or persons, like an HR manager.
  3. Place a statement in your handbook that only leave granted by that central person or persons is authorized, and that no one else within the company has the authority or discretion to grant a leave of absence of any kind. That way, even if a supervisor tells an employee that leave is “cool,” it will not be reasonable for her to rely on that statement.

Do you want to read more on coverage by estoppel?


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, November 8, 2010

Are businesses cracking down on bandwidth?


I cannot work in silence. I never could, and I likely never will be able to. In high school, I did all my homework with the stereo blaring in my bedroom. In college, I studied in the common area of my dorm, with activity buzzing all around. And in law school, the student lounge was my study area. So, it comes as no surprise to me that I’ve never been able to practice law in silence either. These days, it’s either my iPod, or XM radio streaming through my desktop. The latter, however, is a bandwidth hog. Do the math. If you multiply me times a few dozen employees (or a few hundred, or a few thousand, depending on the size of the organization), it’s no surprise that corporate networks are being strained.

It’s also no surprise that employers are starting to fight back. According to the Silicon Valley Mercury News, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics announced to its employees that it would begin blocking music-streaming sites, online radio stations and gaming sites, and sites that stream sports and entertainment audio or video. Lockheed estimates that these recreational uses consumed up to 10% of its Internet bandwidth.

Decisions such as those taken by Lockheed are difficult ones. It’s often a struggle to balance corporate resources and employee morale. There is no right or wrong answer. You could frame the dilemma simply as “more bandwidth costs more money, ergo, bandwidth restrictions.” Or, you believe that happy employees are more productive employees, and determine that what you spend in extra bandwidth you will recoup in added productivity. Or, you can act like the HR manager in Dilbert and reward serious offenders by promoting them.

Bottom line – businesses need to make decisions about the appropriate allocation and use of bandwidth, and incorporate that decision into a workplace technology policy that sets out the dos and don’ts of workplace Internet use.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, November 5, 2010

WIRTW #151 (the election recap edition)


Here’s my 140-character recap of Tuesday’s election: Obama did not learn from Clinton’s 92 – 94 mistakes. Cost Dems huge. We’ll see if Boehner learned anything from Gingrich’s post-1994 gaffes. Craving a more substantive analysis of the 2010 mid-term elections?

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Employee Relations

Social Networking and Technology

Wage & Hour

Trade Secrets & Competition


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, November 4, 2010

6th Circuit holds that an individual must be disabled to challenge a selection criteria under the ADA (but does it matter?)


Employee use of prescription drugs has been in the news lately. Last week, the New York Times ran a piece discussing the drug testing of employees for prescription medications. The article discussed Dura Automotive Systems, which, over concerns about drug use and worker safety, hired an independent company to administer random drug tests of its employes. It chose to screen for 12 types of drugs, including hydrocodone and oxycodone. Seven Dura employees tested positive for lawful prescription medications and sued following their terminations.

Yesterday, in Bates v. Dura Automotive Systems, Inc. (6th Cir. 11/3/10) [pdf], the 6th Circuit dismissed the claims of any of the plaintiffs who are not disabled under the ADA.

Section 12112(b)(6) of the ADA prohibits discrimination based on qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria. It provides:

No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual [by] using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.

The 6th Circuit concluded that the plain language of the statute barred non-disabled employees from pursuing a claim:

Although non-disabled individuals may bring claims under some provisions of the Act, the plain text of subsection (b)(6) only covers individuals with disabilities. The text of subsection (a) and (b)(6) specifically refers to “qualified individual[s] with disabilit[ies],” and not … a broader class of individuals such as “employees.” … A straightforward reading of this statute compels the conclusion that only a “qualified individual with a disability” is protected from the prohibited form of discrimination described in subsection (b)(6)…. Although other sections of the Act apply to non-disabled individuals, the Act’s primary purpose is to prevent discrimination against disabled individuals…. Interpreting subsection (b)(6) as being limited to individuals with disabilities better gives effect to Congress’s decision not to use the word “employees” in this subsection.

This case may end up being much ado about nothing. Because terminations occurred before Jan. 1, 2009, the 6th Circuit decided this case under the pre-amendment ADA, which had a might tighter definition of “disability.” As I have previously discussed, the ADA Amendments Act expands the definition of “disability” so broadly that virtually every employee with a medical condition could be considered “disabled.” Therefore, future drug testing cases likely will not be decided on the issue of whether the tested employees were “disabled.” Instead, courts will decide future cases on whether the drug testing was job related and consistent with business necessity—an affirmative defense under the ADA. For this reason, it is important for businesses to contemporaneously document the job nexus and business need for all employee drug testing.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, November 3, 2010

Does your social networking policy violate federal labor laws?


It was only a matter of time before the NLRB inserted itself into the intersection of social networking and employment relations. It has Twitter account. Now, it has issued its first complaint challenging an employer’s social networking policy.

The NLRB has issued a complaint against a company that fired an employee after posting negative comments about her supervisor on her personal Facebook page. The Blog of Legal Times reports that the NLRB not only alleges that the employer illegally fired the employee for the posting, but that the company “maintained and enforced an overly broad blogging and Internet posting policy.”

An NLRB investigation found that the Facebook postings were “protected concerted activity,” and that the company’s blogging and Internet posting policy contained unlawful provisions, including one that barred employees from making disparaging remarks when discussing the company or supervisors and another that prohibited employees from depicting the company in any way over the Internet without company permission.

“Such provisions constitute interference with employees in the exercise of their right to engage in protected concerted activity,” the NLRB found.

This case could have far reaching implications for all employers—not just those that are collectively bargained. If the NLRB concludes that a singular posting on a personal website constitutes protected concerted activity, then it will be nearly impossible for an employer to regulate off-the-clock Internet activity. The NLRB will hold a hearing on this case on January 25, 2011. I will be very interested to read the ALJ’s decision.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Reading the tea leaves: Staub v. Proctor Hospital and the “Cat’s Paw”


Before we get into the specifics of the Staub case, let’s first discuss the relationship between a cat’s appendage and employment discrimination law. The “cat's paw” derives from a 17th century fable by French poet Jean de la Fontaine. In “The Money and the Cat,” a monkey tricks a cat into scooping chestnuts out of a fire so that the monkey can eagerly gobble them up, leaving none left for the cat. It generally describes a situation where one is unwittingly manipulated to do another’s bidding. Drawing the parallel between la Fontaine’s fable and discrimination law, one seeks to hold an employer (the cat) liable for the discriminatory animus of an employee who played no role in the decision, but nevertheless exerted some degree of influence (the monkey). As Mike Maslanka put it on his Work Matters blog, the question is what is an employer’s liability “when the guy who pulled the trigger is pure, but the guy who loads the gun is not?”

Thus, the argument in the case is framed like this:

  • Employers argue that federal discrimination laws make the employer liable only for the actions of the employee or supervisor who takes the discriminatory action.
  • Employees,  however, argue that the is enough that the person with the discriminatory animus (the money) played some role in the process, even if the decision maker (the cat) is completely unaware of the animus.

As for the specifics of the case, Staub brought his claim under USERRA, which, among other things, protects those in military service from discrimination upon their return to employment from active duty. Staub had been a long-time employee of Proctor Hospital before being called upon to serve in Iraq. Many at the hospital were critical of Staub’s military service because of the strain it put on those who had to cover from him in his absence. When the Vice President of HR, who held no hostility towards Staub, terminated him, he sued, claiming that although the decision maker was not personally biased against his military service, she fired him based on the hostility of Staub’s direct supervisors.

The 7th Circuit reversed a jury verdict for Staub, holding:

[W]here an employee without formal authority to materially alter the terms and conditions of a plaintiff’s employment nonetheless uses her “singular influence” over an employee who does have such power to harm the plaintiff for racial reasons, the actions of the employee without formal authority are imputed to the employer…. [W]here a decision maker is not wholly dependent on a single source of information, but instead conducts its own investigation into the facts relevant to the decision, the employer is not liable for an employee’s submission of misinformation to the decision maker.

In other words, under the 7th Circuit’s pronouncement of the cat’s paw, the employer can only be liable if the decision maker is only influenced by the animus of the non-decision makers.

Yesterday, the Supreme Court held oral argument [transcript, in pdf] in this case. It’s hard to read Supreme Court Justices at oral argument. Sometimes they play devil’s advocate, and sometimes they genuinely challenge the attorney. Regardless, I found the following question from Justice Breyer (one the Court’s more liberal justices) to the employer’s attorney to be insightful:

You have A and B, they are both supervisors; in the one case B fires the employee because he is in the Army, and he says it: Ha, ha, that’s why I’m doing it. In the second case he fires the employee … for a perfectly good reason, but A has lied about it. And the reason A lied about it was because she wanted to tell him a lie so B would fire the employee, and her reason is because he’s in the Army. Those two situations, the second seems to me one of … 80 million situations, fact-related, that could arise, and I don’t know why we want a special standard for such a situation. Why not just ask the overall question, was this action an action that was -­ in which the bad motive was a motivating factor. Forget psychoanalysis of A. B is good enough -- or vice versa.

I also found insightful the following exchange between Justices Alito and Kennedy and the employee’s attorney:

   Justice Alito: Even -- even if the employer at that time did every -- made every reasonable effort to investigate the validity of all the prior evaluations, still the employer would be on the hook?

   A: Yes. There is nothing in the statute or in the common law that creates a special rule for thorough investigation.

   Justice Kennedy: Well, that's a sweeping rule. I was going to ask a related hypothetical. Suppose the -- the officer who is in charge, charged with the decision to terminate or not to terminate says: I'm going to have a hearing. You can both have counsel. And you have who, is it -- suppose Buck -- suppose the two employees that were allegedly anti-military here testified and they said there was no anti-military bias, and the person is then terminated. Later the employee has evidence that those two were lying. Could he bring an action then?

   A: Yes. Yes.

   Justice Kennedy: That’s sweeping. That's almost an insurer’s liability insofar as the director of employment is concerned…. He has to insure. He has -- he has done everything he can, he has an hearing, and he has almost absolute liability.

Reading the tea leaves, it is likely that the cat’s paw will survive the Supreme Court’s review in a narrow form. I predict that the court will derive a standard that looks to the ultimate decision and the role that the animus of the non-decision maker played in that decision. I also think that the Court will craft an affirmative defense or other means to rebut the inference of the cat’s paw, such as the decision maker's independent investigation of the circumstances leading to the termination.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, November 2, 2010

Do you know? 10 provisions to include in severance and separation agreements


Last week, I wrote about problems in enforcing non-disparagement clauses in separation agreements. It got me to thinking—what other clauses should businesses prioritize for inclusion in separation agreements, other than the release and waiver? Here are my thoughts:
  1. Consideration: A statement that the consideration provided to the employee is more than that to which the employee is otherwise entitled to employment by way of employment. Otherwise, the release and waiver could fail for the employee not receiving anything of value in exchange.
  2. Confidentiality: A covenant as to the confidentiality of the agreement. You do not want other employees learning the terms of the separation, or that agreement was even reached. Otherwise, it could open the floodgates to other employees seeking separation packages.
  3. Secrets: A covenant as to the confidentiality of employer’s confidential and proprietary information.
  4. Return of Property: A covenant that all corporate property has been returned, or will be returned by a date certain.
  5. Transition: A promise to reasonably cooperate with the employer as to the transition of job duties and responsibilities.
  6. No-rehire: A promise that the employee will not apply for any positions in the future, and that the company is not obligated to consider him or her for future employment. Because there is some risk that a clause such as this could be viewed as retaliatory, indemnification language is not a bad idea.
  7. No Liability: A statement that the agreement is not an admission of liability.
  8. Governing law, Jurisdiction, and Venue: An agreement as to the law that will govern the agreement, and the jurisdiction and venue in which one must file any lawsuit regarding a breach of the agreement.
  9. Entire Agreement: An integration clause, stating that the written agreement is the parties’ entire agreement, that no other written or oral agreements exist, and that the parties may only amend the agreement in writing signed by all.
  10. Voluntariness: An acknowledgement that the employee read and understands the agreement, and had sufficient time and an opportunity to consult with his or her own legal advisor prior to signing the agreement.
What else are people including in their separation and severance agreements? Readers, did I miss any?


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, November 1, 2010

You deserve to be told who to vote for today … at McDonald’s


A McDonald’s franchisee in Canton finds itself in trouble this election season for including inside employees’ paychecks a pamphlet urging them to vote Republican. As if an employer’s inclusion of political literature with paychecks isn’t intimidating enough, the note stated, “If the right people are elected, we will be able to continue with raises and benefits at or above the current levels. If others are elected, we will not.”

These actions likely violate a little-known Ohio law that prohibits an employer from influencing the political opinions or votes of employees. O.R.C. § 3599.05 provides:

No employer or his agent or a corporation shall print or authorize to be printed upon any pay envelopes any statements intended or calculated to influence the political action of his or its employees; or post or exhibit in the establishment or anywhere in or about the establishment any posters, placards, or hand bills containing any threat, notice, or information that if any particular candidate is elected or defeated work in the establishment will cease in whole or in part, or other threats expressed or implied, intended to influence the political opinions or votes of his or its employees.

The lesson is simple—keep politics out of the workplace. It’s divisive, makes employees uncomfortable, and, at least in this instance, illegal.

For more on the intersection between election day and the workplace, see Time off to vote on election day.

[Hat tip: The Word on Employment Law with John Phillips and Joe’s HR and Benefits Blog]


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Is it illegal to ask employees to promise not to sign union authorization cards?


1888_vote While the Employee Free Choice Act has stalled in Congress, it does not mean that it is no longer newsworthy. For example, tomorrow, four states (Arizona, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah) will have ballot measures aimed at preventing the EFCA from being implemented on a state level.

For more evidence of the continued relevancy of the debate over the ECFA, consider the case of Regis Corp. The NLRB issued a complaint against Regis as a result of allegations that it asked its employees to sign a document revoking their future right to form a union by using an authorization card. According to Regis, the purpose of the document was to protect the workers’ ability to vote in a secret ballot election. Regis also contends that the agreement was completely voluntary—up to 20% of its workers have refused to sign it and none have been terminated. Yet, five employees complained to the NLRB that they felt their jobs were at risk if they didn’t sign the form, or who said they lost jobs because they questioned it.

Last week, the NLRB issued a complaint against Regis as a result of the secret ballot pledge:

The NLRB today issued a complaint against Minneapolis-based Regis Corporation … alleging it illegally solicited employees to promise in writing that they would not sign union authorization cards in the future.

The complaint also alleges that, in a DVD played to employees across the country, the company’s Chief Executive Officer warned that hair stylists would be blacklisted from the industry if they supported a union. In the recording, he exhorted employees to sign a “Protection of Secret Vote Agreement”, which would prospectively revoke any union authorization cards signed in the future. The complaint further alleges that a district manager threatened employees with job loss if they refused to sign the agreement.

The alleged events occurred in the fall and winter of 2009-2010, at a time when legislation was pending in Congress that would have required employers to recognize a union if a majority of employees signed authorization cards. It has not been enacted.

I have not done the research to conclude whether Regis’s pledge is legal or illegal. But, as this case illustrates, under the current pro-labor NLRB labor practices that come close to the line scrutinized before being put into practice. As the NLRB is currently constituted, this federal agency is a hostile audience for employers accused of anti-union measures. When dealing with labor unions or employee concerted activities, employers should view their measures through the same labor-tinted glasses as will the NLRB.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, October 29, 2010

WIRTW #150 (the sesquicentennial edition)


It’s hard to believe that I’ve been writing these wrap-ups for 150 weeks. When I started this feature on October 12, 2007, I never imagined I’d still be doing it three years later, let alone blogging three years later. Some other milestones from the week of October 12, 2007 (courtesy of Wikipedia):

  • U.S. athlete Marion Jones returns the five medals she won at the Sydney Olympics and accepts a two-year ban from the sport after admitting to her use of a prohibited substance.

  • The general election in the Canadian province of Newfoundland and Labrador gives the Conservative government of Premier Danny Williams an enlarged majority at the expense of the Liberals.

  • Polish police evict about 65 rebellious ex-nuns who had illegally occupied a convent in Kazimierz Dolny, Poland, for more than two years in defiance of a Vatican order.

  • The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention warns consumers not to eat Banquet pot pies or other pot pies made by ConAgra with a printed code ending in C9 due to possible links with a salmonella outbreak.

  • Former U.S. Vice President Al Gore and the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) share the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize.

I’ll let you decide if WIRTW #1 was the most significant event of that week. Next week’s WIRTW #151 marks another milestone—my 1000th post. I promise I’m getting all my self-aggrandizing out of my system this week.

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Social Networking & Workplace Technology

Discrimination

Wage & Hour

Labor Relations

HR & Employee Relations

Litigation


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, October 28, 2010

Best remedy for sick day abuse is a clear policy


In a 2006 episode of The Office, Dwight goes undercover to spy on co-worker Oscar when he suspects sick day abuse. He discovers that Oscar was using his sick day to ice skate. He also nearly discovers Oscar’s closeted homosexuality. I bring this up because, yesterday, careerbuilder.com published its annual list of the most unusual excuses for calling in sick.

The nationwide survey of more than 2,400 employers uncovered that 16% of businesses have fired a worker for missing work without a proven excuse. 29% of employers reported checking up on an employee who called in sick. Of those employers:

  • 70% required a doctor’s note
  • 50% called the employee at home
  • 18% had another worker call the employee
  • 15% (including Dwight Schrute) drove by the employee’s home

Of the more creative (or intriguing, depending on your perspective) excuses given by employees:

  • A chicken attacking an employee’s mom
  • A finger stuck in bowling ball
  • A foot stuck in a garbage disposal
  • One employee even called in sick from a bar at 5 p.m. the prior night.

I suggest that you call a sick day a sick day, and if you want to allow employees to use days off for “mental health days,” call your time off Paid Time Off, and not Sick Leave.

The best way to curb sick day abuses is to clearly spell your business’s expectation in a sick leave policy. What are the legitimate reasons for using a sick day? When is a doctor’s note required? What level of specificity is required? And, most importantly, what are the consequences if an employee is discovered lying about sick leave? According to CareerBuilder’s survey, 60% of employers allow employees to use sick day for mental health days. You may not think an employee’s “mental health day” is that big of a deal. You will reconsider, however, when you face a discrimination lawsuit from an employee terminated for dishonesty and you have to explain when you did not discipline a white employee who lied about his sick days.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, October 27, 2010

Court concludes that “common slang” does not violate non-disparagement clause in severance agreement


I’ve seldom, if ever, negotiated a separation or settled an employment dispute for an employer without insisting that a non-disparagement clause be part of the signed agreement. The reasoning is simple—it’s not in a company’s best interest to have an ex-employee running around bad-mouthing it or trashing its reputation. The reality, however, is that a clause in a contract is only as good as one’s ability to enforce it when breached. In Ohio Education Assn. v. Lopez (10/19/2010) [pdf], one Ohio appellate court has removed a good deal of the bite from this class of clauses in separation and settlement agreements.

The facts of Lopez are straight-forward. In connection with the resignation of its assistant executive director and general counsel, the Ohio Education Association presented Lopez with a severance agreement. The agreement contained the following non-disparagement language, which is similar to that which you will find in most such agreements:

Employee further agrees not to at any time disparage, defame, or otherwise derogate Employer’s Officers, Executive, Committee Members, employees or agents.

OEA sued Lopez for an alleged breach of that clause by leaving the following voicemail for its outside counsel:

Davey, you never call me anymore. This is el jeffe. Call me sometime. I’m all settled with the OEA so you don’t have to worry about this gag order and all this s___ that slimebag Reardon said to you. So call me…. Bye.

The court of appeals concluded that while the voicemail did breach the non-disparagement clause, the breach was immaterial and therefore not actionable:

Here, the purpose of the separation agreement was to end the employment relationship and resolve all disputes. The nondisparagement provision was a negotiated term of the agreement. The provision OEA alleged Lopez breached uses the terms “disparage, defame, or otherwise derogate.” All of these terms connote harming a person’s reputation or causing one to seem inferior. The term “slimebag” is a common slang expression meaning “[a] despicable person, usually a male.” McGraw-Hill Dictionary of American Slang and Colloquial Expressions (4th ed.2006), 323…. This kind of trifling figure of speech is of so little consequence it cannot be said to be material and should be disregarded…. [T]he slang expression is such a part of modern casual speech as to be almost meaningless. OEA could not demonstrate that the message caused any damage to OEA or Reardon.

Because this case requires a showing of actual harm to prove a material breach of a non-disparagement clause, it will make it that much more difficult to enforce these provisions. Nevertheless, they remain an important part of any severance or settlement agreement because: 1) they establish the expectation that ex-employees are to act professionally and business-like when talking about your organization, and 2) protect your business from the malicious speech intended to cause real harm.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

Do you know? The DOL is encouraging employee covert ops in your business


Six months ago, I wrote about the Department of Labor’s Wage & Hour Division’s launch of a one-stop web portal, We Can Help. Its stated purpose is to provide employees with information about their rights under federal wage and hour laws. At the time, I noted my concern that the most prominent part of this website is a section entitled, “How to File a Complaint.”

While trolling the We Can Help website over the weekend (yes, I know, the exciting life of an employment lawyer-cum-blogger), I came across a Work Hours Calendar [pdf]. The calendar encourages employees to track their arrival and leave times, start and stop times, meal breaks, and other breaks on a daily basis. The distinctions drawn between arrival versus start times and stop versus leave times suggests that the DOL is trolling for potential off-the-clock claims against employers. The calendar’s instructions shed some light on the DOL’s other goals, and lends further support to my belief that the DOL is prioritizing off-the-clock claims.

It is recommended that you keep all your pay stubs, information your employer gives you or tells you about your pay rate, how many hours you worked, including overtime, and other information on your employer’s pay practices. This work hours calendar should help you keep as much information as possible.

Employers must pay employees for all the time worked in a workday. “Workday,” in general, means all of the hours between the time an employee begins work and ends work on a particular day. Sometimes the workday extends beyond a worker’s scheduled shift or normal hours, and when this happens the employer is responsible for paying for the extra time. Usually, workers have to be paid for all the time that they work, including:

  • Waiting for repairs to equipment necessary for work
  • Time spent traveling between worksites during the workday
  • Time spent waiting for materials during the workday
  • Breaks less than 20 minutes long
  • Time spent completing unfinished work after a shift

The form ends with the following ominous statement:

You work hard, and you have the right to be paid fairly. It is a serious problem when workers in this country are not being paid every cent they earn. All services are free and confidential, whether you are documented or not. Please remember that your employer cannot terminate you or in any other manner discriminate against you for filing a complaint with WHD.

Still think you can afford to put off that wage and hour audit?


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, October 25, 2010

Court compels production of social networking user names, logins, and passwords, and dispels any notions of personal privacy


As I’ve recently discussed (Discovey of Social Networks in Employment Disputes and More on the Lack of Privacy in Social Media), social networking profiles and posts have become fertile ground for the formal discovery of information about litigants. Last month, one Pennsylvania trial court took this discovery one step further, and ordered the production of a plaintiff’s social networking user names and passwords.

In McMillen v. Hummingbird Speedway, Inc. (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas 9/9/10), the plaintiff filed suit to recover damages for substatial injuries he allegedly sustained during a stock car race. The defendant asked in discovery for the names of any social networking sites to which the plaintiff belonged, along with users names, logins, passwords. The plaintiff objected, claiming that his Facebook and MySpace user names and login information were confidential. The trial court disagreed, and ordered the production: “Where there is an indication that a person’s social network sites contain information relevant to the prosecution or defense of a lawsuit, … access to those sites should be freely granted.” It relied, in part, on Facebook’s terms and conditions, which the court concluded dispelled any notion that information one posts on Facebook is private:

Yet reading their terms and privacy policies should dispel any notion that information one chooses to share, even if only with one friend, will not be disclosed to anybody else…. Facebook users are thus put on notice that regardless of their subjective intentions when sharing information, their communications could nonetheless be disseminated by the friends with whom they share it, or even by Facebook at its discretion. Implicit in those disclaimers, moreover, is that whomever else a user may or may not share certain information with, Facebook’s operators have access to every post….

The court also found that the relevancy of social networking information outweighed the potential of harm from the disclosure of that information.

Furthermore, whatever relational harm may be realized by social network computer site users is undoubtedly outweighed by the benefit of correctly disposing of litigation. As a general matter, a user knows that even if he attempts to communicate privately, his posts may be shared with strangers as a result of his friends’ selected privacy settings. The Court thus sees little or no detriment to allowing that other strangers, i.e., litigants, may become privy to those communications through discovery….

Millions of people join Facebook, MySpace, and other social network sites, and as various news accounts have attested, more than a few use those sites indiscreetly…. When they do and their indiscretions are pertinent to issues raised in a lawsuit in which they have been named, the search for truth should prevail to bright to light relevant information that may not otherwise have been known.

In last Sunday’s New York Times Magazine, Walter Kirn made the following observation about the intersection between social networking and the loss of personal privacy:

As the Internet proves every day, it isn’t some stern and monolithic Big Brother that we have to reckon with as we go about our daily lives, it’s a vast cohort of prankish Little Brothers equipped with devices that Orwell, writing 60 years ago, never dreamed of and who are loyal to no organized authority. The invasion of privacy—of others’ privacy but also our own, as we turn our lenses on ourselves in the quest for attention by any means—has been democratized.

As McMillen illustrates, by choosing to sacrifice our personal privacy through social interactions on social websites, we are also choosing to sacrifice our right to protect those interactions from discovery. 

[Hat tip: Delaware Employment Law Blog]


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Friday, October 22, 2010

WIRTW #149 (the work / family edition)


October is National Work & Family Month. In it’s honor, I bring you three posts I read this week celebrating this cause:

Here’s the rest of what I read this week:

Discrimination

Workplace Technology & Social Networking

Wage & Hour

HR & Employee Relations

Labor Relations

Non-Competes & Trade Secrets


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Thursday, October 21, 2010

EEOC holds public hearing on credit histories and employee selection criteria


Yesterday, the EEOC held a public hearing on the use of credit histories as selection criteria in employment. It heard testimony from representatives of the National Consumer Law Center, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the National Council of Negro Women, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Society of Human Resources Management, in addition to lawyers and psychologists. Following the hearing, the EEOC posted a press release summarizing the testimony. It has also posted the prepared remarks of the people testifying
Kudos to the EEOC for presenting a balanced panel of representatives of both employee interests and business interests, even though it is trying to further an agenda against the use of credit histories in employment. Sara Murray, reporting at the Wall Street Journal, synthesizes the core debate between employee advocates the business advocates on this issue:
The underlying concern is that poor credit could become a barrier to landing a job. Employers contend credit checks help them evaluate candidates and protect against fraud. Another concern is the potential discriminatory impact on hiring…. Opponents of the practice cite studies showing that African-Americans and Latinos tend to have lower credit scores. They also dispute whether credit reports are an accurate way to measure an employee’s qualifications.
Proponents of credit checks, which include fraud examiners and credit-reporting groups as well as employers, contend the histories are an important screening tool for employers and tend to be used sparingly…. Michael Eastman, an executive director at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, told the EEOC that employers take individuals’ circumstances into account. Many at the hearing stressed that employers look for a pattern of careless financial behavior, not one-time events. “It’s very easy for the best, well-intentioned people to have very difficult times,” he said. “Employers recognize that.” Credit checks can also be used as a tool to protect businesses against fraud, supporters argue.
Blanket prohibitions on any practice are usually not a good idea. In this area, there are good reasons to allow the use of credit checks for job candidates. Consider the following, cited during yesterday’s EEOC testimony by Christine Walters of the Society for Human Resource Management and Pamela Devata of Seyfarth Shaw:
  • While 60% of employers use credit checks to vet job candidates, only 7.8% use them for all candidates.
  • Employers generally conduct credit checks when the information is relevant to the particular position: jobs with financial or fiduciary responsibilities (91% of employers), senior executives (46%), and jobs with access to confidential employee information (34%).
  • Employers do not use credit checks to screen out applicants before they can even get in the door. 57% of businesses only initiate credit checks after a contingent offer, and another 30% only after the job interview.
  • Credit checks can help protect against employee theft and fraud. In 44.7% of cases of employee fraud, the perpetrators were experiencing financial difficulties, and in 44.6% of cases they were living beyond their means.
  • According to credit report provider Experian, employers never see credit scores. However, most of the research on the disparities in credit histories between racial groups is based on those scores. It is unfair to hold employers accountable for the scores they never see.
Additionally, it is not as if employees are without protections when employers seek to use credit histories in employment decisions. There is an entire federal statute— the Fair Credit Reporting Act—that provides myriad hoops for employers to jump through before and after using credit information. It also requires that employees give their consent before an employer can even request a credit history. And, Title VII prohibits the discriminatory use of credit histories. To per se prohibit employers from using information that is relevant to many positions simply does not make sense from a business perspective, and HR perspective, or an EEO perspective.

Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Wednesday, October 20, 2010

I wonder if these kids will need extra harassment training when they grow up?


Seen yesterday at AT&T Park, as photographed by The700Level.com:

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Better sign these kids up now for the anti-harassment power course when they enter the workforce.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Tuesday, October 19, 2010

Do you know? Litigating disputes in court does not always make business sense


I believe that litigation is the worst possible way to settle disputes. This may come as a shock, considering that I am a litigator and trial lawyer. Consider, however, that when you decide to litigate, you resolve to pay me six figures for the following: to prepare and respond to discovery requests, produce and review documents, prepare for, take, and defend depositions, draft and respond to motions, and prepare for a trial that has less than a 5% chance of ever occurring. You also resolve to have years of your life and the lives of your employees sucked up by document productions, depositions, reviews of letters, pleadings, and motions, and court appearances. All the while, I’m also dealing with obstreperous opposing counsel (which drives up your cost even more) and an over-taxed court system that likely lacks the time, resources, and manpower your case deserves. In other words, in many cases you are tossing good money after bad. It’s my job to appropriately counsel you so that does not happen.

There are lots of cases that have to be litigated to be resolved. A (small) percentage of them will even need the wisdom of a jury of our peers to conclude. When a plaintiff makes a settlement demand many times in excess of what it will cost you defend the case, litigation makes sense. When the future of your business hinges on an outcome (such as a key employee’s theft of trade secrets), litigation makes sense. When an employee did something horrifically wrong causing the termination, and you cannot in good judgment pay that employee any amount of money, litigation makes sense.

Litigating on principle, though, is not preferred. When ex-employee accuses you of bigotry by suing you for discrimination, your natural inclination is to roll up your sleeves and fight to defend your name. In many cases, that inclination is wrong. You are running a business, and litigation should be treated as a business decision, not an emotional decision. Emotional decisions cost money, and end up as headlines in your local newspaper.

Steve Strauss, writing at USAToday.com, offers businesses this advice: “Not every dispute is a litigation-worthy dispute. Even in the best of cases, you should think that your odds of winning are 50-50. The judge may say yes, or she may say no. The jury may find in your favor, or not. It's 50-50. Of course some suits are better than others, but you just never know what a judge or jury will do.” He is right when he says when you litigate “you are playing with fire and if you are not careful, you will get burned.” Keep these ideas in mind in your next employment dispute. They will lead to a reasoned business decision, not an emotional one.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.

Monday, October 18, 2010

Interesting data in latest litigation trends survey


Law firm Fulbright & Jaworski has released its 6th annual Litigation Trends survey (you can also read my thoughts on the 2009 survey and 2008 survey). This year's survey of 275 U.S. companies of various sizes and industries has some interesting findings:

  • More than 25% of those surveyed expect the number of disputes their companies face to increase in the next 12 months, while only 6% foresee a decrease.
  • 40% of U.S. respondents cite the poor economy as the reason for the expected increase in litigation next year.
  • 49% of respondents had labor and employment litigation pending in 2010, up from 45% in 2009.
  • Yet, employment cases of various types either increased at a slower pace in 2010 as compared to 2009.
These statistics are the opposite of what one would expect in a down economy that is trying to rebound. Race, sex, age, disability, and religious discrimination cases all slowed in 2010. Yet, most respondents expect discrimination cases to increase in 2011. 

It's hard to know what to make of these results. On the one hand, one would expect the pace of employment litigation to pick up in a down economy. On the other hand, it could simply be that the economy, and its effect on jobs, was worse last year than this year. Or, maybe 275 companies is too small of a sample to be truly predictive of what's happening in corporate America. Regardless, it is foreboding that businesses almost unanimously see the pace of litigation either quickening or staying the same in 2011. In other words, I'm sure I'll have plenty to write about in the coming year.


Presented by Kohrman Jackson & Krantz, with offices in Cleveland and Columbus. For more information, contact Jon Hyman, a partner in our Labor & Employment group, at (216) 736-7226 or jth@kjk.com.