WIRTW #51

It's impossible to escape news about the economy. The Connecticut Employment Law Blog lists 5 laws employers should be thinking about in today's economy. Meanwhile, Know HR lists 5 things employers should be telling their employees about their 401(K)s.

I've written previously on the ADA Amendments Act. Overlawyered discusses one attorney's argument that under the new ADA amendments, "being male" might qualify as a protected disability. Let me be the first to say that I'll eat my hat if any court ever says that my maleness qualifies as a disability.

The Delaware Employment Law Blog instructs on the handling of permanent replacement employees during a labor strike.

The Workplace Prof Blog discusses oral argument in a 3rd Circuit case on the issue of gender stereotyping under Title VII versus sexual orientation discrimination. The male plaintiff, who by all accounts acted very effeminate, argued that he was discriminated against because he did not conform to his co-workers' sexual stereotypes. The district court dismissed his sexual harassment claim because discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is not unlawful. The appellate court will decide whether anti-gay discrimination is more based on sexual orientation or gender stereotyping. For my thoughts on this issue, see D.C. Court rules in favor of transgendered job applicant.

Work Matters argues that women should stop taking advantage of their sexuality by making bogus harassment claims to take revenge on men that had jilted them.

George's Employment Blawg talks about the importance of defining the terms of an independent contractor arrangement in a written agreement. I've also written before on this issue.

HRWorld writes on working through cancer.

The Privacy Law Blog reports on a 3rd Circuit decision which held that it was illegal for a labor union to access driver records for union organizing purposes.

Next week we'll celebrate the 1 year anniversary of this column, and announce a new weekly feature that will be joining the blog.

Supreme Court hears oral argument in Crawford v. Nashville - asks whether participating in an investigation equal protected activity

The Supreme Court started its term this week, and wasted no time hearing its first employment case. Yesterday it heard oral argument in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, which is out of the 6th Circuit. Crawford asks if Title VII's anti-retaliation provision protects an employee from being fired because she cooperated with her employer's internal sexual harassment investigation.

Vicki Crawford was terminated after she participated in an internal investigation of a sexual harassment claim made by a co-worker. The 6th Circuit held that her employer had no retaliated against her because participation in a purely internal, in-house investigation, in the absence of any pending EEOC charge, is not a protected activity. The Court reasoned that a contrary result would chill employers' investigations because they would not interview witnesses for fear of potential retaliation liability. Crawford, not surprisingly, has argued the converse, that employees will likely avoid aiding employers with internal investigations if they believe they can be fired for do so, which will chill the investigations.

The Workplace Prof Blog has a thorough analysis of the oral argument. The Justices' questioning seems to indicate that case can go either way. The Justices were clearly bothered by a couple of things. First, the opposition clause would only protect those who take the employee's side, and not those that might support the employer. Practically, this should be a non-issue because those employees that support the employer should not have to fear retaliation. Secondly, the Justices expressed a real fear about opening the floodgates to federal court with a slew of retaliation claims based on purely internal investigations.

It is here that I agree with Professor McCormick from the Workplace Prof Blog. Ultimately, this is a policy driven, and not statutory driven, case. It should come down to whether five of the Justices value protecting the sanctity of internal workplace investigations. It seems that the employee has the better of the argument. Employees already perceive that they can be fired if the company doesn't like what they have to say. As one who's done his fair share of internal investigations, take it from me that it's hard enough as is to get employees to voluntarily cooperate. Assurances of no-retaliation are usually necessary to get them to open up, if at all. A ruling for the employer in this case would make internal investigations all that much harder to conduct. Because internal investigations are essential to our harassment jurisprudence, the Court would be sending the wrong message by coming down on the employer's side in this case.

A call for the reform of ballot measures

It's so nice when labor and business gets together to make a common sense decision for the betterment of all. Last month, Ohio's labor unions and business organizations compromised on the removal of the Healthy Families Act from November's ballot. Now, Colorado's unions and employers have done the same on its four controversial ballot measures.
The Denver Post reports that labor and management have reached an accord that will remove the following four issues from its ballot:

1. Eliminating "at will" employment and requiring private employers to have a "just cause" with supporting documentation before terminating employees.
2. Mandating that all companies with 20 or more employees provide health insurance for workers and dependents.
3. Removing workers compensation's "exclusive remedy" provision, and permitting injured workers to collect workers comp benefits and sue their employer.
4. Holding corporate officials criminally liable for illegal company activities.

Look, these ballot initiatives are scary. In Ohio, one labor organization only needed 250,000 signatures to place the populist, yet very dangerous, Healthy Families Act on the ballot. A system that can be so easily hijacked by special interests looking to push an agenda needs to be fixed. Supposedly, we elect legislators to enact, and a governor to sign or veto, legislation. They are supposed to speak as the collective majority will of the electorate. Yet, the legislature and the governor would have had no say-so if 50% plus 1 voted in favor of the Healthy Families Act.
One possible fix is a super-majority (60%?) to pass a ballot initiative. Another is to require many more signatures than the relatively small number that currently suffices. A third option is to eliminate ballot initiatives altogether. On balance, the super-majority option seems to makes the most sense - it preserves the sanctity of our separation of powers, allows the populace to still have a direct say on issues they it deems to be of great importance, and limits the ability of dangerous laws to play to populist sentiments.
This change is necessary to protect our state's economy from what is coming down the pike in two years when labor unions begin gathering signatures for the next anti-business ballot measures, such as those that were recently removed in Colorado.

Determining the 12-month period for FMLA leave

The FMLA allows eligible employees to take 12 weeks of unpaid leave during any 12-month period. Don't assume, however, that the FMLA's 12-month period equates to a calendar year. In fact, the FMLA allows employers to choose from four different methods of calculating the 12-month period:

1. The calendar year.
2. Any fixed 12-month "leave year," such as a fiscal year, a year
   required by State law, or a year starting on an employee's
   anniversary date.
3. The 12-month period measured forward from the date any
   employee's first FMLA leave begins.
4. A "rolling" 12-month period measured backward from the date an
   employee uses any FMLA leave.

Employers are free to choose any one of these four methods, as long as the choice is applied consistently and uniformly to all employees. Once a company picks one, it cannot change to another without first giving all employees at least 60 days notice, and only if the change does not cause any employees to lose any leave time.

There are pluses and minuses to each of these options. The first two  options are definitely the easiest to administer. However, they could allow for employees' double-dipping. An employee with a serious health condition could take 12 weeks of leave at the end of the year and 12 weeks at the beginning of the following year (provided the employee recertifies the need for the leave). The same 24-week problem could impact option three.

Under option four, each time an employee takes FMLA leave the remaining leave entitlement would equal any balance of the 12 weeks that had not been used during the immediately preceding 12 months. For example, if an employee has taken eight weeks of leave during the past 12 months, an additional four weeks of leave could be taken. If an employee used four weeks beginning February 1, four weeks beginning June 1, and four weeks beginning December 1, the employee would not be entitled to any additional leave until February 1 of the next year. However, beginning on the next February 1, the employee would only be entitled to four weeks of leave, with an additional four to accrue on June 1. and then again on December 1. This method offers employers the most flexibility, but is clearly the most difficult to administer and track.

Importantly, you have to designate one of these options. If an employer fails to do so, a court will apply the option that provides the most beneficial outcome for the employee.

Intermittent leave allows for recertification of the serious health condition each year

Let's say you have an employee who suffers from chronic migraine headaches. She applies and is approved for intermittent FMLA leave on September 24. Your company uses the calendar year to calculate FMLA eligibility benefits. During her period of intermittent leave, her condition worsens and she takes an extended period off, which lasts into the beginning of the next calendar year. Because you assume that FMLA eligibility cannot carry over from one year to the next, you ask the employee to recertify her need for FMLA leave as of January 1. When she fails to do so, you begin counting her absences as unexcused, and ultimately terminate her for excessive absences.

When the inevitable lawsuit is filed, are you correct that FMLA eligibility expires at the end of the FMLA year? Can you require the employee to recertify the need for the leave at the beginning of the next FMLA year, and legally deny further leave if she fails to do so? According to the 6th Circuit in Davis v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co. (9/29/08), the answer is yes:

[A] series of absences, separated by days during which the employee is at work, but all of which are taken for the same medical reason, subject to the same notice, and taken during the same twelve-month period, comprises one period of intermittent leave. That leave, however, can only extend to the end of the twelve-month FMLA period in which it began. Once a new twelve-month FMLA period begins, any additional absences caused by that same chronic condition would constitute a new period of intermittent FMLA leave. Otherwise, there would be no point at which the initial period of intermittent FMLA leave ended and a new period commenced. Under that scenario, employees would never have to reestablish their eligibility for FMLA leave and would therefore be perpetually entitled to twelve weeks of FMLA leave per year based on a single eligibility determination. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Thus, absences caused by the same chronic condition, but occurring in different twelve-month FMLA periods, constitute different periods of FMLA leave. If a company has an employee with a chronic condition that spans two years, it can legally re-determine the employee's FMLA eligibility at the beginning of each leave year, according to the Davis opinion.

This opinion has significant implications on how an employer chooses to calculate the FMLA leave year, an issue we'll look at tomorrow.

New Ohio minimum wage rate

Ohio's minimum wage law calls for the state minimum wage to increase by the annual rate of inflation each January 1. On September 30, the Ohio Department of Commerce announced that the new minimum wage effective 1/1/09 will be $7.30 per hour. Stash this tidbit away for when the calendar turns.

WIRTW #50

Tattoos seem to be hot issue this week. In addition to my post on this topic, The Pennsylvania Labor & Employment Blog, The Word on Employment Law, and The HR Capitalist all provide their own points of view.

Human Resource Executive Online has a nice summary of the various employment law ballot issues around the country. Why should Ohio companies care what is going on in other states? Because it may foreshadow what's next for Ohio.

Do you want to put yourself in the best position possible in litigation? Take the advice of the Manpower Employment Blawg and tell the truth.

The Delaware Employment Law Blog reports on a settlement that cost a company more than $300,000 for the acts of a bullying employee.

In a similar vein, On Point gives its thoughts on a $101,500 verdict in a sexual harassment claim brought by a barmaid for "Animal House"-type behavior at her workplace.

BLR's Daily HR Advisor lists 25 forbidden interview questions. I've previously written on how to avoid hidden interviewing traps.

Law.com discusses the difficulties inherent in trying to discover online data in litigation.

A second opinion on terminating the chronic complainer

There is perhaps nothing scarier to an employer than an at-risk employee who complains about discrimination. Many employees complain because they think it affords them some level of job protection, and many employers become gun shy in pulling the trigger for fear of a retaliation lawsuit.

A couple of months ago, I discussed Butler v. Alabama Dept. of Transportation, which gave employers hope that all is not lost when considering terminating a chronic complainer. Magyar v. Saint Joseph Regional Medical Center (7th Cir. 9/12/08) provided a different take on this issue, and serves as a cautionary tale for companies that want to terminate an employee who complains about discrimination.

Jessica Magyar worked as a hospital scheduler. Two times, a co-worker named Carl, 30 years her senior, sat in her lap and whispered to her that she was "beautiful."  Magyar reported the incidents to her immediate supervisor, Goddard, who then spoke to Carl but did not follow-up with Magyar.

While the harassment temporarily stopped, Magyar feared "that at any moment there might be a third incident." Thus, two months later she went to the Hospital's General Counsel and complained about Goddard's failure to respond to the complaint. Goddard then followed-up with Magyar, who secretly tape recorded the conversation. Approximately a week later, Goddard informed the GC that Magyar's issues "are resolved."

In the meantime, Goddard combined Magyar's job with that of another part-time employee. With the creation of the new position, Magyar received no further work and was eventually terminated. She then sued for retaliation.

The majority opinion found that Magyar's complaint up the chain of command constituted protected activity:

We note that, to succeed on a retaliation claim, Magyar need not prove that the underlying conduct she perceived as sexual harassment actually was serious enough to constitute a Title VII violation. Instead, she need only show that, when instituting her grievance, she had a "sincere and reasonable belief" that she was opposing an unlawful practice.... In this case, the record sufficiently demonstrates that Magyar subjectively felt that she had been sexually harassed.... Having a man old enough to be her father plop into her lap and put his lips to her ear to whisper “you’re beautiful” is the type of occurrence that, if it happened often enough, could constitute sexual harassment, and so Magyar's grievance was objectively reasonable.

In a strong dissent, however, Judge Posner takes the majority to task for missing the distinction between complaining about harassment and complaining about the handling of a complaint of harassment:

Magyar was complaining to the general counsel not of having been sexually harassed (she mentioned the alleged harassment only by way of background, for that grievance had long since been resolved), but of Goddard’s handling of the grievance.

Even more troubling to Judge Posner, however, was that Magyar seemed to be setting up the hospital for a lawsuit:

Shortly after the meeting with Goddard of which Magyar now complains (the meeting in which she revealed the sexual assault), she emailed Goddard saying: "Thank you ... so much for listening and understanding. You made me feel a lot more comfortable when I left. Thanks :)"

The only possible explanation for Magyar's dramatic swerve from being pleased with Goddard's handling of the situation (the smiley-face email) to litigation planning, complete with an illegal secret tape recording, is that she saw that she was about to lose her job. Otherwise the two-month interval between the meeting with Goddard that is the core of her complaint about Goddard's handling of the harassment grievance and the meeting with the general counsel makes no sense.

My friends at the Workplace Prof Blog take Judge Posner's side:

It seems that Judge Posner is correct. Magyar's complaint about the processing of her sexual harassment complaint  is not protected activity under Title VII. An internal investigation is not a practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII. It is rather a complaint about the handling of an internal investigation which is an internal business decision.

I do not think the analysis of this case is so simple. A complaint about the handling of a harassment complaint should count as protected activity. If an employee cannot complaint up the chain of command about a manager's handling of a harassment complaint, there would be little accountability or oversight for how a company adjusts the complaint. The company would always be able to hide behind the "internal business decision" defense and act with impunity towards the employee who takes issue with the harassment investigation. Even more troubling to me is Judge Posner's weighing of the facts on summary judgment. Yes, there are concerns about Magyar's motivation given the timing of her conduct and her surreptitious recording. Yet, aren't these facts that should be weighed and resolved by a jury?

For businesses, the takeaway from this case is that any employee who complains about discrimination or harassment should be treated with extra care. It does not mean that such an employee cannot be terminated. Any such termination, however, must be carefully deliberated and meticulously documents, your attorney should be consulted before reaching a decision, and you should brace yourself for the likely prospect of defending a retaliation lawsuit.

Employment decisions based on tattoos are not discriminatory

Last week I was having lunch in the Tulsa airport, and saw a woman with green hair, a bull ring through her nose, and at least a dozen large tattoos. I turned to my partner and asked, "Who would ever hire her?" Apparently, a lot of employers are asking the same question.

According to last Wednesday's New York Times, courts continue to find policies prohibiting tattoos and body modifications to be nondiscriminatory.

While there is ample evidence of tattooing’s migration from the backwaters of alternative culture into the mainstream (or at least onto some part of David Beckham’s body), we are still a long way from seeing facial tattoos on the selling floor at Bloomingdale’s or the trading floor of the stock exchange.

In case after case, the courts have found on-the-job appearance requirements — including policies forbidding tattoos and body modifications — to be nondiscriminatory.

Among the better publicized cases was that of Kimberly Cloutier, a Massachusetts woman who sued for the right to wear her 11 earrings and eyebrow piercings while at work as a Costco cashier. Claiming membership in the Church of Body Modifications, Ms. Cloutier argued her piercings were a form of religious expression. Although she ultimately lost, her case was soon followed by others in Massachusetts and in Washington State.

There is nothing discriminatory on its face about refusing to hire the green-haired, tattooed, or pierced. It is simply a decision of the type of image that your company wants to project. Of course, it matters that such a policy is applied non-discriminatorily. In other words, a company can't have two standards to visible body art -- one for men and one for women, or one for whites and one for blacks. So, to answer my question, a company should not be liable if it rejects the green-haired airport barfly because of her unique appearance.

Time off for religious holidays

Today is Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New Year. As it falls during the work week, many Jews (including yours truly) are taking the day off. The question, however, is what are an employer's obligations to an employee who asks for a day off to observe a religious holiday?

Title VII requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee whose sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance conflicts with a work requirement, unless doing so would pose an undue hardship. An accommodation would pose an undue hardship if it would cause more than de minimis cost on the operation of the employer's business. Factors relevant to undue hardship may include the type of workplace, the nature of the employee’s duties, the identifiable cost of the accommodation in relation to the size and operating costs of the employer, and the number of employees who will in fact need a particular accommodation.

Scheduling changes, voluntary substitutions, and shift swaps are all common accommodations for employees who need time off from work for a religious practice. It is typically considered an undue hardship to impose these changes on employees involuntarily. However, the reasonable accommodation requirement can often be satisfied without undue hardship where a volunteer with substantially similar qualifications is available to cover, either for a single absence or for an extended period of time.

In other words, permitting Jewish employees a day off for Rosh Hashanah, and next week for Yom Kippur, may impose an undue hardship, depending on the nature of the work performed, the employee's duties, and how many employees will need the time off. Employees can agree to move shifts around to cover for those who need the days off, but employers cannot force such scheduling changes.

In plain English, there might be ways around granting a day or two off for a Jewish employee to observe the High Holidays, but do you want to risk the inevitable lawsuit? For example, it will be difficult to assert that a day off creates an undue hardship if you have a history of permitting days off for medical reasons.

Legalities aside, however, this issue asks a larger question. What kind of employer do you want to be? Do you want to be a company that promotes tolerance or fosters exclusion? The former will help create the type of environment that not only mitigates against religious discrimination, but spills over into the type of behavior that helps prevent unlawful harassment and other liability issues.

D.C. Court rules in favor of transgendered job applicant

Four years ago, the 6th Circuit handed down a landmark decision in Smith v. Salem. In Smith, the Court reversed the district court's dismissal of a Title VII sex discrimination claim brought by a transgendered firefighter. It found that

Sex stereotyping based on a person’s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as “transsexual,” is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity....

Having alleged that his failure to conform to sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave was the driving force behind Defendants’ actions, Smith has sufficiently pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and gender discrimination.

The following year, in Barnes v. Cincinnati, the same court followed suit by affirming a jury verdict in favor of Phillip Barnes, a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual who was denied a job in the Cincinnati Police Department.

Last week, the D.C. District Court, following Smith and Barnes, reached a similar conclusion in Schroer v. Billington. In that case, the Library of Congress had offer a position to David Schroer, until he told his his future employer that he would be showing up at work as Diane. He sued for gender discrimination after the Library rescinded the job offer. The trial judge ruled that the employer is liable for sex discrimination:

The evidence establishes that the Library was enthusiastic about hiring David Schroer -- until she disclosed her transsexuality.... The Library revoked the offer when it learned that a man named David intended to become, legally, culturally, and physically, a woman named Diane. This was discrimination "because of ... sex."

In other words, while transsexuality and transgenderism are not protected classes in and of themselves, men who fail to conform to sexual stereotypes of how men are supposed to look and act might be protected by Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. My concern with this decision is that if gender identity is protected under the umbrella of sex discrimination, why do we need to amend Title VII to specifically include gender identity as a new protected class.

For companies, the lesson to be learned in a universal one - employment decisions should always be made based on legitimate criteria and not innate personal characteristics. The former can always be defended; the latter opens up an organization to liability.

WIRTW #49

It's been a fairly light week, but I still have a few gems to pass along from my fellow bloggers:

The HR Capitalist writes on the bane of every lawyer's and businessperson's spouse, Blackberry addiction.

The Connecticut Employment Law Blog dissects whether there is a right or wrong answer to using social networking sites in employment decisions. For my thoughts on this issue, see Revisiting the Facebooking of job applicants.

HR World reports on Working Mother Magazine's annual list of the 100 best companies for working moms.

Wage & Hour -- Developments & Highlights discusses a case recently filed in the Northern District of Ohio, which seeks to determine whether topless dancers are employees or independent contractors.

BLR's HR Daily Advisor tells us how companies beg to be sued.

Finally, Jottings by an Employer's Lawyer discusses Walmart's ongoing wage and hour problems.

BREAKING NEWS: President Bush signs the ADA Amendments Act

While the Wall Street bailout/rescue plan has the White House preoccupied, President Bush did find time today to sign the ADA Amendments Act. The new provisions go into effect January 1, 2009. For more on what this new law means, see House overwhelmingly votes in favor of ADA Amendments Act of 2008.

Discrimination verdicts rise 70% in one year

Earlier this week I reported that fewer plaintiffs are winning their federal employment cases. Another study, however, suggests that those those are winning are winning bigger verdicts. Mark Toth at the Manpower Employment Blawg reports on a study released by Jury Verdict Research, which concludes that the median discrimination verdicts rose from $147,500 in 2006 to $252,000 in 2007, an astounding 70% increase.

The good news, however, is that employers really are better off in federal court, where they won 43% of the time, compared to only 34% in state court. And, in the cases won by plaintiffs, the median jury award in federal court was 22% lower than the median state jury award.

Is this increase a trend or an anomaly? It's hard to say. 2008 already saw the largest employment law jury verdict in the history of Ohio, $46.6 million. In a today's difficult economy, it is certain that more employment cases will be filed. It will remain to be seen if jurors who are facing their own tough economic times will continue to be generous.

A prediction on how Ohio state courts handle the ADA Amendments Act

It's been fairly well reported, here and elsewhere, that Congress has passed the ADA Amendments Act, and once President Bush signs it, as he is expected to do, the ADA's changes will go into effect on January 1. Beginning on January 1, the definition of what qualifies as a "disability" under the ADA will be much broader statutorily. One of the key changes is that the Sutton v. United Airlines U.S. Supreme Court case, which held that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with reference to the effects of mitigating measures on the impairment, will be expressly overturned.

The open question, however, is what will happen to the definition of "disability" under Ohio law. R.C. 4112.01(A)(13) defines "disability" as:

a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, including the functions of caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working; a record of a physical or mental impairment; or being regarded as having a physical or mental impairment.

This definition mirrors the old definition of "disability" in the ADA, and, in fact, Ohio courts often look to the old federal definition and the cases interpreting it (such as Sutton) to give some meat to the rather bare-bones statutory definition.

The question, then, is what will Ohio courts do with Ohio disability discrimination law after the ADAAA becomes federal law. Will Ohio courts follow Sutton and its progeny, or judicially adopt the new federal statutory definition? To the extent that the Ohio legislature has not changed the statutory definition of a "disability" under R.C. 4112, Ohio courts would be overstepping their bounds by doing so. The Congress made a decision to change the federal definition of disability. If Ohio wants to follow suit, it should do so through its legislature, and not via the courts' ad hoc adoption of the new definition.

If I am correct, and Ohio state law continues to mirror the old federal definition, it will be curious to see if plaintiffs in disability discrimination cases continue to favor state courts (with their better jury pools) and state law (with its more expansive damages), or will move towards federal claims in federal forums to take advantage of the broader coverage afforded by the ADAAA.

A rant about forms

Employment forms are not difficult to find. They are all over the internet. There are form handbooks, form employment applications, form harassment policies, form severance agreements, and myriad other employment and personnel related documents. Many companies even have old forms that an attorney prepared years ago, and dust them off when a situation warrants. Companies rely on these forms to save a few dollars in legal costs. After all, why pay a lawyer several hundred dollars to draft a form for a business when they are available for free? A lawyer must have reviewed it at some point, right? Not necessarily.

Even if a lawyer did review a form at some point, it may not be up to date, it may not have been reviewed for a specific state's particular employment laws, and it certainly was not reviewed for a specific legal situation. Forms are just that, a clean slate that can be adapted to a situation, but not perfect for any or every situation. Each state has specific laws that impact a form's language. Moreover, the law itself is always in flux. New cases come out that give new spins to old laws. New laws are passed that create new legal obligations. How many "form" EEO policies on the internet do you think take into account the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act that was passed in May, or account for Ohio's recent ban on military status discrimination? Do you think a generic employee handbook will take Ohio's smoking ban into consideration?

The point is, it may save a few dollars to use a form without consulting an attorney, but it will cost many dollars more to hire a lawyer to fix a mistake after the fact, especially if the mistake does not come up until a disgruntled employee files a lawsuit.

'Tis better to be in federal court after all

I don't think I'm giving away any state secrets of the defense bar by saying that all told, employers would much rather be in federal court than state court. Federal court gives a better jury pool and a much better chance that a summary judgment motion will be granted. Now, a study commissioned by the American Constitution Society confirms this long held belief. According to the study, which was based on data from 1979 to 2006, plaintiffs who brought employment discrimination suits in federal district courts prevailed only 15 percent of the time, compared to 51 percent for non-employment related cases. Some other key numbers from the study:

• The filing of employment cases in federal court has dropped by 37% from 1999 to 2007.
• The courts of appeals reverse 41% of plaintiffs' victories in employment cases.
• The same courts of appeals only reverse 8.7% of defendants' victories in employment cases.

While comparable state court data is not available, it does not take a huge leap of logic to conclude that federal filings are down 37% because more cases are being filed in state court.

This study is not necessarily groundbreaking news, but it does underscore the importance of forum selection in an employment lawsuit, and the real value to a company to have its case heard in federal court.

[Hat tip: Legal Blog Watch]

WIRTW #48

The news cycle this month has certainly been interesting. I can't recall when 3 huge stories dominated in such rapid succession. We started with Sarah Palin, moved onto Ike, and now we're inundated with economic doom and gloom. I'm starting this week's review with the latter. The Labor and Employment Law blog discusses a recent survey that asked employees what they are most worried about. It makes for an interesting read, and gives companies some insight on what issues are important to their employees.

Of course, the election is always newsworthy these days. COSE Mindspring asks if presidential politics and office politics can co-exist. Rush on Business reports on a summary prepared about the presidential candidates' positions on small business issues.

In light of the upcoming season premier of The Office, That's What She Said reminds employers that now is as good a time as any to review personnel policies.

World of Work reports on a recent 6th Circuit case that I missed, in which the court held that a company's failure to reasonably accommodate an employee's disability supported the employee's constructive discharge claim.

The Manpower Employment Blawg gives 10 great tips for testifying in court or a deposition.

The Delaware Employment Law Blog discusses a topic I touched on yesterday, the inherent dangers in making deductions from employees' paychecks.

Finally, Workplace Privacy Counsel lets us know that web-surfing at work is becoming more acceptable.

A primer on intermittent FMLA leave

Is there anything more frustrating for HR professionals than intermittent leave under the FMLA? While I can't ease that frustration, I can provide short primer on the rules of games that must be followed.

What is intermittent leave and when does it have to be provided?

The FMLA provides that leave may be taken "intermittently" in the following circumstances:

• When medically necessary for planned or unanticipated medical
  treatment of a serious health condition.
• For recovery from treatment of a serious health condition.
• For recovery from a serious health condition.
• To provide care or psychological comfort to an immediate family member with a serious health condition.

Examples of intermittent leave include leave taken on an occasional basis for medical appointments, or leave taken several days at a time spread over a period of six months, such as for chemotherapy.

Treatment by a health care provider is not necessary if the employee or family member is incapacitated or unable to perform the essential functions of the position because of a chronic serious health condition.

Intermittent leave is not available after the birth or placement of a child for adoption or foster care, unless the employer agrees. A pregnant employee, however, is allowed to take leave intermittently for prenatal examinations or for her own condition, such as for periods of severe morning sickness.

May an employer transfer an employee to an "alternative position" to accommodate intermittent leave?

The short answer is yes, if the intermittent leave is foreseeable based on planned medical treatment for the employee or a family member. The alternate position must have equivalent pay and benefits, but not necessarily equivalent duties. The employer may increase the pay and benefits of an existing alternative position to make it equivalent, or may transfer the employee to a part-time job with the same pay and benefits. When the employee no longer needs to continue on leave and is able to return to full-time work, the employee must be placed in the same or equivalent job as the job he/she left when the leave began.

It should go without saying that retaliation is still illegal, and an employer cannot transfer an employee as a means to discourage the taking of intermittent leave.

How is intermittent leave calculated?

Only the amount of leave actually taken may be counted toward
the 12-week FMLA entitlement. For example, a full-time employee working five days a week, one day off would equal 1/5 of a week of FMLA leave.

If an employee works part-time or a variable schedule, the amount of leave is determined  on a pro rata basis by comparing the new schedule with the employee's normal schedule. For example, if an employee who normally works 30 hours per week works only 20 hours a week, the employee's ten hours of leave would constitute one-third of a week of FMLA leave for each week the employee works the new schedule.

If an employee's schedule varies from week to week, a weekly average of the hours worked over the 12 weeks prior to the beginning of the leave period would be used for calculating the employee's normal workweek.

An employer may limit leave increments to the shortest period of time that the employer's payroll system uses to account for absences or use of leave, provided it is at least one hour. Thus, if a payroll system only tracks time in whole days, that company will have to figure out a way to track intermittent leave by the hour.

May an employer deduct hourly amounts from an employee's salary for intermittent leave taken?

Again, the short answer is yes, but with a huge caveat. Any such deductions to the salary of an exempt employee will severely jeopardize that employee's exemption. Companies must take extreme care in making any deductions from the salaries of exempt employees.

UPDATE: House passes ADA Amendment Act; President expected to sign shortly

The Connecticut Employment Law Blog and World of Work have the details.

For my earlier thoughts on these amendments, see House overwhelmingly votes in favor of ADA Amendments Act of 2008.

The Ohio Healthy Families Act is dead, but what's next?

Aside from being key battleground states in the 2008 election, Ohio and Colorado have another similarity, one to which employers in our state should pay attention.

In 2006, both states' voters passed ballot initiatives that amended their respective state constitutions to provide for a higher minimum wage. Why, you might be asking, should Ohio businesses care about what Colorado voters did two year ago? Because both minimum wage ballot initiatives were union-backed, as was the Healthy Families Act, and as are four different measures on Colorado's ballot this fall that should have businesses scared for their lives. According to Business Insurance, Colorado employers are fighting four proposed constitutional amendments on November's ballot that would devastate businesses in that state, by:

• Eliminating "at will" employment and requiring private employers to have a "just cause" with supporting documentation before terminating employees.
• Mandating that all companies with 20 or more employees provide health insurance for workers and dependents.
• Removing workers compensation's "exclusive remedy" provision, and permitting injured workers to collect workers comp benefits and sue their employer.
• Holding corporate officials criminally liable for illegal company activities.

Ohio businesses quickly mobilized against the Healthy Families Act, and should be commended for their efforts to defeat it. Imagine, however, the devastating cumulative effect of no more at-will employment, mandatory health insurance, and private lawsuits for workplace injuries. Companies need to stay vigilant in their efforts to keep Ohio business-friendly, and combat the type of job-killing ballot initiatives that labor organizations are testing in Colorado. Do not think for a second that if one or more of these Colorado initiatives are successful that we won't see some combination of them in 2010.

As long as labor organization can place transparently populist anti-business measures on the ballot via petition drives, we need to be mindful of what is happening in Colorado and fearful that it will come our way in the next election cycle.

Do you need to control employee blogging?

Washington Redskins Tight End Chris Cooley apparently (and accidentally) posted pictures from the team's playbook on his blog. The Washington Post quotes Skins Head Coach Jim Zorn:

It "is quite interesting, I think for all coaches in today's technology-sound world," Zorn said. "At any level, not only the NFL level, but at any level there's MySpace, Facebook, there's blogging. I just think it's something that most coaches have never had to deal with or have dealt with. This will be my first experience. There's no rules, there's no laws.

"I think the rule of thumb that I'm going to have to contend with here is that if you have your own blog, and you're putting photos or you're even saying anything, that nothing really should be put in there that has Redskins playbook [on it]. That goes without saying. I think Chris used a little bit of poor discretion using that type of prop, if you will."

As this story illustrates, you can't always trust good intentioned employees to use good judgment, never mind disgruntled employees who want to harm your business. Coach Zorn says that there are no rules, but that does not have to be the case in your organization.

Companies should consider accounting for employee blogs and other social media in overall technology use policies. Do you want employees to blog at all? If not, say so in a policy. If so, consider implementing clear guidelines employees can follow about what they are and are permitted to say.

I also recommend taking a look at Dan Schwartz's (of the Connecticut Employment Law Blog) five tips for drafting a corporate blogging policy:

1. Employees can be instructed that they should not comment or use any confidential information about the company or discuss internal matters. (Whether the employee should be allowed to identify the employer is a business decision for the company.) 
2. Employees should be told that blogs should be done during non-working hours and not using Company resources, unless authorized by the company.
3. Employees should be told that the blog should have appropriate disclaimers that indicate that all views on the blog are those of the individual and have not been reviewed or approved by the [company].
4. Employees should be told that the blog should not imply sponsorship, endorsement or support by the company, nor should the blog use any logos or trademarks of the company.
5. Employees should be instructed that the blogs should not be libelous or defamatory, and that the blogs should avoid being written in a way in which it could be construed as harassing or discriminatory on the basis of a protected category.

Without some clear guidelines in place, employees don't know what's permissible and what's not, and like Coach Zorn, employers feel like they don't have and rules to fall back on. Common sense simply doesn't always work.

Senate unanimously passes amendments to ADA

Last week, the Senate unanimously passed the ADA Amendments Act (S. 3406). It is similar to the bill the House passed 402-17 earlier this year. Given this widespread bipartisan support, it is likely that we might see the first Democratically-driven employment law changes before President Bush leaves office. By doing so, this President Bush would expand upon the law first enacted by his father in 1990.

The highlights of the bill defines "substantially limits" to mean "materially restricts," it specifies examples of major life activities, and expands upon them to include major bodily functions, and helps employers by exempting from "regarded as" claims transitory or minor impairments that last or are expected to last for 6 months or less.

The biggest changes, though, will come to the definition of "disability" itself. In Sutton v. United Airlines, the Supreme Court held that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with reference to the effects of mitigating measures on the impairment. If this bill becomes law, it will reverse that ruling, and require the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity to be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.

[Hat tip: Workplace Horizons]

A lesson in drafting clear handbook policies

Quality Mold had a handbook policy under which an employee would forfeit unused vacation upon a termination for "gross misconduct." The handbook, however, did not ascribe a definition to "gross misconduct." Quality Mold administered drug tests to its supervisors after receiving a tip from an employee's mother that one supervisor was furnishing drugs to her son. John Lang tested positive for cocaine and marijuana. Quality Mold terminated him and refused to pay him for his unused vacation time, determining that a failed drug test constitutes gross misconduct. In Lang v. Quality Mold (Summit Cty. 9/10/08), the Court of Appeals disagreed:

Quality Mold has argued that "gross" means "[g]laringly, obvious, [or] flagrant." As the magistrate noted, there was no evidence that Mr. Lang distributed illegal drugs to other employees. There was also no evidence that Mr. Lang's drug use had impaired his performance, that he had endangered other workers, that he had any absenteeism or disciplinary problems, or that he had caused harm to Quality Mold's other employees or property. Under these circumstances, this Court concludes that the trial court's finding that Mr. Lang had not committed gross misconduct was supported by the record.

On first blush, this opinion seems to defy common sense. As the concurring opinion points out, "employers and managers of companies unquestionably have an interest in preventing drug use by their employees, as it affects not only the quality of their production but also the safety of their staff and potential consumers." However, as the concurring opinion also points out, "employers also enjoy the prerogative to clearly set forth terms that define the manner in which vacation can be used or retained and the consequences for violation of company policies."

Let this case serve as a cautionary tale -- don't leave policies open to interpretation by a court. If you want drug use, or some other reason, to disqualify an employee from receiving a vacation payout on termination, say so. Don't trust that judges will see things your way when you have to argue an ambiguity after the fact.

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Apparently it's not just Sikhs that Disney World is alleged to discriminate against. The Delaware Employment Law Blog reports on a decision out of the 11th Circuit in which an Asian man's national origin discrimination claim against Disney World was thrown out because he was not qualified to work in Epcot Center's Norwegian restaurant.

Politics continue to dominate the headlines. The Connecticut Employment Law Blog draws some employment law lessons from Barack Obama's "lipstick on a pig" comment from earlier this week.

CCH HR Management presents a nice, neutral summary of the candidates' positions on various workplace issues.

The Word On Employment Law points out an issue that may have fallen under the radar in the EEOC's recent new compliance manual section on religious discrimination in the workplace. Apparently, the EEOC is now taking the position that it is not religious discrimination for employers to hold worship services at work during business hours.

Courtesy of the World of Work comes this shocker -- a retail chain's store manager calling a department head "Grandma" was evidence of age discrimination.

The Philadelphia Business Journal has an insightful piece about current trends in the enforcement of non-competition agreements.

The HR Capitalist makes an excellent point on the allocation of the responsibility for background checks between employers and recruiters.

BLR's HR Daily Advisor debunks some common myths about sexual harassment.

The Workplace Prof Blog discusses a Tennessee Supreme Court decision which held that an employer owed a duty of care to the daughter of a former employee for her asbestos-related death.

Finally, on The Becker-Posner Blog, Gary Becker and Judge Richard Posner have a healthy debate on whether competition between businesses or the law is more effective at fighting discrimination.

If you could ask each Presidential candidate one question...

Dan Schwartz at the Connecticut Employment Law Blog asks, "What one question would you like the debate moderators to ask each of the major party candidates?" Here's mine.

In May 2007, the EEOC published its Enforcement Guidance on Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities. As part of Sen. Obama's plan to strengthen families, he has vowed to protect against caregiver discrimination by committing the government to enforce those EEOC guidelines.

For Sens. Obama and Biden:

Gov. Palin could be a heartbeat away from assuming the presidency. Do you believe that a mother of a child with special needs can effectively balance her job as a mother and being the leader of the free world?

For Sen. McCain and Gov. Palin:

Since Gov. Palin's nomination, your campaign has gotten a lot of traction out of her life story. You have accused the media and the Democratic party of sexism in their treatment of Gov. Palin and her dual role as a politician and mother to a special needs child. In light of Gov. Palin's caregiving role, if elected, will you make the same commitment as Sen. Obama to combat workplace discrimination against people with caregiving responsibilities?

UPDATE: Coincidentally, msnbc.com posted an article this morning about the potential Palin effect on working moms. From the article: "A spokeswoman for the McCain-Palin campaign said she was unable to say at this time what Palin’s position is on federal policies relating to job protections and benefits for working mothers." All the more reason to ask this question.

Every minute counts for FMLA eligibility

A few years ago I had the privilege of arguing the winning side in Ricco v. Potter (6th Cir. 7/27/04). Ricco held that "make-whole relief awarded to an unlawfully terminated employee may include credit toward the hours-of-service requirement contained in the FMLA's definition of 'eligible employee,'" reasoning that "[t]he goal of a make-whole award is to put the employee in the same position that she would have been in had her employer not engaged in the unlawful conduct; this includes giving the employee credit towards the FMLA's hours-of-service requirement for hours that the employee would have worked but for her unlawful termination."

Pirant v. U.S. Postal Service (7th Cir. 9/4/08) illustrates the import of the Ricco holding. the USPS terminated Pirant for attendance violations. She claimed that the USPS violated the FMLA by terminating her for missing work because of an arthritic knee. One part of one day of work proved dispositive to her FMLA claim. On October 5, 2001, Pirant’s supervisor ordered her to clock out two hours early, claiming that she was being insubordinate and not doing her work. Pirant clocked out and went home two hours early. While she complained to a Postal Service Dispute Resolution Specialist, who advised that she could file a formal grievance for restoration of back pay if she still thought she had been wrongfully ordered to clock out two hours early. Pirant, however, never filed a timely grievance. The USPS secured dismissal of her FMLA claim because she had only worked 1249.8 hours in the preceding 12 months. Thus, she was 12 minutes short of the law's requisite 1,250 hours.

This case is a good lesson for companies that something as trivial as a grievance over 2 hours of missed work could end up being very significant. If Pirant had grieved that two-hour suspension and had won, she would have been over the 1,250 hour threshold. In that case, instead of fighting over her eligibility for FMLA leave, the employer would have been fighting over the motivation for her termination, a much harder case. However, because she failed to grieve that suspension, it was a moot point:

Pirant also argues that she should be credited for the two hours she alleges she missed when her supervisor improperly ordered her to clock out early. Citing the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2004), Pirant argues that hours not worked because of a wrongful suspension or discharge count as hours of service for FMLA purposes. Ricco does not help her here....

Here, Pirant was advised of her right to file a formal grievance and request for back pay after the October 5, 2001 clock-out incident. She did not do so—not, at least, until after she was terminated and long after the 15-day regulatory filing period had expired. Nor did she pursue any challenge to the dismissal of her belated grievance as untimely.... By failing to pursue a formal challenge to her suspension, Pirant has accepted that she is not entitled to either compensation or FMLA credit for the lost two hours.

[Hat tip: Workplace Prof Blog]

Are you ready for the return of labor unions?

Statutes are famous for their creative names. For example, did you know that the [USA] Patriot Act is actual short for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act? The Employee Free Choice Act (ECFA) is no exception. After all, in a democracy who's against people having a free choice? If you are an employer of a non-union shop, you best decide that you are against it, and figure out a plan to cope with it if it becomes law.

Under current federal labor law, the tools used to recognize a union as employees' exclusive bargaining representative begin with a employee petition for representation by a union, and in most cases end with a secret ballot election. If more than 30% of employees, but less than a clear majority, sign petition cards requesting representation, the cards are submitted to NLRB to hold a secret ballot election. If more than 50% of employees certify their desire for representation, a union can choose to form based on the cards alone. An employer, however, does not have to recognize the card check petition and can require a secret-ballot vote overseen by the NLRB. Because most, if not all, employers will insist on a secret ballot election if given the opportunity, there are very few unions that end up being certified without an election being held.

The EFCA, however, will change this process by removing the secret ballot election. Under the EFCA, an employer would no longer have the opportunity to demand a secret ballot election. In other words, a majority of cards will be enough to certify a union.

Is there anything less democratic about people not being able to state their opinion via a secret ballot? I can't put it any better than Representative John Kline of Minnesota:

 

This bill has passed the House, but was held up by a filibuster in the Senate. Regardless, President Bush has already gone on record with a promise to veto it if it ever comes in front of him. Unsurprisingly, Barack Obama is in favor of the EFCA, and John McCain is against it. Even if McCain wins in November, this issue will not go away, as Congressional Democrats will continue to aggressively push for its passage.

For now, and even if the EFCA becomes law, the best defense against a labor union is simply being a good place to work. Having competitive wages and benefits, maintaining open lines of communication between employees and management, making personnel decisions for legitimate, non-arbitrary reasons, and fostering a sense of community all go a long way to deterring employees from even considering brining in a union.

What McCain's Sarah Palin decision teaches us about employment law

A lot of ink has been spilled in the last 10 days about John McCain's decision to choose Sarah Palin as his running mate. Much of that ink has focused on Palin's family issues that have come to light and whether McCain's team properly vetted her background. Suffice it to say that I'd like to see companies do more extensive screenings on even their hourly employees then it is believed McCain did on Palin.

Some of that ink has also suggested a sex-based bias in the treatment of Governor Palin as a mom and the role that plays in her ability to effectively perform her job. Some conservative pundits have suggested a bias because no one is questioning Obama's ability to govern and be a father at the same time.

While this debate has a lot to say about sexual stereotypes and the treatment of parents in the workplace, I'd like to use this debate to illustrate another point. On May 21, 2008, President Bush signed into law the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA"). Among other provisions, GINA makes it illegal for employers to discriminate against any employee because of the employee's genetic information, or the genetic information of an employee's family members. While it may seem legitimate to question whether Sarah Palin has the time to take on the Vice Presidency and effectively parent a special needs child, GINA instructs that such considerations are illegal.

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With Ohio's Healthy Families Act officially dead, attention turns to legislation on the federal level. It is safe to say that if Barack Obama is elected President, employment law in this country will see its biggest transformation since perhaps 1964. On the horizon are landmark pieces of legislation, including the federal Healthy Families Act, the Employee Free Choice Act, the ADA Restoration Act, the Civil Rights Act of 2008, and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. The ABA Journal Daily News and Human Resource Executive Online have the details.

Work Matters, a blog I recently discovered, has an interesting take on race in the workplace.

The Business of Management points out that it is generally a bad idea to notify employees about a lay off via email.

The Delaware Employment Law Blog reports on the 10 best excuses for being late to work.

The Evil HR Lady gives some tips on how to handle an employee who frequently skips out of work because of headaches.

The Labor and Employment Law blog lists 8 steps employers should take to comply with HIPAA.

Fair Labor Standards Act Law talks about Kimoto v. McDonald's Corp., in which a California federal court refused to certify a wage and hour class action.

Finally, Workplace Prof Blog gives its opinion on a 3rd Circuit case which held that a Spanish-speaking employee could be bound by an arbitration agreement written in English.

Ohio Chamber of Commerce announces victory on paid sick leave

The Ohio Chamber of Commerce has weighed in on the timely demise of the Healthy Families Act:

The Ohio Chamber of Commerce is pleased the mandated sick leave proposal will be pulled from the November ballot.  We appreciate the courage Governor Ted Strickland exhibited as he worked diligently to protect Ohio’s economy from this extremely costly proposal.  We applaud his leadership and the leadership of Senate President Bill Harris and House Speaker Jon Husted on this issue.  They truly understood how detrimental this mandate would be to our state’s economy and the ability to attract and retain the jobs Ohioans so desperately need.  Ohio employers have always provided good-paying jobs with excellent benefits.  With this issue behind them, they can now get back to the work of growing their businesses and creating jobs.

Meanwhile, SEIU District 1199, the measure's sponsor, has indicated that it pulled the issue from the ballot after Gov. Strickland and Sen. Sherrod Brown pledged their help in enacting the law on a federal scale. In other words, stay tuned in 2009 for the resumption of this battle on Capitol Hill.

Victory (for now): Healthy Families Act to be pulled from ballot

Rumors started circulating early this morning that the Governor finally succeeded in getting the Healthy Families Act pulled from the ballot. Now, we have formal confirmation, courtesy of the Columbus Dispatch:

Ohioans for Healthy Families, the group that backed the paid sick-day amendment, said today that it has asked that the proposal be pulled off the Nov. 4 ballot.

Officials with the Service Employees International Union were holding a press conference this morning with Gov. Ted Strickland and U.S. Sen. Sherrod Brown, D-Ohio, to announce the decision.

Strickland and Brown said they would push for a separate law requiring paid sick days.

The compromise almost certainly will be Sen. Brown pushing for similar legislation in the Senate. If Obama wins the election, it is guaranteed that we will see the Healthy Families Act, in some form, on a national level. More on this to come.

On a personal note, thank you Governor Strickland for standing up for Ohio's businesses and taking a position that might not be popular with your base, but is clearly in the best interest of Ohio.

Now, I have to go find something to do to fill all my time that's been taken up by this issue.

Be careful what you ask for

Non-competes are a curious breed. They are often used, but difficult to enforce. What's the harm in trying, you might ask? If an employee signs a non-competition agreement and goes to work for a competitor, why not roll the dice and see if you can extract your pound of flesh from the former employee and your rival?

U.S. Foodservice v Marzich (N.D. Ohio 9/2/08)* illustrates the dangers. As a result of U.S. Foodservices's attempt to enforce a non-compete agreement against former executives, it is now faced with an Opinion and Order from a federal court that its agreement is invalid as a matter of law:

The breadth of solicitation and confidentiality covenants certainly extend beyond the reach necessary for the protection of Foodservice's business interests and presents an undue hardship on the Former Employees in violation of Maryland's law on restrictive covenants.... The Agreement lacks the narrow tailoring necessary to merely prevent the Former Employees from trading on the goodwill they created while serving Foodservice customers. Rather, the restrictive covenants appear designed to prevent any kind of competition by the Former Employees, which is not a legally protected interest under Maryland law.... While Foodservice has a legitimate interest in protecting its customer relationships, it does not have a legitimate interest in limiting ordinary competition. By prohibiting the Former Employees from soliciting business, "directly or indirectly" from any "Persons" in the universe of "Customers" who have ever made "contact" with Foodservice, "whether or not these [contacts] resulted in sales," the Agreement prohibits the Former Employees from engaging in conduct that could only reasonably be construed as ordinary competition.

If the company cannot enforce a non-compete against former executives, who can it enforce it against? A national company with more than 27,000 employees is now faced with the prospect of having an agreement that it can never enforce against anyone. For current employees, it will have to go back to the drawing board. For former employees, in the words of one of my former law professors, it's too bad, so sad, hard cheese.

This case certainly gives companies something to consider the next time an employee goes to work for a competitor.

*Full disclosure: KJK represents the defendants.

Q&A on applying performance and conduct standards to employees with disabilities

It is an oversimplification to simply say that employers should hold disabled employees to the same conduct standards as non-disabled employees. Certain conditions may require modifications of conduct and performance standards as a reasonable accommodation to enable an employee to perform the essential functions of the job adequately. To clarify these issues, the EEOC has published a comprehensive Q&A on Applying Performance and Conduct Standards to Employees with Disabilities.

According to the EEOC:

Although, an employee’s disability typically has no bearing on performance or conduct, sometimes an individual's disability may contribute to performance or conduct problems. When this is the case, a simple reasonable accommodation often may be all that is needed to eliminate the problem. However, EEOC continues to receive questions from both employers and employees about issues such as what steps are appropriate where a disability is causing – or seems to be causing – a performance or conduct problem, when a request for accommodation should be made, and when an employer can properly raise the issue of an employee’s disability as part of a discussion about performance or conduct problems. Even when the disability is not causing the performance or conduct problem, some employers still have questions about what action they can take in light of concerns about potential ADA violations.

The Q&A covers topics such as:

• Seeking medical information when there are performance or conduct problems
• Attendance issues
• Dress codes
• Alcoholism and illegal use of drugs
• Confidentiality issues arising from granting reasonable accommodation to avoid performance or conduct problems

It's a must read for any company dealing with a disabled employee who is not meeting standards or who is having conduct or discipline problems potentially attributable to a disability.

Sometimes the little things go a long way

Often times, we forget that the law is a floor and not a ceiling. For example, just because the FMLA caps unpaid leave at 12 weeks does not mean that every employee who cannot return to work at the end of 12 weeks should be terminated (in fact, the ADA may require otherwise).

De la Rama v. Illinois Dept. of Human Servs. (7th Cir. 9/2/02) illustrates this point. De la Rama called in sick from July 19, 2004 through August 19, 2004. Although she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia in early August, she did not tell her employer until much later. Instead, she continued to call in sick without explaining the nature of her illness. Ultimately, in October she submitted a medical certification and requested for a leave of absence, for which the employer granted FMLA leave. De la Rama was out on unpaid FMLA leave for 17 weeks, and upon her return assigned to a different unit under a new supervisor at her request. Her absences in July and August, however, were treated as unauthorized.

She sued, claiming that the classification of her July and August absences as unauthorized interfered with her rights under the FMLA. The court disagreed:

[I]n light of the fact that de la Rama was permitted to take seventeen weeks of leave—five weeks more than the twelve weeks the Department was required to give her under the FMLA—we find it difficult to see how the Department interfered with her entitlement to leave at all.

The employer's generosity in giving de la Rama the leave she needed once she documented her need was very persuasive to the court in deciding whether its designation of her prior leave as "unauthorized" violated the FMLA. In other words, its willingness to go above and beyond for an employee demonstrated that it did not harbor an intent to violate the Act. Keep this in mind the next time you are faced with the prospect of terminating an employee at the end of the 12th week of leave, or extending the leave for a few extra weeks to allow the employee to return to work.

Employer's failure to provide written notice does not save employee who failed to return to work following FMLA leave

Under the FMLA, an employer must provide an employee taking FMLA leave "with written notice detailing the specific expectations and obligations of the employee and explaining any consequences of a failure to meet these obligations." 29 CFR 825.301(b)(1). In fact, the Department of Labor provides a convenient form for employers use. Among other items, the notice must provide whether the employer will require the employee to "present a fitness-for-duty certificate to be restored to employment." 29 CFR 825.301(b)(1)(v). If an employer fails to provide the required notice, "the employer may not take action against an employee for failure to comply with any provision required to be set forth in the notice." 29 CFR 825.301(f).

Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place (6th Cir. 8/29/08) answers the question of what happens if an employee mistakenly assumes that a fitness-for-duty certificate is required before she can return to work. When Sonia Tucker started her FMLA leave, she claims that her employer did not provide her with the written notice required by 825.301(b)(1). She also claimed that while she was cleared to return to work on January 17, 2007, she failed to do so because she believed her employer required a fitness- for-duty certificate. When she failed to show up for work on January 17, the employer fired her for job abandonment.

The Court held that even if the employer failed in its obligation to provide Tucker with the required written notice, her FMLA claim warranted dismissal because she did not claim that the fitness-for-duty certification was an actual requirement:

Plaintiff has further failed to allege she was terminated for failing to present the fitness-for-duty certificate. In ¶ 12 of her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, “defendants unlawfully terminated plaintiff from her employment for alleged job abandonment.” (Emphasis added). She does not allege her employment was terminated for failure to provide a fitness-for duty certificate. Plaintiff clearly alleges she “had been initially cleared to return to work from her medical leave on January 17, 2007.” (Amended Complaint at ¶ 9). She did not return to work on that date. Rather, she went to her physician on that day to be examined and to obtain a fitness-for-duty certificate. (Amended Complaint at ¶ 11). Nowhere does Plaintiff indicate she advised Defendants of the doctor’s appointment, or otherwise communicated with Defendants on the date of her scheduled return. As the Magistrate Judge noted, the provision in 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(f), barring employer action against an employee for failure to present a fitness-for-duty certificate “is only triggered if the employer actually required the employee to present a fitness-for-duty certificate.” (Emphasis added).

Typically, ambiguous employment policies do not help an employer. In this case, however, the ambiguity was fatal to the employee's claim. Because the employer did not tell the employee, in writing, that a fitness-for-duty certificate was required, the court overlooked its failure to tell the employee that the certificate was not required.

Despite this decision, it is not a real good idea for companies to ignore their obligations under 825.301(b)(1) to provide written notice to employees taking FMLA leave. Much more often than not, that failure will invoke 825.301(f)'s protections, and an employer will not be able to fire an employee who fails to meet some other FMLA obligation (such as returning to work).

Happy Labor Day

Like most, I'm happily taking this Labor Day off. If you're looking for something to read, hop over to the Connecticut Employment Law Blog, where Dan Schwartz gives us a brief history of this holiday.

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Lawsuits come in all shapes, sizes, and levels of intrigue. One lawsuit filed this week in federal court in Connecticut is high on the latter -- check out the Connecticut Employment Law Blog's post on Scott Levy, et al. v. World Wrestling Entertainment. Scott Levy, who wrestles under the name "Raven", claims that the WWE mis-classified him and other similarly situated current and former WWE performers as independent contractors. Levy claims that he is owed compensation as a result of being an employee of the WWE. While the Complaint is vague, one would presume that at least some of the compensation owed is for unpaid overtime. We should continue to keep on this case, as the WWE and Vince McMahon are known for being aggressive litigants.

The Delaware Employment Law Blog continues the wage and hour theme by giving a good primer on the FLSA's executive exemption.

Fair Labor Standards Act Law rounds out this week's wage and hour posts by reporting on a case in which the court held that an employee's ability to work overtime was an essential function of her job, thereby dooming her disability discrimination claim.

Workplace Horizons gives detail on a potentially significant trial in which a transgender Plaintiff alleges that the Library of Congress engaged in sex discrimination in violation of Title VII by refusing to hire her. This case is being tried after the district court ruled that Title VII is broad enough to cover transgender persons under its provision banning discrimination based on sex. On the flip side, Dan Schwartz at the Connecticut Employment Law Blog reports on an opposite outcome in a case filed in federal court in Connecticut.

The FMLA Blog digests a case in which the court held that discouraging the use of FMLA leave can violate the FMLA even if the employer ultimately grants the leave.

Labor and Employment Law Blog has a top-5 list of  workplace privacy tips for employers.

Nolo’s Employment Law Blog bashes companies that use surveillance on employees taking FMLA leave. Linked are my thoughts on the Vail v. Reybestos case.

Finally, Rush on Business reminds us that honesty really is the best policy in business dealings.

LPGA Tour implements English proficiency requirement

From this morning's USA Today:

The LPGA tour will use the next four months to create evaluation procedures for its new policy requiring its member golfers to speak English or face suspension.

All players who have been on the tour for two years could be suspended if they fail to pass an oral evaluation of their English proficiency starting at the end of the 2009 season.

The evaluation will assess communication skills, including conversation. Players will be required to conduct interviews, interact with pro-am partners and fans and give acceptance speeches in English and without the help of an interpreter, according to LPGA deputy commissioner Libba Galloway.

"For an athlete to be successful in the sport-entertainment business we live in today, they need to perform on and off the field of play, and communicating effectively is a big part of that," Galloway said "We are a U.S.-based tour, and the majority of our pro-am players, our fans, our sponsors speak English."

I've written before about the legality of English-only rules. Generally, courts uphold English-only rules if the employer can show a legitimate business justification for the requirement. Examples include:

• Curbing employee hostilities.
• Promoting communication with customers, coworkers, or supervisors who only speak English.
• Enabling employees to speak a common language to promote safety or enable cooperative work assignments.
• Facilitating a supervisor's ability monitor the performance of an employee.
• Furthering interpersonal relations among employees.

The LPGA's rule is not a ban on the use of foreign languages, but, as the press has been reporting it, a requirement that its members are proficient in English. Thus, it is less onerous than a prohibition on the use of one's native language. Nevertheless, pundits are already decrying this proposal and opining on its illegality.

Let's look at the LPGA's rationale for this rule. 18 of this year's 23 LPGA tournaments have been won by players for whom English is not their native language, including all four of this year's majors. 45 of the 120 players on tour are South Korean, seven of which in the top 20. The LPGA has made the decision that to grow its sport in its home country, its stars need to be able to communicate effectively with the media. The LPGA is not requiring its members only speak English, but that they are able to communicate in English when the need arises (such as in press conferences or pro-am events). Because of this legitimate business purpose, the LPGA's proposed rule should pass muster under Title VII.