Ohio appellate court puts age discrimination statute of limitations in doubt

Ohio's age discrimination statute of limitations has always been one of the quirks of Ohio employment law. All discrimination claims under R.C. Chapter 4112 have a six-year statute of limitations, except for age claims. Until recently, it has been well established that an age claim brought under R.C. 4112.99 had a 180-day statute of limitations. Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., decided last month by the Hamilton County Court of Appeals, rejects that longstanding conventional wisdom, and holds that plaintiffs have six years to bring such age claims.

One can bring an action for age discrimination under four different provisions within R.C. Chapter 4112:

• First, R.C. 4112.02(N) prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of age and provides for "any legal or equitable relief that will effectuate the individual's rights." An age-discrimination claim under this statute must be brought within 180 days of the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice.
• Second, R.C. 4112.14(B) provides a remedy for age-based discrimination in the hiring and termination of employees "which shall include reimbursement to the applicant or employee for the costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, of the action, or to reinstate the employee in the employee's former position with compensation for lost wages and any lost fringe benefits from the date of the illegal discharge and to reimburse the employee for the costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, of the action." A six-year statute of limitations applies to these claims.
• Third, R.C. 4112.99 provides an independent civil action to seek redress for any form of discrimination identified in R.C. Chapter 4112. The statute makes violators of R.C. Chapter 4112 "subject to a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief."
• Finally and alternatively, a plaintiff may file a charge administratively with the OCRC under R.C. 4112.05., but such a filing acts as an absolute bar to instituting a civil action in court.

When filing an age claim, one must elect which statute one is filing under.

At least as far back as the Ohio Supreme Court decided Bellian v. Bicron Corp. in 1994, it has been well established that an age claim under R.C. 4112.99 is subject to the 180-day statute of limitations in R.C. 4112.02(N). See Oker v. Ameritech Corp. ("An age-discrimination claim brought pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4112 must be initiated within the one-hundred-eighty-day statute of limitations period set forth in former R.C. 4112.02(N)."); McNeely v. Ross Correctional Inst. ("Whether an age discrimination claim is premised on R.C. 4112.02 or 4112.99, a plaintiff must file the claim within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act.").

The Hamilton County Court of Appeals, however, has put this conventional wisdom in doubt. In Meyer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., that court concluded that because R.C. 4112.99 provides an independent cause of action, it is separate from R.C. 4112.02(N), and therefore subject to the same six-year statute of limitations as other claims brought under R.C. 4112.99. The Court based its rationale on the recent Ohio Supreme Court decision in Leininger v. Pioneer National Latex holding that Ohio does not recognize a common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge based on the public policy against age discrimination:

Recently, in Leininger v. Pioneer National Latex, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio does not recognize a common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge based on the public policy against age discrimination, "because the remedies in R.C. Chapter 4112 provide complete relief for a statutory claim for age discrimination." In reaching its holding, the court reiterated its prior holding that had rejected the argument that the specific-remedies provisions of subsections within the chapter prevail over the more general provisions of R.C. 4112.99. The court noted that "R.C. 4112.08 requires a liberal construction of R.C. Chapter 4112. Although R.C. 4112.02(N), 4112.08, and 4112.14(B) all require a plaintiff to elect under which statute (R.C. 4112.02, 4112.05, or 4112.14) a claim for age discrimination will be pursued, when an age discrimination claim accrues, a plaintiff may choose from the full spectrum of remedies available. Leininger's argument also does not take into account the scope of R.C. 4112.99's remedies. In Elek v. Huntington Natl. Bank (1991), 60 Ohio St. 3d 135, 573 N.E.2d 1056, we stated that R.C. 4112.99 provides an independent civil action to seek redress for any form of discrimination identified in the chapter. Id. at 136. A violation of R.C. 4112.14 (formerly R.C. 4101.17), therefore, can also support a claim for damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief under R.C. 4112.99. This fourth avenue of relief is not subject to the election of remedies."

Meyer's logic is a tortured reading of Leininger, which expressly found that R.C. 4112.02(N) and R.C. 4112.99 are subject to the same statute of limitations for age claims:

Although R.C. 4112.14 was the only statutory claim available to Leininger at the time she filed her complaint due to the expiration of the statute of limitations for claims under R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.05, this fact does not justify limiting our examination of the available remedies under the chapter as a whole. In determining whether a common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge based on Ohio's public policy against age discrimination should be recognized, we need to look at all the remedies available to a plaintiff at the time the claim accrued.

There is certainly some appeal to the argument that it does not make any sense that age claims and all other discrimination claims have different statutes of limitations. On the other hand, R.C. Chapter 4112 has three distinct remedial statutes for age discrimination, more than any other type of discrimination. The point is that if we are going to change the statute of limitations, it should be done by the legislature, and not by an appellate court diverging from 14 years of precedent. To again quote the Leininger decision: "Leininger contends that the short statute of limitations of R.C. 4112.02 ... detracts from the remedial scheme of R.C. Chapter 4112. The period within which a claim must be brought, however, is a policy decision best left to the General Assembly."

The Meyer case is most likely an anomaly. Regardless, if you are practicing in Hamilton County, you should be aware that employees have six-years to file their age claims in that court. This issues bears watching to see if any other appellate districts follow suit, or if the Supreme Court takes up this issue to resolve this recent divergence of opinion.