The dissent argues that Zajc's claim is nothing more than a back door whistleblower claim, that there is no evidence that Zajc complained about any safety concerns, and that even if he did, he failed to comply with the mandatory prerequisites of the Whistleblower Act. In the words of the dissenting Judge Gallagher:
Absent facts demonstrating a clear safety concern, I do not find any clear public policy expressed in the above statutes that would be jeopardized by the termination of an employee who disagrees with his employer about whether a part is nonconforming or defective and then disobeys instructions to ship the goods.... In this case, Zajc is asking us to find a clear public policy that an employer cannot discharge an employee who disagrees about the quality of parts and refuses to ship the parts without any showing that public safety is being endangered. I do not believe that Zajc has shown that the narrow public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine should be extended to the limited facts of this case.
Those who are regular readers of this blog will not be surprised that I think the dissent has the better of the argument. The tougher question is how to interpret the implications of this decision. For the past several years, we've seen a tightening of the public policies that will support a wrongful discharge claim. The Zajc case, though, seems to open up a can of worms by permitting employees to shoehorn a termination into a tangentially implicated statute. For employers, the bottom line is to make employment decisions based on legitimate, non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory business reasons. Companies should never fail to take a legitimate employment action out of a fear of being sued. Cases like Zajc, however, certainly inject a little more uncertainty into the process for companies and for the lawyers advise them.
A copy of Zajc v. Hycomp, Inc. is available for download here.